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Digital information communication technologies (DICTs) play an ever-more prominent role in politics, from
the technologically sophisticated presidential campaign of Barack Obama to the Twitter-inspired Occupy Wall
Street movement. However, not all political groups embrace technology to the same degree. Little scholarly
attention has been paid to understanding why some groups adopt DICTs and use them to achieve political
goals, while others do not. This dissertation attempts to remedy this by examining what drives DICT adoption
among 48 organizations involved in advocacy activities in support of and in opposition to gay rights and
marriage equality. It further contributes to the literature on DICTs and politics by considering the role of
national context in DICT adoption, selecting organizations based in the United States, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom, and comparing patterns of DICT adoption cross-nationally. Several important findings emerge
from this research. First, there is significant variation in the extent to which the 48 organizations under study
adopted DICTs. There appears to be no relationship between organizational ideology and an organization's
tendency to adopt DICTs, nor do the characteristics of the organizations' staff or target publics appear to
influence their adoption of DICTs, although this does seem to affect the extent to which they deploy offline
tools. The paper finds that first-mover advantage plays a key role in DICT adoption, with laggards finding it
hard to build online momentum. Further, the amount of resources an organization is able to deploy strongly
affects their ability to adopt DICTs. A number of national factors also appear to play a role in DICT adoption,
particularly the competitiveness of the issue that organizations are engaged with, and the political traditions of
the nation in which organizations are domiciled. Overall, this paper finds that the adoption of DICTs is a
complex process, born of an interaction between an organization and its characteristics, and the environment
in which it operates. The dissertation concludes by offering a model of this process, suggesting that it could
help organizations build better strategies for DICT adoption, particularly when circumstances are challenging.
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ABSTRACT 
 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND DIGITAL INFORMATION COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES: THE SEARCH FOR EXPLANATORY MODELS OF SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS’ PROPENSITY TO USE DICTS IN DEVELOPED 
DEMOCRACIES  
 
Felicity Duncan 
 
Michael X Delli Carpini 
Monroe Price 
 
Digital information communication technologies (DICTs) play an ever-more prominent 
role in politics, from the technologically sophisticated presidential campaign of Barack 
Obama to the Twitter-inspired Occupy Wall Street movement. However, not all political 
groups embrace technology to the same degree. Little scholarly attention has been paid 
to understanding why some groups adopt DICTs and use them to achieve political goals, 
while others do not. This dissertation attempts to remedy this by examining what drives 
DICT adoption among 48 organizations involved in advocacy activities in support of and 
in opposition to gay rights and marriage equality. It further contributes to the literature 
on DICTs and politics by considering the role of national context in DICT adoption, 
selecting organizations based in the United States, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, and 
comparing patterns of DICT adoption cross-nationally. Several important findings 
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emerge from this research. First, there is significant variation in the extent to which the 
48 organizations under study adopted DICTs. There appears to be no relationship 
between organizational ideology and an organization’s tendency to adopt DICTs, nor do 
the characteristics of the organizations’ staff or target publics appear to influence their 
adoption of DICTs, although this does seem to affect the extent to which they deploy 
offline tools. The paper finds that first-mover advantage plays a key role in DICT 
adoption, with laggards finding it hard to build online momentum. Further, the amount of 
resources an organization is able to deploy strongly affects their ability to adopt DICTs. 
A number of national factors also appear to play a role in DICT adoption, particularly 
the competitiveness of the issue that organizations are engaged with, and the political 
traditions of the nation in which organizations are domiciled. Overall, this paper finds 
that the adoption of DICTs is a complex process, born of an interaction between an 
organization and its characteristics, and the environment in which it operates. The 
dissertation concludes by offering a model of this process, suggesting that it could help 
organizations build better strategies for DICT adoption, particularly when circumstances 
are challenging. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010 a wave of protests convulsed the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
facilitated by the use of new digital information communication technologies (DICTs) 
such as mobile phones (Baron, 2012; Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Harb, 2011; Khondker, 
2011; Sabadello, 2011; Skinner, 2011; Stepanova, 2011). A year later “Occupy Wall 
Street” protestors coordinated a seemingly leaderless global campaign against 
contemporary capitalist arrangements using digital tools such as Twitter and Facebook to 
spread messages, share logistical information, and mobilize thousands of people in 
dozens of cities worldwide (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris, 
2012; Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & Albacete, n.d.).  
As these two examples illustrate, DICTS are playing an increasingly prominent, if 
still not fully understood role in collective action and social movement politics.1 
However, not all social movements engage in the same practices, use the same tools, or 
even rely on the internet and DICTs to the same extent. My own research among Tea 
Party groups in the United States, for example, found that they did not deploy Web 2.0 
tools to organize, instead focusing their recruitment and mobilization efforts on personal 
networks, using the “mundane internet tool” (Nielsen, 2011) of e-mail newsletters and e-
mail lists to communicate, but also relying on the telephone and regular face-to-face 
                                                           
1
 DICTS are also changing the landscape of more “routine” periods of contention within 
institutionalized politics such as elections. For example, in 2012 the Obama campaign again 
raised the bar for online electoral campaigning through the use of such things as a dedicated 
social networking site, an iPhone application that allowed individuals to act as one-person phone 
banks, an endless stream of online video, and a data mining operation that tapped dozens of 
databases and online information traces and used sophisticated modeling to identify and reach 
prospective voters, supporters, and volunteers (Ghani, 2013; Davidsen, 2013; Kreiss, 2012). 
However, while distinguishing institutionalized politics such as elections from social movements 
can be increasingly analytically and conceptually difficult (Chadwick, 2007; Masket, Heaney, 
Miller, & Strolovich, 2009), my focus in this dissertation will be on the latter. 
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meetings. Karpf (2009, 2012) has documented a substantial and sustained gap between 
the use of the internet, data, and Web 2.0 tools by tech-savvy progressive organizers and 
activists and that of their lagging conservative counterparts in the United States. And, as I 
will detail in my literature review, many studies document variation in the use of the 
internet among social movements of different stripes in other countries. However, as I 
will demonstrate, to date there has been relatively little scholarly attention paid to 
systematically identifying factors that may explain variations in the use of DICTS among 
such movements, and there has been little attempt to identify variables that hold 
explanatory power across different national contexts.  
My dissertation contributes to the literature by comparatively examining 
similarities and differences in the use of DICTS by social movement advocacy 
organizations in three developed democracies; specifically groups organized in support of 
or in opposition to gay rights and marriage equality in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland. I am interested in understanding the extent to which variation in 
the adoption of digital tools is associated with the characteristics of the actors, including 
their ideology, the demographics of the groups they target, their connections to other 
organizations, and the dynamics of the political process, including the actors’ 
relationships to political power. I am also interested in determining whether patterns of 
usage and non-usage are similar across different national contexts, and in offering 
explanations for these differences.  
To achieve this, I draw on data collected through the analysis of secondary 
sources, an organizational survey, an in-depth analysis of organizations’ online activities, 
and elite interviews. My approach is a hybrid of inductive and deductive research. I start 
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from a set of expectations culled from the existing literature, which I summarize in a 
simple heuristic model. However, my approach also allows for the possibility of gaining 
new, unexpected insights from my deep reading of my data, my elite interviews, and my 
analysis of survey answers (i.e., grounded research – see Glaser & Strauss, 1999). I 
incorporate both quantitative and qualitative data in my analysis, and use the insights I 
gain to build a new heuristic model that captures the dynamic processes I observe and the 
impact that national context and environment has on processes of DICT adoption.  
In my first chapter, I will introduce and discuss the various bodies of literature 
that inform my proposed project. The second chapter will outline my arguments and the 
particular variables I wish to examine. Chapter three provides a detailed discussion of my 
proposed methodology and the data I collect. Chapters four, five, and six detail my 
findings, offering my analysis of my initial heuristic model, an assessment of the ways in 
which DICT adoption differ by country and some potential explanations therefore, and a 
description of the modified model that I propose offers insight into the process of DICT 
adoption by advocacy organizations.  
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This project locates itself in research on the use of DICTS in the organization and 
mobilization of collective action (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 
2001). As such, it draws on several literatures that have often developed independently of 
one another. In order to cover this broad terrain, my review of relevant literature proceeds 
as follows. I begin with a general introduction to research on politics, the Internet, and 
related information and communication technologies. I then briefly discuss the 
development and state of research on social movements, followed by a review of the 
current state of knowledge about the use of DICTS by social movements. Finally, I focus 
more specifically on what the literature tells us about my central research question: which 
factors best account for variations in the use of the internet and other DICTs by political 
actors.  
DICTS and Politics 
Digital information and communication technologies, or DICTs, refers to the 
constellation of new technologies, tools, practices, and affordances that have emerged 
over the past 25 years. As such, this term captures a host of tools that involve the transfer 
of digital information from one user to another, from a website to the computer of a 
visitor, for example, or from one person’s mobile device to another person’s. 
Furthermore, following Salter (2003), I do not wish my use of the term DICTs to be 
understood purely as a reference to particular technological tools. DICTs also incorporate 
practices and paradigms – they privilege certain skills, for example, and encourage 
certain types of behaviors and uses and discourage others. Thus, DICTs is a rich term, 
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referring both to tools and to the practices attached to them – both to cookies and to the 
uses to which the data gathered by cookies are generally put.  
As many scholars have noted (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008; Breindl, 2010a; Earl 
& Kimport, 2011; Fung, Gilman, & Shkabatur, 2013; Sibbernsen, 2012), the study of 
DICTs (starting most often with the Internet) and their role in politics has generally been 
dominated by two schools of thought: technological optimists, who argue that the unique 
affordances of online technologies have the potential to revolutionize the practice of 
politics, and pessimists, who insist that the constraints of pre-existing power relations and 
political structures will be replicated or exacerbated online, and that online tools will be 
used for surveillance and the maintenance of power and the status quo. Leading voices 
among the optimists include Benkler (1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003, 2006), Castells (1996, 
2009, 2010), Negroponte (1996), Shirky (2009, 2011), and Noveck (2010), while 
prominent pessimists include Hindman (2008), Morozov (2011), and Schlozman, Verba, 
and Brady, (2012). Over the years, much research and debate has been driven by the 
search for evidence that one or the other side is correct.  
In the early days of DICTs scholarship, when empirical evidence was still sparse 
and much of the writing on the topic came from activists, information scientists, legal 
scholars and technologists (Farrell, 2012), those who imagined the new communication 
technologies birthing a democratizing revolution in politics dominated the discussion. In 
his magisterial trilogy of books on the information age, for example, Castells (1996, 
2009, 2010) posited a number of ways in which the new technologies would 
fundamentally reshape society, introducing a new age of networked capitalist 
development (for a discussion of his themes, see Loader, 2008). These themes continued 
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to have resonance over time, and were echoed in influential works like Benkler’s (2006) 
book on social production and networks, which explored the internet’s potential for 
enabling new forms of collaborative production of media and material goods, as well as 
in Shirky’s (2009) book examining the new forms of collective organization that the 
internet enables and speculating as to their democratizing potential. Scholars anticipated 
that DICTs would usher in a new era of political engagement worldwide and would 
deepen democracy and broaden political participation in technologically advanced 
democracies by lowering barriers and costs (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010; Farina, 
Newhart, Cardie, & Cosley, 2010; Noveck, 2010; Osimo, 2008). As I will discuss, these 
hopes and predictions inspired a great deal of the work on the relationship between 
DICTs and politics, with many scholars exploring the ways in which DICTs enable new 
forms of collaboration, organization, production, and low-cost communication for 
political purposes.  
As scholarship developed and empirical evidence began to accumulate, however, 
more-pessimistic assessments of the role of DICTs in politics emerged. Scholars noted 
the existence of a digital divide; those with access to fewer material and educational 
resources were less able to acquire and utilize new technologies for political engagement 
and economic purposes, and so faced the possibility of further marginalization (Hargittai 
& Walejko, 2008; Hargittai & Litt, 2012, Norris, 2001). In addition, as these technologies 
developed, tendencies toward centralization, corporatization, and increased control and 
surveillance manifested, leading scholars to conclude that the internet would primarily 
replicate or deepen offline patterns of power and authority (Hindman, 2008; Margolis & 
Resnick, 2000; Morozov, 2011). Further, many worried that the ease with which DICTs 
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could be used to find ideologically congruent information would lead to political 
polarization and ideological segregation and diminish the quality of democratic discourse 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011; Hargittai & Kane, 2008; Sunstein, 2002, 2009; Yardi, & 
Boyd, 2010).  
More recently, scholars have begun to raise concerns about the role of so-called 
“Big Data” in politics (Kreiss, 2012). Campaigns increasingly use a range of public and 
commercial databases and data gathered from online tools like cookies to segment and 
target voters with greater accuracy and a higher degree of personal tailoring (Ghani, 
2013; Hersh, 2013; Issenberg, 2012); researchers worry that such tactics invade voters’ 
privacy and reduce their political autonomy (Barocas, 2012; Evans, 2012; Tufekci, 2013). 
The use of data mining techniques is not limited to political campaigns; social movement 
and non-profit organizations also deploy such tools online, raising additional concerns 
about privacy and their effect on democratic processes (Delany, 2013; Karpf, 2009, 
2010a; 2010b). Despite a number of empirical studies, then, there is as yet no scholarly 
consensus on whether DICTs have had a net positive or a net negative effect on the 
political realm, or on the context in which effects are likely to be positive or negative. A 
debate between these two camps, and research on both sides continues.  
These twin themes of optimism and pessimism speak directly to the present 
project. Like the optimists, I am interested in examining the ways in which political 
actors have used DICTs to innovate in the practice of contentious politics, to form new 
collectives and new types of organizations, and to mobilize and engage citizens for 
collective action. At the same time, however, in attempting to evaluate what leads to the 
differential adoption of online affordances by political actors, I emphasize the limiting 
 
 
8
factors that constrain patterns of adoption and usage. Like the pessimists, I am concerned 
with gaps in online participation and usage and their relationship to material constraints, 
as well as to the broader national and institutional contexts in which actors find 
themselves. Thus, my project, like many contemporary accounts of DICTs and their 
relationship to politics, will tread a middle ground between these poles, noting the ways 
in which pre-existing and external structures of power, distributions of resources, and 
legal and institutional arrangements limit the democratizing and empowering potential of 
the internet, but also noting the ways in which online tools and new technologies have 
enabled new forms of collective action, new political identities and coalitions, and new 
means of political engagement that represent a change to the practice of politics. As we 
move now to an exploration of research on social movements and on the role of DICTs in 
collective action, these twin themes – the regressive tendencies and the revolutionary 
power of DICTs – will form a backdrop to our overall understanding of the 
internet/politics nexus.  
Social Movements and Collective Action 
The study of collective action has a long history. Early students of contentious 
political activity by non-institutional actors, generally groups of citizens with grievances, 
initially approached their subjects through the lens of extremism, deprivation, and 
violence (Tarrow, 2011). Building on the work of eighteenth century sociologist Emile 
Durkheim, disruptive collective action was seen as a symptom of anomie, of dislocation 
from traditional roles and identities and the rootlessness that accompanied the Industrial 
Revolution (Tilly, 1978, 2006). Scholars theorized that relative deprivation – 
impoverishment or the denial to one group of resources that another group possessed – 
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led dislocated individuals in industrial society to embrace violent, disruptive, and deviant 
behavior in a bid to redress their grievances. Such perspectives often had a Marxist 
inflection; collective action was understood as the almost-inevitable consequence of 
inequality and the capitalist production system, which disempowered and exploited 
workers. The work of Chicago School sociologists Park and Burgess (1921) added the 
idea of irrationality to the study of collective behavior; these scholars proposed the 
irrationality of the mob as a model for how riots and protests occurred. The emphasis was 
thus on the social psychology of collective action, the ways in which individuals’ 
deprivation and irrationality led them to embrace deviant, non-normative behavior.  
Over time, however, this social psychological paradigm was challenged. Faced 
with the peace and civil rights movements of the 1960s, scholars reevaluated their models 
of collective action. Researchers, noting that while grievances are ubiquitous, movements 
seeking their redress are not, began to ask why certain marginalized groups, but not 
others, took action at particular times, but not at others. A new generation of scholars 
began to build a theory that defined the object of study, namely social movements, with 
greater care, and focused on questions of material, social and cultural resources and the 
political environment, emphasizing the roles of organizations, social networks, and 
movement and government tactics, a perspective that came to be known as the resource 
mobilization paradigm (Olson, 1971; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tilly, 1993, 
2004). The emphasis in the study of collective action moved from treating it as aberrant 
to seeing it as a part of the political process in a democracy. By reconceptualizing 
sustained collective action as a social movement, researchers were able to bring new 
models to bear on the study of why and how collective action occurred. In their seminal 
 
 
10
piece on the resource mobilization paradigm, McCarthy and Zald (1977) explained: “This 
approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement 
phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of 
social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support 
for success and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements.” (p. 
121).  
Scholars working in the resource mobilization paradigm have offered various 
definitions of social movements that emphasized their distinctiveness from political 
parties, interest groups, and revolutionaries. For example, Sydney Tarrow (2011) defined 
social movements as “collective challenges [to elites, authorities, other groups or cultural 
codes] by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with 
elites, opponents and authorities.” (p. 18). He emphasized that social movements involve 
sustained engagement – fleeting events like spontaneous riots are thus excluded. Social 
movements also involve people who share a purpose and sense of solidarity, who have a 
shared identity that inspires them to participate in the movement, and who seek to 
challenge elites, thus marking them as a phenomenon distinct from interest groups and 
political parties. Finally, social movements engage in sustained interactions with elites, 
opponents, and authorities; unlike revolutionaries, they seek to interact with and alter the 
system, rather than overthrow it through violent or other means. In a similar vein, Tilly 
(2004) defined social movements as a series of contentious performances, displays and 
campaigns through which ordinary people make collective claims. For Tilly, social 
movements are among the primary vehicles through which citizens engage in politics; 
because they involve ordinary people engaged in contention and making collective 
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claims, social movements are distinct from institutionalized collectives like political 
parties or lobbying groups.  
By clearly defining social movements as the object of study, the field thus moved 
away from the social psychology perspective that pathologized collective behavior, 
instead treating social movements as enduring, semi-institutional phenomena to be 
understood through a structural lens. 
Initially, the resource mobilization paradigm emphasized material and political 
resources above all else (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). However, as the paradigm developed, 
the almost-exclusive emphasis on the mobilization of resources evolved into a more 
nuanced perspective that incorporated the role of external political opportunities and 
actors, including the media and their framing of movements, as well as emotion, 
communication, and the dynamics of political processes (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della 
Porta & Diani, 2006; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; McAdam, 1999; Snow, 
Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 2001, 2006). This led to the 
development of broad frameworks for understanding the dynamics of collective action in 
social movements, such as that provided by McAdam et al (1996), who offer three 
interrelated factors to explain the emergence, development, and outcomes of social 
movements: mobilizing structures, opportunity structures, and framing processes.  
Mobilizing structures are those mechanisms that enable people to organize and 
engage in collective action, including social structures (for example, the role played by 
Black churches in the civil rights movement in the 1960s) and tactical repertoires (such as 
the use of sit-ins, occupations, marches, and so on). Opportunity structures refer to 
conditions in the environment conducive to social movement activity, including, for 
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example, the accessibility of the political system (how easily those with grievances can 
make their needs known to those in power and influence the progress of policy), the 
degree of elite alignment or disagreement (that is, the extent to which fractures in elite 
coalitions may offer openings for changes to extant political and economic structures), 
and the capacity and appetite of the state for repression. Finally, framing processes refer 
to strategic attempts by social movement organizations or political entrepreneurs to craft 
and disseminate materials that explain social problems in particular ways, to promote 
particular attributions of responsibility for those problems, and to suggest certain 
remedies. As we shall see, most of the work on the impact the internet has had on social 
movements has focused on its effects on mobilizing structures and on framing processes.  
Linked to these concerns, a number of challenges that social movements had to 
overcome were identified within the resource mobilization paradigm. One of the primary 
challenges is the so-called free rider problem, which Olson (1971) identified as a key 
constraint to collective action. Essentially, even when people hold a common grievance, 
they have little incentive to organize into a group to seek redress. Organizing and 
participating in collective action is costly, while the benefit of such action is uncertain 
and potentially limited. Thus, each individual in a potential collective has a material 
incentive to free ride on the actions of others, reaping the reward of action without 
personally incurring the costs. Overcoming this tendency came to be seen as one of the 
primary tasks of social movements, and mobilizing structures, in particular formal 
organizations, were seen as the most important way to do this (Bimber, Flanagin, & 
Stohl, 2005). Specifically, formal organizations were seen as central to the 
communicative and organizational work involved in collective action including “locating 
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and contacting appropriate participants, motivating them to make private resources 
publicly available, persuading them to remain involved despite short-term setbacks and 
long-term risks, and coordinating their efforts appropriately.” (Bimber, Flanagin, & 
Stohl, 2005: p. 368). This paradigm thus placed social movement organizations (SMOs) 
at the center of analysis, and focused on how such organizations emerged and developed, 
coordinated the mobilization of people and resources, and guided the process of claim-
making.  
The resource mobilization paradigm identified a second crucial challenge facing 
social movements once it incorporated the social constructionist perspectives of framing 
theory, namely the challenge of creating and disseminating compelling issue frames in 
the face of usually hostile mass media (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della Porta & Diani, 
2006; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 
1986). Media attention is a crucial resource for social movements, but media are prone to 
produce unfavorable representations of movements, with a tendency to emphasize 
violence and deviant behavior, and to simplify or distort movement messages (Della 
Porta, 2011; DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; van Laer, 2007). Attracting media attention 
and influencing the frames of the movements presented by the media thus posed a second 
major challenge for social movements.  
A great deal of scholarship on collective action has organized itself around these 
concepts: around the life cycle of the social movement in terms of emergence, 
development, and outcomes; around the structuralist framework of mobilizing structures, 
opportunity structures, and framing processes; and around identifying the tactics social 
movements use to overcome the challenges of free ridership and attracting sympathetic 
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media coverage. To some degree, the contemporary resource mobilization paradigm 
captured in MacAdam et al’s (1996) framework remains a dominant model for the study 
of social movements. However, increasingly an alternative model of contentious 
collective action called new social movement (NSM) theory, which has a more social 
constructionist bent, also informs scholarship.  
As Buechler (1995) explains, NSM theory emerged in response to the resource 
mobilization paradigm’s emphasis on material and structural factors, including the 
material origins of grievances, which were often seen as rooted in Marxist economic 
identities. For NSM theorists, a range of identities beyond those catalogued in Marxist 
thought, including gender and sexual orientation, can serve as a source for collective 
claims-makings. NSM theorists generally agree that symbolic action in the cultural 
sphere can be seen as a legitimate form of political action, that post-materialist values 
emphasizing quality-of-life issues beyond material sufficiency are a major contemporary 
motivator of political and collective action, that collective grievances are socially 
constructed rather than having a priori structural origins, and, importantly, that 
submerged, latent, and temporary networks often undergird collective action rather that 
the centralized and formal social movement organizations prominent in the resource 
mobilization account (Buechler, 1995: p.442). This paradigm thus allows for a 
conceptualization of collective action that is subtly different from that of the resource 
mobilization paradigm, with an emphasis on a broader range of grievances, and multiple 
forms of networked organization and political action, and a lesser focus on the role of 
formal organizations and material resources – as we will see, these ideas have special 
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resonance with the ways in which social movements and collective action have changed 
with the spread of the internet.  
If we incorporate NSM theory into the existing definitions offered by the resource 
mobilization paradigm, we may define social movements as networks of individuals, 
characterized by varying structural forms and degrees of centralization, that are engaged 
in sustained collective action over grievances rooted in a shared identity, and who pursue 
their goals using various forms of collective action and communication. This definition is 
broad, and we can foresee some of the objections raised by various scholars to 
conceptually separating social movements from interest groups, political parties, or even 
voters during elections. In all cases, there are networks of people, shared identity, and 
political goals pursued through various forms of collective action (Bennett, Breunig, & 
Givens, 2008; Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005, 2012; Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009; 
Chadwick, 2005, 2007; Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006; Masket, Heaney, Miller, & 
Strolovich, 2009; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). However, in the following discussion I 
will maintain the distinction between institutional and non-institutional collective 
contentious political action, and focus on the literature around social movements and 
DICTs.  
DICTs and Social Movements  
From the earliest research on DICTs and politics, scholars anticipated that DICTs 
would have a profound impact on social movements. Traditionally, as Chadwick (2007) 
explains, “Social movements [have eschewed] hierarchy, and [depended] upon mass 
mobilization to achieve their aims because they have usually been excluded from 
participation in mainstream channels or because they have deliberately sought to work 
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outside the system to avoid cooption. Typically, participants in social movements have 
encouraged methods of organization and decision-making that are self-consciously 
nonhierarchical, consensual, and participatory.” (p. 285). 
As habitual outsiders in the political system, social movements’ ideological 
preference for nonhierarchical, consensual, and participatory forms of organization was 
seen as ideally suited to the internet age. The internet, conceptualized as a decentralized, 
open, and flexible platform, and as a mass medium able to connect individuals across 
time and space, seemed to offer enormous opportunities for social movements to organize 
more cheaply and effectively, and to build more diverse networks. However, as time has 
passed, social movement organizations have displayed a great deal of variation in the 
extent to which and in the manner in which they have adopted DICTs. 
To shape my discussion of how social movements’ adoption of DICTs has varied, 
I will consider the matter under three headings: organization, communication, and 
repertoires. Note that the separation into these three areas is largely arbitrary; the effect of 
DICTs on movement practices and structures is dynamic, and effects on various aspects 
of collective action are interrelated. The same mechanisms appear to mediate DICTs’ 
effects across these three areas, and as you will see, similar themes and arguments have 
been made in each. However, this separation has the utility of providing a structure for 
this discussion, and for suggesting particular expectations and variables that will be 
useful for the present project. I will conclude the literature review by considering the 
various explanatory hypotheses offered by the literature to account for differences in the 
extent to which particular movements adopt online tools and new organizational forms.  
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Organization. As I have defined them, social movements consist of networks of 
individuals, whether in the form of a close-knit community or a loose-knit group of 
strangers, who are mobilized to pursue a common goal through collective action. The 
processes of finding potential movement participants, mobilizing them to participate in 
collective action, and coordinating their actions in the pursuit of movement goals are the 
primary organizing tasks facing social movements. Generally, the literature has found 
that most social movements have their origins in the labors of political entrepreneurs, 
highly motivated individuals or small groups who share a political identity and a 
grievance and seek to organize a larger network of people around that identity and 
grievance.  
The main challenge facing these movement entrepreneurs, as alluded to earlier, is 
the free-rider problem. The free-rider problem can be expressed by the question: how do 
individuals overcome the lure of free ridership to form groups and take collective action? 
Traditionally, the answer has been two-fold: first, that people must be inspired to 
embrace a shared identity that makes movement participation seem necessary; and 
second, that a formal organization must be created to manage movement participants’ 
activities and to maintain the movement network and the engagement of members. Both 
of these processes – identity cultivation and institution formation – are the work of 
organizing. Organization, both as process and as institution, is thus central to social 
movements, and DICTs have had a number of dramatic and profound effects on social 
movement organization in both senses (Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Bimber, 
Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005, 2012; Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009; Chadwick, 2005, 2007; 
Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004).  
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Shared identities. As described, social movements emerge when political 
entrepreneurs begin to search for and recruit potential participants. In general, this 
process involves tapping into existing social networks and spreading a sense of shared 
identity and grievance among their members, and then coordinating those who identify 
with the cause to take particular actions. DICTs have changed all of these aspects of this 
process through their effect on costs, and their ability to activate networks and spread 
identities. In order to mobilize people to take collective action, it is first necessary to 
convince them of the need for such action, that is, to foster within them a political 
identity and a sense of grievance, which generates feelings of solidarity and the desire to 
engage in action. Shared identities, thus, are central to the formation and maintenance of 
social movements. A number of scholars have argued that the internet can be used to 
generate a sense of solidarity and to share common grievance frames across social 
networks (Brainard & Siplon, 2000; Myers, 2000; Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & 
Albacete, n.d.; van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). Many observers of the Arab Spring have 
hypothesized that the formation of a shared identity was one of the key contributions that 
online tools made to the movements. Harb (2011), for example, argues that the key role 
that social media played in the Arab Spring was the dissemination of information, action 
frames, and images through social networks that helped to foster a sense of collective 
identity among protestors and thus to encourage them to participate in anti-regime 
activities, an argument echoed by Zhuo, Wellman, and Yu (2011), Wolfsfeld, Segev, and 
Sheafer (2013), Axford (2011), Howard and Hussain (2011), and Stepanova (2011).  
In the online environment, political entrepreneurs are able to cheaply and easily 
produce communications materials and disseminate them through social networking sites, 
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e-mail chains, and websites. The internet is particularly good at facilitating the spread of 
messages and frames through pre-existing social networks, as motivated individuals are 
able to easily share them with friends and family on social networking sites and through 
personal e-mails. As Kavada (2012) shows in her study of the use of social networking 
sites for identity building by transnational progressive social movement organization 
Avaaz, social movements make use of a number of web features such as comments, share 
buttons, like buttons and so on, to promote shared identities and allow members to 
communicate with one another to foster a sense of solidarity. In a similar vein, in their 
study of the digitally organized protests against copyright reform in the European Union, 
Breindl and Briatte (2013) find that one of the key roles of DICTs was to enable highly 
interested parties (political entrepreneurs) to generate and share a collective action frame 
around the issue of copyright, thus building an online, and ultimately offline, 
transnational community with a shared identity, a sense of solidarity, and motivation to 
engage in political action. Likewise, Calderaro (2010) noted the role that e-mail listservs 
played in facilitating discussion, engagement, and the generation of shared identities 
among protestors and activists at the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa.  
The role of DICTs in fostering shared identities is not, however, uncontroversial. 
Some scholars have argued that online tools and mediated communication cannot create 
the type of strong bond among individuals that forms the basis for the intensive and long-
term commitment required to cause political change, arguing that such tools are too 
individualizing and remote to foster collective identity. Fenton and Barassi (2011), for 
example, conducted ethnographic research among trade unionists in Britain, and found 
that online tools such as social networking sites encourage a highly individualized style 
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of engagement that activists viewed as inimical to the formation of collective identity and 
the promotion of collective frames and action. In another example, in her study of the use 
of e-mail listservs and the role of face-to-face communication among activists connected 
to the Global Justice Movement, Kavada (2010) found that while e-mail enabled activists 
to express their individuality and the movement to manage diversity, divergence, and 
individual autonomy, face-to-face contact was critical for promoting unity, convergence, 
and a sense of collectivity. DICTs alone, she argued, were not able to generate the sense 
of solidarity and connection required to fully engage people in social movement.  
In response to such criticism, however, one can point to work by Bennett (2012), 
who contends that in the contemporary political environment, citizens increasingly reject 
collectivist identities, instead seeking a more-personalized expression of their political 
interests. He argues that contemporary social movements can, in the digital environment, 
capitalize on this new feature of political engagement by offering potential movement 
participants highly individualized access points to the movement. In a study of two social 
movement organizations that arranged protest events during the 2009 G20 London 
summit, for example, Bennett and Segerberg (2011) note that one organization, Put 
People First (PPF) was able to mobilize citizens by offering them a broad frame for 
action (putting people first) and allowing them to personalize their engagement with the 
movement by attending protests with their own slogans, or providing their own messages 
to G20 organizers through the PPF portal. In contrast, another organization, G20 
Meltdown, offered highly specific frames for collective action and a particular identity 
for participants, and was less able to motivate and mobilize citizens (see also Bennett, 
2008; Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Bennett & Segerberg, 2009).  
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Thus, we can conclude that one of the ways in which DICTs facilitate 
organization for social movements is through the dissemination of collective action 
frames that foster a shared political identity among potential movement participants, 
whether that identity is highly specific or more diffuse – consider, for example, the 
Occupy Wall Street frame “We are the 99%,” a broad catch-all that participants were able 
to personalize to fit with their political orientations and personal identities while at the 
same time serving as a collective identity that bound participants together (DeLuca, 
Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris, 2012).  
Accordingly, one of the crucial ways in which I expect DICT adoption to vary 
among organizations will be the extent to which they use online tools to foster collective 
identity, and the ways in which they do so 
The process of organizing and the form of organizations. Beyond spreading 
identities through networks, however, DICTs also have an effect on the practical and 
logistical side of social movements’ organization. One of the key mechanisms here is 
cost. In Olson’s (1971) work, free ridership was understood to be an issue because the 
cost of creating and of participation in a social movement was great; communication was 
expensive, and large, costly organizations were needed to recruit and coordinate 
members, and to solicit resources. The internet has the potential to dramatically lower all 
of these costs (Bennett & Segerberg, 2009, 2012; Garrett, 2006, van Laer 2007). Mass 
communication using DICTs displays an interesting cost pattern: the marginal cost of 
reaching the nth recipient is virtually zero, and the cost of reaching multiple recipients is 
virtually equal to the cost of reaching one – think of the cost of adding a single recipient 
to an e-mail versus the cost of adding a hundred recipients, and compare that to the cost 
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of mailing one letter versus the cost of mailing one hundred letters. In the internet age, 
mass dissemination of movement messages becomes dramatically cheaper. In addition, 
online tools like shared calendars, websites, online donation portals, and information 
tools like electronic databases have the potential to make organizing, aggregating 
resources, and coordinating efforts significantly cheaper and less complex. Thus, the 
costs and labor of organizing are reduced in the information age.  
This radical restructuring of the cost of organizing opens up an intriguing 
possibility which Clay Shirky (2009) calls “organizing without organization.” The idea of 
groups organizing in the absence of large, formal organizations has become a popular 
preoccupation among academic researchers as a result of the remarkable successes of 
projects like the development of the Linux operating system and the popular 
encyclopedia project hosted at Wikipedia.com, which are made possible by the 
development of cheap communication and workflow management tools that can be 
accessed by individuals located anywhere (Shirky, 2009; Karpf 2010b, 2011; Lev-On & 
Hardin, 2008). These projects have seen large groups of individuals seemingly 
spontaneously organizing to produce complex goods, and have raised the idea of open 
source politics, which is the notion of citizens spontaneously and without central 
leadership forming groups to achieve complex political goals – social movements without 
the social movement organizations (Karpf, 2010b, 2011; Kreiss, 2010; Lev-On & Hardin, 
2008).  
Many have seen this form of organization in the Occupy protests of 2011 
(DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris, 2012; Theocharis, Lowe, 
van Deth, & Albacete, n.d.). Researchers have noted that no particular centralized body 
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organized Occupy protests, although the idea for the protests was rooted in a call for the 
occupation of Wall Street from Canadian anti-consumerist group Adbusters, who 
themselves described the proposed occupation as America’s Tahrir, a reference to the 
Tahrir Square protests in Egypt in 2010. Nevertheless, rather than relying on a central 
formal organization, Occupiers used a range of social media tools to coordinate protests 
and spread information (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012; Gaby & Caren, 2012; Juris, 
2012; Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & Albacete, n.d.). Although Juris (2012) shows that 
more-formal social movement organizations are now emerging from Occupy networks, 
particularly at the local level, the main period of protest occurred without the central 
presence of formal organizations. This may thus be seen as an example of organizing 
without organizations.  
However, as Karpf (2010b, 2011) notes, the example of Wikipedia suggests that 
such open source projects ultimately require management structures in the form of 
enforceable community norms, and that key individuals will emerge as more-central 
nodes in the informal network, a phenomenon that Theocharis (2012) has documented in 
Occupy-related Twitter networks. In other words, even without formal organizations, 
organizers are necessary (an observation that many observers have drawn attention to in 
the case of Linux production; the Linux open source production process works largely 
thanks to the fact that there is a small, central group of people organized around founder 
Linus Torvalds that contribute most of the work to the project and that organize and 
monitor others’ contributions). Further, it appears as if the emergence of some kind of 
formal organization is almost inevitable in such “organized without organization” 
projects, such as the Wikipedia Foundation and the Linux Foundation (Karpf, 2010b, 
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2011). Thus, while the internet facilitates the spread of identities and to a certain extent 
enables “organizing without organizations,” social movement organizations are by no 
means obsolete in the internet age. Social movements still require some type of formal 
organization in order to retain momentum and to act strategically over the long-term; 
what is changing is the form and mode of operation of social movement organizations, 
and this is an important topic for study (Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Bimber, 
Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005, 2012; Bimber, Stohl, & Flanagin, 2009; Chadwick, 2005, 2007; 
Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006).  
Social movement organizations have long been a feature of the social movement 
landscape, particularly since the 1970s, when enduring organizations emerged from the 
major movements of the era (Karpf, 2009, 2012). Typically, social movement 
organizations followed the usual bureaucratic organizational template, and tended 
towards hierarchical and centralized structures. Consider, for example, the National 
Organization for Women, an organization born in the 1980s from the women’s 
movement (National Organization for Women, n.d.). This social movement organization 
has a formal, hierarchical structure and a large staff, as well as offices in Washington 
D.C.. It coordinates actions and campaigns among members, and priorities are decided 
largely at the center of the organization, although individual chapters have some freedom 
to pursue their own local agendas. The structure of NOW is typical of social movement 
organizations that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, although even older organizations 
have a similar structure – Karpf (2012), for example, described the structure of the pro-
wilderness Sierra Club, founded in 1892, in terms of its centralization, reliance on 
hierarchy, and tendency to follow particular bureaucratic routines.  
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DICTs, however, allow social movement organizations to take new and powerful 
forms by changing the costs and labors involved. Consider MoveOn.org, which was 
founded in 1998 as an online petition which gathered half a million signatures to ask 
Congress to censure then -president Bill Clinton and ‘move on’, instead of proceeding 
with an impeachment over his sexual involvement with a White House intern. 
MoveOn.org grew from there, defining itself as a progressive movement organization and 
organizing protests, campaigns, and pledge drives for various progressive issues. 
Although it may not appear to be a traditional social movement organization, 
MoveOn.org does represent the organizational hub of a decentralized network of people 
that share a political identity as progressives and pursue common goals through the use of 
various protest tactics, and thus meets the requirements of the earlier definition of social 
movements. Indeed, MoveOn.org is now widely regarded as the paradigm example of an 
online, internet-age social movement organization, and is seen as having redefined the 
concept of the social movement organization (Brasted, 2012; Carty, 2010, 2011; Kavada, 
2012; Vromen & Coleman, 2013).  
On the cost side, the effect of the internet on MoveOn.org’s structure is profound. 
MoveOn.org has a very modest budget. It has no physical offices; its small staff generally 
works from home. A rotating staff is hired during busy campaigns, with a lot of authority 
over how those campaigns are run, but they are only temporary employees, for the most 
part, MoveOn.org operates with a small staff, few of whom are located in Washington 
D.C., where most social movement organizations typically base themselves. Since its 
inception, MoveOn.org has relied on low-cost internet tools such as an easily accessible 
online fundraising application hosted by actblue.com, the low-cost medium of e-mail, 
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and, in its earlier days, the free internet service Meetup.com, which served as a portal for 
coordinating volunteers before MoveOn.org started to host its own portal. In his book on 
progressive online organizing, Karpf (2012) draws a contrast between the low budget and 
limited staff complement of a decentralized and flexible organization like MoveOn.org, 
which claims to have five million members, with the large budget and staff and complex, 
hierarchical structure of an established advocacy group like the Sierra Club that has just 
1.4 million members. The internet, he argues, and the many organizing tools it offers for 
little to no cost, changes the underlying structure of social movement organizations 
(Karpf, 2012).  
Admittedly, the literature has not been unequivocal on this point. At least one 
author has found that the process of moving organizing efforts online can in fact create 
new, burdensome costs for organizers of collective action, including a dramatic increase 
in the amount (and a concomitant reduction in the value) of communication which places 
a drain on time and cognitive capacity, as well as difficulties in coordinating across 
multiple platforms and ensuring that efforts are not replicated (Nielsen, 2009). In the 
course of an ethnographic study of a volunteer group involved in the 2008 Democratic 
U.S. presidential primaries, Nielsen (2009) found that volunteers described being 
overwhelmed with the volume and disorganization of information and communication 
generated by active participants online, to the point where they reportedly abandoned the 
use of online tools during the busiest organizing period of their campaign. Nevertheless, 
most of the literature agrees that cost reduction on the organizational end is a key feature 
of internet-enabled activism. Thus, I anticipate finding that social movements will tend to 
utilize DICTs to reduce their costs, although their use of low-cost online tools will differ.  
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Moreover, the effect of DICTs on social movement organizations goes beyond 
reducing their budgets; the day-to-day practices social movement organizations engage in 
and the ways in which they coordinate activities, set priorities, and engage with members 
have also changed with the advent of DICTs. MoveOn.org, for example, uses DICTs to 
give its members greater voice in the decision-making processes of the organization. 
MoveOn.org staff develop a list of possible priorities for the organization each year, and 
members vote on which they believe should be the top ones, and the organization 
frequently circulates polls to a subsample of its five-million member mailing list 
soliciting feedback on current campaigns, member priorities, and other topics. Thanks to 
DICTs, member polls and feedback can be quickly analyzed and incorporated into 
movement strategies. MoveOn.org also uses so-called a-b testing, which involves sending 
different versions of a message to two random samples of the mailing list and observing 
which message generates greater feedback or higher contributions and then using these 
observations to refine messages that are then circulated among the rest of the membership 
mailing list (Karpf, 2012). This use of rapid online testing means that MoveOn.org is able 
to quickly refine messages and respond to member preferences, thus making it better able 
to mobilize members. MoveOn.org also frequently invites members to create videos, host 
their own events, start MoveOn Councils in their areas through the MoveOn.org website, 
create their own online petitions, and engage in a number of other actions that offer 
members opportunities to engage, contribute to the movement’s agenda, and, as discussed 
in the previous section, participate in the creation and maintenance of a shared identity.  
These structures for engagement and participation are innovations in the social 
movement space and in the use of DICTs. By using the communications infrastructure 
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and interactive tools of the internet, MoveOn.org has found new ways to engage and 
organize members. DICTs have enabled social movement organizations to take on a new 
form – small, lightly staffed, decentralized and not located in any particular physical 
place, with an emphasis on using digital tools to solicit member feedback, either with 
their conscious knowledge, as in the case of inviting members to vote on priorities, or 
without it, for example, by monitoring which e-mail appeals are more likely to be opened 
and using those data to design future appeals. Carty (2011) describes MoveOn.org and 
similar organizations like GetUp! in Australia and Avaaz on a global level as multi-issue 
internet-mediated organizations in recognition of their tendency to switch across a 
number of issues in line with trending topics in the news, and of their absolute reliance on 
DICTs for their operation (Carty, 2011; Karpf, 2012).  
However, the extent to which social movement organizations adopt new 
organizational forms and incorporate digital tools in their organizational management 
repertoires differs. Indeed, most social movement organizations do not deploy DICTs to 
the same degree or in the same manner as MoveOn.org. In a study examining American 
social movement organizations’ web use, for example, Stein (2009) surveyed a number of 
organizational websites and measured the extent to which they incorporated various 
functionalities. She found that organizations primarily used their websites for information 
provision, with few websites offering functionalities or tools related to coordinating 
action, engaging in fundraising, making lateral linkages with other organizations, or, 
especially, allowing for interaction and dialog, and permitting creative expression from 
members. Thus, I anticipate that social movement organizations will adopt the new 
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organizational forms enabled by DICTs to different degrees; this will be another key 
dimension along which actors’ adoption of DICTs will vary.  
Communication. In the preceding section, I noted the ways in which DICTs 
affect the cost of communication, and the role that cheap communication tools like e-mail 
can play in fostering collective identity and thus helping to overcome the free-rider 
problem. However, these technologies affect communication in social movements in 
other ways too. In particular, DICTs offer social movements a tool to overcome another 
key challenge: spreading their message beyond movement participants and ensuring that 
they are framed in a favorable way in the mass media. As I alluded to in the discussion of 
the history of collective action research, work in the framing paradigm has informed the 
study of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Gamson, 
Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). 
Essentially, this literature argues that one of the key tasks facing social movements is 
creating resonant frames for social problems that can be adopted by non-participants and 
that can then inform policymaking.  
For Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986) frames are schemata that 
organize information and provide structures for interpretation, and are used to make sense 
of the world and to influence people. By promoting particular frames – for example, 
framing gun control as an encroachment on personal freedom – social movements unite 
people and prompt them to take action. In describing the mechanics of framing, Entman 
(1993: 53) writes “To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them 
more salient … in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
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interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations for the item 
described.”  
Entman identifies four aspects of frames: first, problem definition, which 
identifies the problem, conflict or controversy under consideration; second, causal 
interpretation, which suggests the causes underlying the problem; third, moral evaluation, 
which suggests to the reader how the event should be morally categorized; and finally, 
treatment recommendation, which concerns the course of action suggested, either 
implicitly or explicitly, to remedy the problem. The task of social movements is to create 
resonant frames for understanding the issues with which they engage and to promote that 
frame among non-participants. In doing this, movements face two challenges. First, they 
must develop frames that have cultural and political resonance and that appeal to a broad 
group of people. Second, they must find ways to promote their frames in the face of mass 
media that generally resist movement attempts to control framing and that tend to focus 
on the deviant or disruptive aspects of collective action rather than the political messages 
activists are attempting to share (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). DICTs offer tools for 
overcoming both of these challenges. 
Creating resonant frames. In the online environment, social movements are more 
easily able to generate resonant frames. First, through commons-based production, 
movements can incorporate suggestions and improvements from many members into 
movement messages (Tatarchevskiy, 2011). Members can contribute images, videos, 
poetry, essays and many other pieces of media that can frame the movement’s message in 
various ways. Then, a second aspect of the internet, namely its ability to monitor 
feedback and use reputation systems such as “likes” to raise or lower the profile of an 
 
 
31
item, can help winnow out less-appealing frames and draw attention to successful ones. 
For example, Gaby and Caren (2012) described how certain posts on Occupy Facebook 
pages attracted a large number of “Likes” and how those “Likes” corresponded to more 
members joining Occupy groups. In one example, a photograph of an elderly man with a 
particularly touching and well-crafted protest sign became the most popular picture on 
one Occupy group page – movement members can track what frames resonate with 
audiences through feedback mechanisms like this. Finally, virality on the internet, which 
is the phenomenon whereby certain items such as online videos become suddenly 
popular, attracting a very large number of views in a very short period of time, can act as 
another tool indicating to social movements when they have found a resonant message 
(Nahon, Hemsley, Walker, & Hussain, 2011).  
Frame circulation. A second way in which DICTs have affected communication 
in social movements is by offering movements new options for circulating their frames. 
Traditionally, social movements were highly reliant on mass media for spreading their 
messages. Indeed, many movement tactics, such as sit-ins or large protest marches, were 
designed specifically to attract media attention in the hope of spreading movement 
messages to a broader public (Benford & Snow, 2000; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; 
Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; McAdam, 1999; Snow, Rochford, Worden, 
& Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 2001, 2006).  
With the emergence and spread of DICTs, however, social movements have a 
range of new options for communicating their messages. For example, DeLuca, Lawson 
and Sun (2012) show how, in the early days of the Occupy Wall Street occupation of 
Zuccotti Park in downtown Manhattan, while the mass media largely ignored the 
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activists, occupiers were still able to circulate their messages through political blogs, 
social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook, and mass e-mails. While the few early 
news stories published on the Zuccotti Park occupation tended to treat it as a laughable 
exercise, multiple framings of the event were diffused through the internet, with millions 
of people reading blog posts, Tweets, e-mails and status updates that offered alternative 
frames (DeLuca, Lawson, & Sun, 2012). The authors also offer evidence that such frames 
spread among non-participants by noting post-Occupation changes in poll data indicating 
the degree to which Americans perceived income inequality as an important problem. 
This suggests that, at least to some degree, movements today are able to influence frames 
by circumventing news media. This change in the media environment is quite profound; 
indeed, Cammaerts (2012) argues that the communicative environment in which social 
movements operate has altered to such a degree that he introduces a new concept, the 
mediation opportunity structure, to capture the new opportunities available to movements 
in their engagements with discourse, media, and networks of people. In the new 
environment, social movements have a greater number of tools available to them for 
circulating frames and producing media content, and this creates new opportunities for 
movements to promote their frames and achieve political goals (Cammaerts, 2012). By 
using low-cost digital tools to produce and circulate media, and by tapping into social 
networks among participants and beyond to source and spread messages, social 
movements can, in the internet age, create and circulate messages outside traditional 
channels, thus overcoming the challenge of disseminating their messages to a broad 
audience.  
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Repertoires. As discussed earlier, from the perspective of movement organizers, 
DICTs have changed the cost of organizing and thus helped to overcome the free-rider 
problem. But beyond this, DICTs have also changed the cost calculus for potential 
participants and thus had a far more direct impact on the centrality of the free-rider 
problem for social movements. Indeed, in their various collaborations looking at 
collective action and behavior in the digital age, Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl (2005, 
2006, 2009, 2012) argue, inter alia, that DICTs lower the cost of participation to the point 
where it is no longer sensible to speak of individuals making a binary, cost-based 
decision on whether or not to participate in movements. As Bimber et al (2005) explain, 
many of the first steps to participation in social movements in the internet age are 
virtually costless – sharing information about an issue with friends through a social 
networking profile, for example, or signing an e-petition. Thus, individuals do not make a 
single, cost-based decision to participate or not, but instead incrementally involve 
themselves in collective action through small, iterative and low-cost steps. This, the 
authors argue, reduces the centrality of the free rider problem in contemporary collective 
action. Instead of inducing potential participants to make a single decision to participate, 
movements can now move people along an action tree, from easy, low-cost/costless 
action to donation to offline activity (Bimber et al., 2005). In other words, by adding to 
social movements’ tactical repertoires and creating a new menu of potential actions for 
participants to take, DICTs have altered the process of member recruitment as well as the 
nature of the collective actions taken by movement participants.  
Much empirical work has noted the widespread use of low-cost online action 
tactics by social movements (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010; Harlow & Harp, 2012; 
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Mosca, 2010; Breindl, 2010b, 2013). Brunsting and Postmes (2002), for example, in an 
early study on the topic of online and offline activism, describe in some detail how the 
internet opens up new methods of protest, including online versions of offline tactics such 
as petitioning and letter-writing, and more extreme forms of action such as rioting and 
sabotage, which find online expression through things like dedicated denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks or malicious hacking and website vandalism. In another example, 
Badouard and Monnoyer-Smith (2013) examined how activists have used website linking 
strategies to influence policymaking in the European Union with a relatively high degree 
of success (see also Breindl, 2010b, 2013 for a discussion of how activists effectively 
used various online actions to influence EU policy on intellectual property). Van Laer 
and Van Aelst (2010) usefully offer a two-dimensional typology for understanding the on 
and offline tactical repertoires used by contemporary social movements (see Figure 1.1, 
taken from Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010: p. 4, below).  
Along the first dimension, activism is understood as either internet-supported or 
internet-based. The internet can facilitate internet-supported actions, such as sit-ins and 
occupations, in that online tools can help organize such actions, but they are not native to 
the internet. In contrast, internet-based tactics expand the toolkit available to social 
movements by introducing innovative new tactics that are only possible online, such as 
hacktivism, which refers to aggressive online tactics such as the previously mentioned 
DDoS attacks. The second dimension ranges from low to high-threshold actions. Low-
threshold actions require relatively little effort, commitment, or risk on the part of those 
taking action, while high-threshold actions are risky, and difficult, and require a high 
degree of commitment. It is actions in the bottom right quadrant of the matrix formed by 
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these dimensions that are the kind of “virtually costless action” that Bimber et al. (2005) 
argue have reduced the centrality of the free rider problem for contemporary social 
movements. Sending an e-mail as part of an e-mail bomb campaign is a costless, low-risk 
action that is easily taken by a person who sympathizes with the goals of a particular 
social movement but is not yet ready to undertake a more intensive action; it is a 
plausible first step on the ladder to greater participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: A typology of a new digitalized action repertoire (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 
2010 p. 4) 
 
Some observers have criticized such low-cost online action as “clicktivism” or 
“slacktivism”, arguing that this kind of remote, costless activism lacks the impact of 
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space, as in protest marches or occupations (Gladwell, 2010; Shulman, 2009). They have 
also expressed concerns that such clicktivism could result in displacement, that those who 
would ordinarily participate in costlier and more effective forms of collective action may 
substitute low-cost online actions, thus rendering social movements less potent as a force 
for change (Cornelissen, Karelaia, & Soyer, n.d.). 
However, scholars have offered rebuttals to this argument. Karpf (2010a), for 
example, points out that low-cost online actions are typically only one aspect of a given 
social movement’s repertoire, and that such actions often serve not only as a means of 
engagement for participants, but also as a way for organizers to collect data on matters 
such as which issues are particularly important to potential members. Furthermore, such 
low-cost online actions have been found in some studies to be correlated with offline 
actions – taking an online action can, it seems, lead potential participants in a social 
movement to greater levels of participation. In a survey of activists in the United States 
and Latin America, for example, Harlow and Harp (2012) find that online activism was 
seen as a precursor or complement to more costly offline activism, and Brunsting and 
Postmes (2002) found a high correlation between taking offline action and taking online 
action, suggesting that perhaps online action does not substitute for offline action among 
highly engaged participants; such individuals take part in both forms of action.  
In summary, new forms of online action offer social movements new 
opportunities to engage participants. They offer non-participants a low-cost way to begin 
to engage in collective action, and can lead to higher levels of engagement. Further, such 
actions can serve as a useful source of data for social movement organizations.  
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Having outlined the various dimensions of social movements’ adoption of DICTs, 
I will now discuss some of the explanations offered for the differing degree to which 
various movements and social movement organizations adopt online tools. In the 
preceding sections, my emphasis has been on the dimensions along which social 
movements’ adoption of DICTs is expected to vary. In the sections that follow, I will 
present a comprehensive account of the explanatory variables that the literature offers to 
account for this variation.  
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CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS AN EXPLANATORY MODE OF VARIATION IN 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ORGANIZATIONS’ ADOPTION OF DICTS 
In the literature there is relatively little theorizing on what determines the extent 
to which particular social movements will utilize DICTs. Implicitly, most work seems to 
assume that if the tools are available, political entrepreneurs will adopt them as needed. 
Further, there is no work of which I am aware that considers the influence of national 
context on the extent to which social movements adopt DICTs. Most scholarship on this 
subject implicitly assumes that movements will adopt DICTs, regardless of national 
context or individual characteristics, simply because such technologies have obvious 
utility for movements. This is, thus, a relatively under-theorized aspect of social 
movement studies. There is, however, some scholarship suggesting various movement-
level factors that may influence the degree to which a given social movement or social 
movement organization will adopt DICTs and incorporate them in daily praxis. I will 
examine these briefly. 
Diffusion 
Some researchers suggest that diffusion processes are one way in which the use of 
online tools for collective action spreads; one might thus anticipate that groups that are 
connected to other groups that already use online tools are more likely to make use of 
them themselves (Earl, 2010). For example, as Vromen and Coleman (2013) note in their 
study of Australian social movement organization GetUp!, many of GetUp!’s tactics are 
drawn from the repertoire of America’s MoveOn.org, with which GetUp! has many 
personal contacts and shared political goals. Similarly, in work on the Arab Spring, 
several scholars noted that the innovative online (and offline) tactics used in Tunisia were 
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adopted by Egyptian activists during their protests thanks to both media reports on 
Tunisian tactics and contacts between Tunisian organizers and their Egyptian 
counterparts, including the use of social networking sites for repertoire sharing 
(Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Khondker, 2011; Sabadello, 2011; Skinner, 2011; 
Stepanova, 2011).  
Indeed, one of the main features of the internet is that it allows for activists in one 
country or location to easily communicate with activists in another country or location – 
it facilitates transnational and inter-organizational linkages (Mosca, 2010; Calderaro, 
2010; Garrett, 2006; Van De Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004). These linkages can 
serve as a pathway for the transmission of best online practices. Thus, one would 
anticipate that social movements and social movement organizations that cultivate 
linkages with peers in other countries or with successful organizations in their own 
country are more likely to be exposed to and to adopt innovative online practices. As 
Karpf (2009, 2012) points out, such linkages are most likely to be between movements or 
groups that share a similar ideological position, as for example the links between 
MoveOn.org and GetUp!, which are both progressive, are and thus certain practices may 
be more common among ideologically similar groups across countries than ideologically 
dissimilar groups within them. When examining my data, I will look for evidence that 
groups that cultivate linkages with peers at home and abroad are more likely to adopt 
innovative online tactics and tools, although this may vary between ideological networks 
depending on the extent to which ideologically similar peers have themselves adopted 
such tools.  
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Group Characteristics 
A common assumption in the literature is that younger people are more likely to 
make use of online tools than their older counterparts, who may be less comfortable in 
the digital environment (Baumgartner & Morris, 2010; Collin, 2010). Xenos and Foot 
(2008), in particular, make a strong argument that young people have a different 
relationship to DICTs than their older counterparts, and are significantly more 
comfortable using online spaces to take political action and interact with others. Indeed, 
Bennett (2008, 2012) argues that among the young, political participation looks very 
different than it does among older cohorts thanks in large part to the development of 
DICTs. Bennett (2008) notes that in many developed Western democracies, young people 
are increasingly disengaged from conventional politics – they do not vote at the same rate 
as older people, and do not join political parties and so on. Nevertheless, they engage in 
political action by other means; Bennett describes their approach as “social movement 
citizenship” (Bennett, 2008: p. 8), a form of engagement that involves online and offline 
collective action in the pursuit of goals like human rights promotion, environmental 
protection and so on. He attributes this in part to dysfunction in traditional political 
institutions, but also to the more personalized, interactive, and creative style of political 
engagement facilitated by DICTs. Overall, younger people are seen as more likely to use 
DICTs for political purposes and more comfortable with doing so. There is reason to 
think that this youth advantage in online politics may extend to the realm of collective 
action and social movements.  
In my own unpublished research on the Tea Party, for example, I found that local 
Tea Party groups across the northeast of the United States were unlikely to use DICTs for 
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organizing beyond the use of e-mail newsletters. I hypothesized that one of the reasons 
why the movement failed to adopt online tools was that many of its local-level organizers 
were retired people who expressed discomfort with DICTs. These individuals, who also 
tended to be older, expressed a reluctance to take online actions and engage with the 
movement through DICTs; this hypothesis is in line with the finding of a survey by the 
Pew Research Center that Tea Party members tended to be older than the average for the 
United States (Frome, 2010). The demographics of Tea Party participants and organizers 
thus made online tools an unsuitable choice for organizing. We may therefore conclude 
that the characteristics of social movements’ organizers and members – their 
demographics and personal comfort with online tools – may play a role in determining 
the degree to which a social movement will adopt DICTs. 
Ideology 
In his dissertation and in the updated book version thereof, Karpf (2009, 2012) 
notes a substantial innovation and adoption gap between how progressives, or the Left, in 
the United States use DICTs compared to their conservative counterparts on the Right. 
While the Left has innovative social movement organizations like MoveOn.org, highly 
active online political communities like the blog-based community of the Daily Kos, and 
institutions to support online activism such as the aforementioned ActBlue online 
fundraising toolkit and the New Organizing Institute, a training and networking 
organization for progressive activists, the Right has failed to develop a competing online 
architecture (Karpf, 2009, 2012). This gap in online facility has translated, he argues, into 
an electoral advantage for the Democrats in the United States, which is likely to be 
sustained unless Republicans and the Right are able to build their own online capacity.  
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In seeking to explain this gap, Karpf posits three tentative hypotheses. The first is 
that there may be an inherently top-down quality to conservatism that diminishes the 
Right’s interest in developing interactive, open, and democratizing online portals. As 
Karpf (2009) explains, this argument holds that the Right in the United States is less 
populist and less interested in mass mobilization or community organizing than the Left, 
and that its members are embedded in more traditional organizations such as churches, 
and thus do not need to look online for community (p. 238-242). Karpf himself dismisses 
this explanation, arguing that it does not stand up to historical scrutiny in that the Right 
has a long tradition of community organizing and collective action innovation, as well as 
a tradition of engagement with new media technologies such as talk radio. Nevertheless, 
given the many examples of progressive online organizing in democracies worldwide, 
such as the global justice movement (Kavada, 2010; Mosca, 2010) and the environmental 
movement, it is worth exploring what role, if any, ideology plays in the adoption of 
particular internet-based organizational structures and organizing practices. It may be 
that, when examining social movements and collective action writ large, rather than just 
in the American context, the role of ideology is central to explaining variation in the 
usage of DICTs for political purposes. 
Out-party Innovation 
The second hypothesis that Karpf (2009, 2012) advances to explain the digital gap 
between the Left and Right in the United States is that the Left was forced to innovate 
online because the Democrats were out of power when interactive web technologies 
initially developed, a period which he dates to the mid-2000s, and specifically to the 
second administration of former U.S. President George Bush. Karpf hypothesizes that the 
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Left’s out-party status encouraged it to experiment with new organizing tactics, and that 
because the emergence of interactive web technologies happened to coincide with the 
period in which the Left was out of power, progressive activists chose DICTs as the 
venue for their political experimentation.  
The idea that being under political pressure encourages innovation has venerable 
antecedents. Mayhew (1974/2004), in his discussion of legislators’ actions, argued that 
legislators facing a greater electoral challenge were more likely to innovate in their 
campaigns, and such dynamics have indeed been found to play out in campaigns over 
time. Karpf argues that a similar process may have driven progressive activists to 
innovate during the Bush years; because they had little formal voice in politics as a result 
of the electoral losses of the Democratic Party, progressive activists were driven to use 
innovative tactics to make themselves heard, to influence policy, and to engage networks 
of people who shared a progressive identity during a period in which that identity found 
little expression in institutional politics. As DICTs were, at the time, emerging and 
developing, they were a natural forum for Left wing innovation at a time when the Left 
found it difficult to make its political voice heard.  
It is important to note that this hypothesis hinges on the existence of a close 
relationship between social movement organizations and political parties. After all, social 
movements are generally conceptualized as being outside of formal institutional politics, 
and so would have a perpetual incentive to innovate in that they would always be an “out-
party.” In Karpf’s argument, however, social movements and social movement 
organizations are seen as being integrated, to a greater or lesser degree, with formal 
political parties. This view sees political parties through a particular lens, the parties-as-
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networks lens that understand political parties in the United States as networks made up 
of “candidates and officeholders, formal party officers, loyal donors, campaign staffers, 
activists, allied interest groups, social movements, and friendly media outlets.” (Masket 
et al, 2009: p. 4; see also Schlesinger, 1985; Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009; Skinner, 
Masket, & Dulio, 2012).  
In order for the out-party innovation hypothesis to be credible, close ties – either 
ideological or in the form of overlapping networks of members – must exist between a 
social movement and a party that is out of power. In the American context, it is clear that 
such ties exist. For example, Heaney and Rojas (2011) demonstrate how the peace 
movement in the United States has been strongly influenced by the electoral fate of the 
Democratic Party. When the Democrats were out of power in 2007/2008, anti-war 
protests saw a large increase in participants, many of whom, as Heaney and Rojas (2011) 
determined through the use of surveys, identified themselves as Democratic Party 
members and activists. However, when the Democrats returned to power in 2008/2009, 
participation in anti-war protests declined and, as the authors discovered, that decline was 
due to the absence of participants who identified themselves as Democrats. To the extent 
that similar ties exist between parties and movements in other countries, I expect that 
those social movements that are aligned with parties that are out of power will be more 
likely to innovate than those that are aligned with incumbent parties, and that this 
innovation will take place in part online, where there are opportunities for groups that are 
unable to make themselves heard in the mainstream to craft and disseminate messages, as 
discussed earlier. This is the explanation Karpf (2009, 2012) favors for explaining the 
relative innovativeness of the American Left. I intend to conduct research that will test 
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this explanation. As I will describe more fully in my methods section, I will be including 
data from three culturally similar advanced democracies, in order to explore the extent to 
which this explanation is generally applicable (rather than being unique to the American 
progressive institutions that Karpf considers). 
First-mover Advantage 
The final explanation Karpf (2009, 2012) advances for explaining differential 
levels of online innovation between the American Left and Right is a corollary of the out-
party innovation hypothesis. Essentially, he suggests that the Left, because it was forced 
to innovate during the second Bush administration, enjoys a first-mover advantage 
online, and that this limits the Right’s ability to develop interactive online portals and 
communities. Karpf gives many examples of how, when the Right attempts to open up 
online forums to user input, they face ‘trolling’ by the multitudes of already-active 
progressive internet users, while online progressive forums enjoy such scale that 
conservative trolls are unable to overwhelm them in a similar fashion. For example, 
when, in the wake of Barack Obama’s victory in the 2008 presidential elections, a group 
of young Republicans launched a website called ideas.rebuildtheparty.com to solicit input 
from conservatives on how to improve the party’s campaign strategies, progressive 
pranksters flooded the site with joke recommendations such as “Hire more ninjas,” which 
became the most popular suggestion on the site (Karpf, 2009: p. 253-254).  
Karpf argues that this vulnerability to trolling is a function of the development life 
cycle of online hubs. Citing the example of Wikipedia, he describes how online sites 
experience a five-stage growth process, which he describes as: “(1) beginning with a tiny 
group of lead adopters who co-create the good, (2) expanding to a larger early adopter 
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class which is highly motivated but less technically skilled, (3) launching into the much 
larger early majority class, whose motivation and skill level is more varied and whose 
size pressures the system to adapt, (4) adopting protections against spammers and 
malicious attacks as the site attracts the late majority class and becomes recognized as 
“valuable online real estate,” and (5) dealing with challenges to institutional power 
structures.” (Karpf, 2010b: p. 14). In this process, it is only when a site has developed in 
scale and reach at the fourth stage that it becomes valuable online real estate, or, put 
another way, that it becomes effective and important. He argues that prior to reaching this 
scale, online hubs need to be free to develop under the radar starting with a small group 
of early innovators. However, because of the first-mover advantage enjoyed by online 
progressives, conservative online hubs do not have the luxury of developing organically; 
instead, “nascent [conservative] communities … face challenges and attacks before the 
necessary community-of-interest has formed to protect [them].” (Karpf, 2009: p. 252). It 
is plausible to imagine the first mover advantage accruing to any group in a particular 
issue space. For example, if anti-immigration activists in a particular country are able to 
develop a strong online presence and a large, engaged network of interested supporters, 
subsequent attempts to develop an online presence by those favoring immigration may 
face difficulties if the existing community of anti-immigration activists chooses to troll 
their sites or otherwise resist their development. I thus anticipate that social movements’ 
tendency to adopt DICTs will be influenced by the extent to which they face oppositional 
first-movers in the online space, and will search for evidence of such a relationship in my 
data.  
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A Proposed Model for Understanding Social Movement Adoption of DICTs 
While the extant literatures on DICTS and politics, social movements, and the use 
of DICTS by social movement organizations do not provide anything like a 
comprehensive model for DICT adoption by social movement organizations, they do 
provide the building blocks for constructing a contingent and partial one. Consistent with 
the “hybrid” and “iterative” approach to research I mentioned in my introduction (and 
will develop further below), the purpose of developing such a model is largely heuristic; 
that is, to help guide my research and initial expectations, while allowing for my findings 
to in turn refine my conceptual model. Drawing on prior research, my model includes 
five possible explanatory factors for explaining DICT adoption, with the latter 
conceptualized as having six interconnected components (see Figure 2.1). Further, I nest 
the overall model within national context, as I will explain below. 
 As can be seen, my explanatory variables include “diffusion,” or the adoption and 
use of DICTS through a kind of learning from other organizations with which one 
regularly interacts; “group characteristics” such as the age or income levels of a 
movement’s membership and/or organizational leadership; “ideology,” or how a 
movement’s philosophy does or does not fit with the arguably more interactive, less 
hierarchical qualities of DICTS; “out-party innovation,” or the extent to which DICTS 
are most useful to organizations with less access to more mainstream forms of 
communication and information dissemination; and “first-mover advantage,” or the 
extent to which the DICT environment becomes controlled by whomever “colonizes” this 
space first.  
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In addition, and again drawing on the literature discussed above, my heuristic 
model also lays out the specific uses to which DICTS can be put by social movement 
organizations, and that collectively make up what I mean by “DICT Adoption.” These 
include: fostering shared identities among members; facilitating new forms of 
organizational structure and logistics; developing and producing frames for 
understanding the issue(s) central to the movement and disseminating these frames 
(directly and through other media outlets) to members, other relevant organizations, and 
the larger public; motivating and facilitating action among members/participants through 
the provision of low-cost forms of participation; gathering and utilizing online data to 
assist in the activities described above; and, embracing internet-based activism as a 
legitimate and valuable form of social action.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Model of social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs 
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While my approach to exploring the relationships among these five explanatory 
variables and six outcome variables will be inductive and grounded, the literature 
discussed earlier does provide suggestions for starting points. Specifically, the literature 
leads me to the following expectations.  
First, I expect that the more connected a social movement organization is to other 
organizations, the greater will be its adoption of DICTs. Second, I anticipate that the 
demographic characteristics of social movement organizations’ members and organizers 
will affect the degree to which organizations adopt DICTs. In particular, I expect that 
organizations with younger, wealthier, and more educated members and organizers will 
adopt DICTs to a greater extent than organizations with older, less wealthy, and less 
educated members and organizers. Third, in the literature there is a suggestion that 
movement ideology plays a role in DICTs adoption, specifically, that organizations that 
are more politically progressive are more likely to adopt the democratizing, engaging, 
and open tools available in the internet age. I thus anticipate that the more progressive an 
organization, the more likely it is to be an intensive adopter of DICTs. Fourth, as 
discussed in the literature review, social movement organizations that are at political odds 
with the incumbent party may have a greater incentive to innovate with DICTs, and thus I 
expect that the less aligned with a social movement organization’s objectives the political 
party in power is, the higher that social movement organization’s adoption score will be. 
Finally, I have noted that some scholars have theorized that social movement 
organizations attempting to use DICTs may face an uphill struggle if ideological 
opponents are already highly active online, and thus I expect that the less active social 
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activists who are ideologically opposed to a given movement are online, the higher that 
social movements’ adoption score  
The above expectations will serve as a guide to the both the types of data I will 
gather and to the analysis to which I will subject that data. I hope to assess my data in the 
light of these expectations, noting areas of convergence and divergence with my 
expectations, and using these as a springboard to develop an account of why social 
movement organizations use DICTs in different ways.  
A core part of my argument throughout will be that the use of DICTS by social 
movement organizations is likely to be context dependent. This context includes the 
kinds of factors shown in my model, which capture the context particular to individual 
social movement organizations, but also variations that are tied to different national 
political, social and cultural conditions and histories. Without considering these nation-
level differences it is difficult to know how “transportable” empirical findings (and the 
theories on which they are based) are. This is a particular concern in the present study as 
most of the research identifying factors that influence the use of DICTS by social 
movement organizations that informs my approach has been conducted in the United 
States. In order to better understand the relationship among democratic political systems, 
social movement organizations, and the role of DICTs, then, it is helpful to examine 
movements in a cross-national perspective. Such an approach will enable me to begin to 
draw out what aspects of national culture and politics may be affecting the ways in which 
social movement organizations deploy DICTs in the pursuit of their political goals. As I 
will describe in chapter three, I will therefore select various countries for inclusion in my 
study, and explore how DICT adoption varies across national contexts. Although my 
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conclusions will therefore be subject to certain limitations imposed by my research 
design, I nevertheless offer insight into the role that national level factors play in DICT 
adoption by comparing organizations to peers in other nations, an issue that has 
heretofore been neglected by the literature. 
Conceptually, then, I will be examining the extent to which the model described 
above, supplemented by any additional factors that emerge during my inductive research 
process, explains variation in social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs across 
the countries I select, and comparing the levels and patterns of adoption within the three 
countries to see whether or not I can identify any salient differences across different 
national contexts. I will then attempt to link such differences to country-specific factors 
that offer possible explanations for national variation.  
Having offered a simple model of the specific elements I will be exploring in an 
attempt to better understand how and why organizations adopt DICTs to different 
degrees, I will now turn to a discussion of the specific methodologies I will be using to 
examine these, and the types of data I will bring to bear on these elements.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS  
This project aims to examine the extent to which the organizational factors that I 
have drawn from the literature and outlined in Figure 2.1 are associated with differences 
in the adoption of DICTs by social movement organizations, to assess whether part of the 
variation in social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs is explained by their 
national context (as opposed to their individual characteristics), and finally, to offer 
additional, inductively developed explanations for variations in adoption with reference 
to both organizational and country characteristics. To achieve this, I propose a multi-
pronged, small-n methodological approach, drawing on data gathered through the 
analysis of secondary sources, an organizational survey, semi-structured elite interviews, 
and a systematic examination of the content and structure of organizations’ websites. 
Using these data, I will attempt to parse out the degree to which the various explanations 
advanced by the literature hold true for the organizations I examine, to note any cross-
national differences in patterns of DICT adoption, and to develop additional explanations 
for variation in the use of DICTs.  
While my approach cannot offer conclusive evidence of causal relationships 
between the proposed explanatory and outcome variables2, I argue that it offers a great 
deal of value to the literature on the topic of the use of DICTs for political purposes. As 
the only systematic, cross-national examination of these questions of which I am aware, 
                                                           
2 There is an extensive philosophical literature on the subject of causality, and much debate on the nature of 
the phenomenon and the appropriate methods for demonstrating its existence (for overviews, see Brady & 
Collier, 2010; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994; see also Falleti & Lynch, 2009; Gerring, 2010; Grzymala-
Busse, 2011). Broadly speaking, however, scholars agree that for a causal relationship to exist between two 
variables, the following criteria must be met. First, the causal factor must precede the outcome factor in 
time. Second, there must be a demonstrable association between the causal factor and the outcome factor 
such that variation in the first is associated with change in the second. Finally, all other potential causal 
factors must be accounted for. Measured against these criteria, the qualitative, cross-sectional study I am 
proposing is inadequate to the task of demonstrating causality.  
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the present study will contribute to the field by offering an empirical test of proposed 
explanations, by documenting cross-national variation, and by providing evidence as to 
whether or not suggested explanatory factors are similarly important across national 
contexts. This will have the ancillary benefit of contributing to ongoing debates about the 
homogenizing power of the internet versus the determining power of national context.  
The Selection of Countries for Analysis 
The first step in conducting this project is to select countries for inclusion in the 
study. Generally speaking, there are two possible approaches one might take to 
conducting a transnational comparison. The first is to choose countries that maximize 
differences across key explanatory variables; for example comparing nations with 
radically different political systems, economic development, or technological 
sophistication that have similar values on an outcome variable. Such an approach enables 
a researcher to explore how different levels and sets of explanatory variables lead to 
broadly similar outcomes, and enables him or her to hypothesize about the relationships 
between various explanations and the outcome. The second approach is to compare 
similar nations that vary in terms of the outcome in order to control for certain broad 
explanatory variables and to enable the researcher to determine what more-subtle 
differences may account for differences in the outcome.  
My approach comes closer to the latter. I made this choice for several reasons. 
First, I am interested in the factors that explain DICT use by social movements beyond 
the obvious, such as those related to the availability of these technologies. This means the 
nations I choose should be similar in their levels of DICT development. Second, I am 
interested in understanding variations in the use of DICTS by social movements in 
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developed democracies. Scholars have argued that political activists in the Middle East 
turned to DICTs in order to circumvent state-owned media and to preserve their 
anonymity in the face of political repression (Axford, 2011; Harb, 2011; Howard and 
Hussain, 2011; Stepanova, 2011; Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheafer, 2013; Zhuo, Wellman, & 
Yu, 2011). One would not reasonably expect such dynamics to influence the behavior of 
social movement organizations in a democratic country like the U.S., where the media 
system is more accessible and where state repression is more limited. Similarly, the use 
of DICTs by activists in poor and technologically underdeveloped nations is also likely to 
be driven by different factors than their use by peers in advanced economies, as the levels 
of access, penetration, and available resources are different. Thus, comparing countries 
with very different forms of government would not enable me to distinguish unique 
factors that operate specifically in developed democracies. Third, as I will discuss below, 
I am interested in holding constant the nature of the specific issue(s) focused on by the 
social movement organizations I study; this requires me to choose cases where similar 
issues are politically relevant. Fourth, practical considerations of language, access, 
availability of relevant data, etc., necessarily influenced my choice of nations.  
 I therefore chose to conduct a most-similar-systems study, comparing countries 
that are similar on several key independent variables such as their political systems and 
levels of economic development, in order to identify what other, more-subtle national 
differences might lead to differences in the adoption of DICTS by social movement 
organizations. Specifically, the countries I have selected – Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States – share many common characteristics. First, they share a number of 
political features including civil rights that permit citizens to organize and act 
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collectively, and regular, competitive elections, which suggests that contentious 
collective action in these countries will follow broadly similar patterns; this is in contrast 
to autocratic countries, for example, in which contentious politics and the role of the 
internet therein are quite different (Axford, 2011; Baron, 2012). They also have similar 
levels of economic development – according to the World Bank they are all high-income 
countries; in 2011 per capita income in US dollars in the United Kingdom was $37,780, it 
was $48,620 in the United States, and $39,150 in Ireland (World Bank, 2013a). These 
similarities will enable me to control, to a certain extent, for the effect of democracy, free 
speech, and socio-economic development on the use of the internet in collective action. 
In addition, these countries have similar levels of internet penetration: according to 
World Bank data, in 2011 U.S. had 78.2 internet users per 100 people, the United 
Kingdom had 81.7, and Ireland had 76.8 (World Bank, 2013b). Thus, any differences in 
patterns of DICTs adoption by social movement organizations cannot be plausibly 
attributed to differences in access to technology. Furthermore, there are ideological 
similarities among these nations. All three are characterized by a left-right political 
spectrum, all three have tended to embrace, to a greater or lesser degree, neoliberal 
economic policies, and all face similar societal divisions over social issues such gay 
rights, abortion and reproductive rights (Bartlett, 2010; Bew, 2007; Childs, 2012; Jenkins, 
2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013; Kuklick, 2009; Weaver, & Rockman, 1993). Thus, the 
persuasive task facing social movement organizations in all three countries are similar, 
and the contexts in which they operate are also broadly similar. By comparing similar 
systems, I will be able to control, to a certain degree, for these obvious independent 
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variables, and thus more easily to identify less-obvious factors that may account for 
different patterns of adoption in the three countries under consideration.  
There are, of course, also many differences among the countries; differences that I 
hope will help me better understand the dynamics of DICT adoption in developed 
democracies. For example, the laws governing the online realm differ across countries, as 
do their political cultures, histories, and partisan dynamics, and any of these differences 
that could be plausibly expected to affect patterns of DICT adoption by social movement 
organizations within these three countries. As I showed, the question of country-level 
factors that may affect social movement organizations’ adoption of DICTs has not yet 
been addressed by the literature, and I therefore have no systematic expectations for how 
the pattern of DICT adoption will vary across countries. Nevertheless, by comparing 
three similar systems and drawing on various sources of data, including my elite 
interviews, I hope to be able to make some tentative suggestions as to how national 
context may affect the ways in which social movement organizations engage with DICTs 
beyond those organization-level explanations covered in the model presented above.  
The Selection of an Issue for Analysis 
In considering how best to select organizations within my chosen country, I 
explored the ways in which other studies selected their subjects. Most of the studies I 
considered confined themselves to a single country and often, to a single organization 
selected for convenience, and no study that I am aware of that offered a convincing 
method for randomly sampling from a clearly defined population of social movement 
organizations. However, a study by Stein (2009) that used a random sampling technique 
to gather a sample of social movement organizations in order to analyze their websites 
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provided some inspiration. Stein (2009) drew a random sample from organizations listed 
in the Encyclopedia of Associations: National, which provides information on non-profit 
membership associations in the U.S. that have national scope and reach. Stein (2009) 
used the index to find organizations that are associated with keywords linked to particular 
social issues such as the environment and media reform, and then selected a stratified 
random sample based on those issues. A key benefit of her approach was that, by 
selecting organizations on the basis of the issues with which they engage, she was able to 
obtain a sample of organizations that deal with politically important social issues that 
have attained national prominence; in other words, she was able to ensure that her sample 
included organizations that are actively involved with topical social issues. I thus elected 
to begin the process of identifying suitable organizations for inclusion in my study by 
identifying an issue that has attained prominence in the three countries under study.  
I made this choice for a number of reasons. First, I chose to focus on a single 
issue out of a desire to avoid introducing too many potential explanatory variables into 
my analysis. I am already considering three countries. If I were to then consider multiple 
issues across these countries, my analysis would be made unnecessarily complex. My 
goal was to identify a single issue that was attracting the attention of social movement 
organizations, political players, and the general public in all three of the countries under 
study. Further, I looked for an issue that involves a degree of contention between liberal 
and progressive elements, as one of the key factors in my heuristic model relates to the 
role of ideology in DICT adoption. I also wanted an issue that had attracted the support of 
similar groups across the three countries under question. For example, I rejected 
immigration as an option, as the differences among the countries under study were too 
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great. In the United States immigration has supporters and detractors across the political 
spectrum, and the issue is made more complex by the American tradition of welcoming 
immigrants and the unique economic relations that exist between the United States and its 
neighbors. In Ireland, immigration debates are intertwined with debates about Ireland’s 
relationship to the European Union, from which most of its immigrants originate, and 
Ireland’s long history as a source of emigrants, while in the United Kingdom, most 
migrants hail from former British colonies, and immigration debates tend to split more 
clearly along partisan lines. I thus preferred to find an issue that had a greater degree of 
similarity across the three countries under study.   
Ultimately, I identified gay rights as the issue I would focus on. Gay rights, and in 
particular, the issue of marriage equality for same-sex couples, has attracted attention 
from both conservative and progressive elements in the countries under consideration. As 
noted, one of my goals is to compare conservative and progressive organizations, and the 
selection of organizations that have played some role in debates around gay rights makes 
such a comparison possible. Over the last few years, the issue of same-sex marriage has 
attained a high degree of prominence in the three countries under consideration, with 
proponents and opponents engaging in protests, marches, and other forms of collective 
action. In the U.K., same-sex marriage was recently legalized after a significant battle for 
public opinion (“Same-sex marriage becomes law,” 2013); in the U.S., a Supreme Court 
battle over the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in late 2013, and the 
legalization or prohibition of same-sex marriage by a number of states has raised the 
prominence of the issue (“Supreme Court bolsters gay marriage,” 2013); and in Ireland, a 
referendum will be held in 2015 on the issue of same-sex marriage in the wake of 
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extensive campaigning on the issue (“Referendum on gay marriage,” 2013). The issue 
was thus prominent and actively contested in all three countries under study during the 
period in which I gathered my data. 
In addition, the contours of the debate around marriage equality were similar in all 
of the countries under consideration. In all three countries, as I will show, liberal and 
progressive political parties, organizations, and individuals advanced the cause of same-
sex marriage citing the principles of equality before the law, fairness, and personal 
freedom as reasons for the legalization of same sex marriage. In all three countries, 
conservative groups, individuals, and political parties opposed same-sex marriage, citing 
religious prohibitions and traditional family values as key reasons for their rejection of 
marriage equality. Economic issues played only a marginal role in the debate, typically 
when issues of access to tax benefits for married couples were discussed, and by and 
large, the tenor of the debates in both countries was broadly similar, an assessment I 
made based on reading 338 news articles on the topic of gay rights and marriage equality, 
as I will discuss below.  
The Selection of Organizations for Analysis 
Having thus identified both the countries and an issue to focus on, my next task 
was to identify the particular organizations that would be included in my study. In 
deciding how best to select subjects, I considered a number of alternative methods. First, 
I considered using a list of registered organizations such as that used by Stein (2009). 
Registered non-profits or charities, lists of which are available in all three countries under 
consideration, are, however, not identical with social movement organizations; they 
include organizations providing services in an apolitical fashion, and thus do not fulfill 
 
 
60
the terms of the definition of social movements provided in the literature review. The 
U.S. offers lists of registered lobbyists, which capture a certain type of politically 
engaged organization, but the definition of a lobbyist is also not identical with that of a 
social movement organization, and neither the U.K. nor Ireland currently maintains a 
registry of lobbyists. There is no standardized list of registered social movement 
organizations in any of the countries under study, and thus no readymade sampling frame 
that I could access. I then considered using a web search to identify suitable 
organizations. However, as my interest is in the use of DICTs by social movement 
organizations, relying on an online search to identify suitable organizations would put me 
at risk of selecting on the dependent variable, which can lead to biased estimation of 
relationships among independent and dependent variables in any regression-type analysis 
where a researcher is attempting to link explanations to outcomes (Collier & Mahoney, 
1996; Geddes, 1990; Lustick, 1996). Ultimately, I chose to select organizations based on 
neither their legal status nor their web presence, but rather on the basis of their media 
prominence. Specifically, I identified organizations for inclusion in my study by 
conducting a search of newspaper archives for references to organizations that were 
involved in collective action around the issue of gay rights.  
In order to identify suitable pro- and anti-gay rights organizations, I conducted a 
search of the archives of two national newspapers in each of the countries under study, 
namely the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal in the U.S., The Guardian and 
The Times in the U.K., and The Irish Times and The Irish Independent in Ireland. I 
searched two years of archived material, from September 2011 to September 2013 for 
reference to gay rights, same-sex marriage, and marriage equality. After eliminating 
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duplicates and irrelevant pieces, I was left with 338 articles. I examined each of the 338 
articles I found, and listed any organizations that were identified in the articles as having 
been involved in some form of collective action with respect to gay rights, noting those 
organizations that were mentioned most frequently. Using this approach I identified 53 
organizations in the three countries under study that were mentioned in the news 
coverage. These organizations are listed in Table 3.1 below. Thirty of the organizations 
were described advocating on behalf of gay rights and marriage equality, while twenty-
three were reported as opposing the extension of certain civil rights such as the right to 
marry to homosexuals. The organizations listed in Table 3.1 meet my definition of social 
movement organizations as they have been engaged in collective political action over 
shared grievances related to a prominent social issue. In addition, they represent a group 
of organizations that has succeeded at the tasks of fostering shared identity, mobilizing 
individuals, and taking action. There is a possibility that there is a relationship between 
the degree to which the organizations use DICTs and their success in attracting media 
attention. However, this is not necessarily the case. Organizations that attract media 
attention will typically be those that have coordinated a significant collective action 
event, such as a large protest, which is certainly possible in the absence of DICTs, as the 
long history of collective action indicates. Indeed, using this method is perhaps the only 
way to identify organizations that have succeeded in organizing without using DICTs, as 
well as those that have succeeded with using them. Thus, by using this method I have a 
reasonable chance of finding successful social movement organizations that have 
organized without using DICTs, as well as those that rely on DICTs for their 
effectiveness.
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Table 3.1: Organizations involved in collective action around the issue of gay rights 
United Kingdom United States Ireland 
Pro-gay rights Anti-gay rights Pro-gay rights Anti-gay rights Pro-gay rights Anti-gay rights 
Campaign for 
Homosexual Equality 
Society for the 
Protection of Unborn 
Children 
Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and 
Defenders 
American Family 
Association 
Gay & Lesbian 
Equality Network 
Iona Institute 
LGBT+ Liberal 
Democrats 
Gay marriage no thanks 
Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance Against 
Defamation  
MassResistance  LGBT Noise 
Irish Episcopal 
Conference  
Gay and Lesbian 
Humanist Association 
Catholic Truth Marriage Equality USA 
Concerned Women for 
America 
Marriage Equality 
Ireland 
Youth Defence 
Homosexual Law 
Reform Society 
Anglican Mainstream 
DignityUSA (Catholic 
Church) 
Focus on the Family 
Changing Attitude 
Ireland  
Family & Life 
The Lesbian & Gay 
Foundation (LGF) 
La Manif Pour Tous  Out & Equal 
National Organization 
for Marriage  
Gay & Lesbian Unions 
Eire 
Evangelical Alliance 
Ireland 
LGBT Network Evangelical Alliance 
Human Rights 
Campaign 
Defend the Family L.inC Ireland Stand Up 
OutRage!   Freedom to Marry  
Campaign for Children 
and Families 
Outhouse 
Council for the Status 
of the Family 
Queer Youth Network 
(Q.Y.N.) 
  
Family Equality 
Council 
Institute for Marriage 
and Public Policy 
OutWest   
Lesbian and Gay 
Christian Movement  
  
Gender Public 
Advocacy Campaign 
Americans for Truth 
About Homosexuality 
Rainbow Support 
Services  
  
Stonewall   Lamda Legal 
Heterosexuals 
Organized for a Moral 
Environment 
BeLoGTo   
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By selecting only the most active organizations, I am also biasing my sample 
towards organizations that have succeeded. However, this is not necessarily a conceptual 
problem for this study. My goal is not to determine whether DICTs affect organizations’ 
success, but rather to identify what factors are associated with the use or non-use of 
DICTs by organizations. Thus, selecting successful organizations should not bias my 
analysis, but will rather aid me by making it easier to obtain the information I need.  
I do not claim that this selection process has resulted in my obtaining a random 
sample representative of a population. My sample is non-random, and includes only 
successful organizations that have attracted media attention and that engage with a 
particular subset of social issues. However, my sample has been selected to ensure that I 
obtain a selection of organizations that are free to differ in terms of their adoption of 
DICTs, that meet the criteria for the type of organization that interests me, and that are 
sufficiently large and successful to be able to provide the type of information I require for 
my analysis. As I analyze the patterns of relationships among the factors I plan to explore 
in this portion of the study, I will keep in mind the limitations of the set of organizations 
that I have selected.  
Having outlined how I selected my cases for this study, I will now move to a 
discussion of the specific methods I used to gather the data I needed in order to evaluate 
and explore my heuristic model, as well as providing some detail on the types of data I 
have collected.  
Gathering Data on Political and Legislative Environments  
In order to contextualize the environments in which the organizations I have 
selected operate, I gathered data on each country’s key political institutions, system of 
 
 
64
government, and communications environment. These data were drawn from secondary 
sources, and included data related to laws governing the behavior of social movement 
organizations, with particular attention to any laws addressing the use of DICTs. The goal 
of my analysis of national context is to explore any cross-national differences I find in 
how organizations in these three countries adopt DICTs. Thus, my goal in gathering data 
on the political and legislative contexts within each country is to find information that 
will be useful for understanding the ways in which the countries under study are similar 
or different, with the intention of ultimately linking these differences to any cross-
national variation.  
As noted, I was unable to identify any country-level variables in the literature that 
scholars have advanced as explanations for transnational variation in the adoption of 
DICTs by social movement organizations in developed democracies. Thus, my task is to 
determine whether the patterns of adoption differ across the three countries under 
consideration by gathering data on these organizations, and then to offer plausible 
explanations of the particular national factors that may affect their adoption of DICTs. 
The background research I have conducted serves as a starting point for such 
theorization; it will be supplemented with qualitative data drawn from interviews, as I 
will explain below. Although I do not know a priori which particular factors will prove to 
be important, I anticipate that three core areas of difference are likely candidates: 
differences in the laws involving internet governance, differences in political culture, and 
differences in the intensity of competition over social issues.  
As an example of how such issues may be relevant, consider laws around the use 
of data on the internet. The laws related to the use of cookies differ in the U.S. and the 
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European Union; in the E.U. websites are required to provide visitors with a notice saying 
that they use cookies and requesting user permission to do so. This may potentially 
discourage organizations in Ireland and the U.K. from using cookies as intensively as 
organizations in the United States. However, the warning only notes that cookies are 
used, and offers no information on the number or full purpose thereof, and so this may 
not be a disincentive to use a large number of cookies, but may only affect the decision of 
whether or not to use cookies at all. I will, therefore pay close attention to such laws and, 
during my collection of organizational data, to any national variation in the pattern of 
cookie use. Should the sites in the E.U. show less inclination to use cookies, this may 
suggest that disclosure laws affect organizations’ propensity to gather data online, an 
important issue for scholars who argue that regulation is needed to protect online privacy. 
This is one example of how national context may inform my theorizing about what 
factors affect organizations’ adoption of DICTs. In chapter five, I discuss cross-national 
differences in patterns of adoption, and attempt to theoretically link those to the data I 
have gathered on national political and legislative contexts. 
Gathering Data on Organizations  
Having outlined the manner in which I selected social movement organizations 
for inclusion in my study and how I collected background data on the environments in 
which they operate, I will now turn to a closer consideration of the types of data I 
collected about the organizations themselves. My data-gathering efforts fell into four 
primary categories. First, I conducted an in-depth analysis of each organization’s web 
presence. I did both a close reading and a systematic cataloging of web materials, 
including organizational websites, social media, forums, cookies, privacy policies, 
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disclosure statements, and terms of use agreements, in order to gather data on a range of 
factors. Second, I fielded an online survey to each organization, asking a range of 
questions about DICT usage, online strategies, organizational structure, and online 
experiences. Third, I conducted twelve in-depth elite interviews with people at ten of the 
organizations under study, building insight into their relationship to DICTs and the role 
such technologies play in their organizations. Finally, I used a number of secondary 
sources such as newspaper articles, political party policy documents, public opinion data, 
and offline materials published by the organizations under study to further supplement 
the data I gather using other methods.  
Analysis of web materials. To gather data on DICT adoption, I relied primarily 
on in-depth analysis of each organization’s web presence. I visited each organization’s 
website several times between October 2013 and June 2014, using a codebook (included 
in appendix one) to empirically measure various aspects of the site, as well as spending 
time exploring each site to get a sense of the way in which it was updated, how people 
interacted through and with the site, and what types of content were most regularly 
created and shared. I took extensive notes while examining the websites, building up my 
understanding of what each organization appeared to be doing with its online portals, and 
how intensively such portals were updated and visited. In addition, I examined the 
organizations’ Facebook pages where available, followed their Twitter accounts where 
available, and visited any other social or external media sites they mentioned, including 
YouTube and external blogs. I also took notes on patterns of interactivity, such as the 
frequency of retweeting of organizations’ tweets, the number of comments on their blogs 
and Facebook posts, and other forms of online interaction. In order to assess 
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organizations’ data-gathering processes, I included data-gathering questions in my survey 
(see appendix two), but also used data collected in my analysis of organizations’ 
websites. Specifically, I took note of what cookies each site used, and whether or not 
third-party cookies were used. To do this, I used two approaches. First, I visited each site 
with a newly installed and cookie-free Chrome browser, using the cookie monitoring 
browser utility Collusion (https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/collusion-for-
chrome/ganlifbpkcplnldliibcbegplfmcfigp?hl=en) to note the number of cookies used on 
each site’s homepage and the presence or absence of third-party tracking cookies. I then 
repeated the process of visiting each site, this time using a newly installed and cookie free 
copy of Firefox and the browser utility Lightbeam, again noting the number of cookies 
that the homepage inserted into my browser and whether or not third party cookies were 
included. Wherever possible, I also read through the sites’ privacy policies, user 
agreements, and site disclosures, although only six sites had such documentation. 
To supplement my web material data pool, and for purposes of comparison, 
wherever possible I tracked organizations’ offline activities, relying on news alerts to 
monitor offline meetings and events, and asking interview subjects about their offline 
tactics. My goal in gathering these data was to develop a sense of each organization’s 
DICT adoption, usage practices, and relative sophistication, as well as to assess how 
successful each organization has been at using various online tools, and whether or not 
each organization displayed a clear preference for online or offline activities. With 
specific reference to my heuristic model, the data I gathered from my analysis of web 
materials was used to measure and evaluate a number of elements. These data were 
brought to bear on my analysis of a number of dimensions of DICT adoption, including 
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the promotion of shared identities, organizational structure, framing, low-cost online 
actions, data-gathering and data-mining, and internet-based activism. Furthermore, these 
data informed my assessment of organizational connectedness, member and organizer 
characteristics, organizational ideological orientation, and first-mover advantage (see 
Table 3.2).  
I conducted a range of simple statistical analyses of the data I gathered using the 
codebook in appendix one, the results of which I will present in my analytical chapters 
below. I also qualitatively analyzed the notes I took describing and assessing each of the 
sites under study, noting patterns and interesting aspects of the sites and incorporating 
these observations into my evaluation of my heuristic model and into my theory-building 
process, as I will recount more fully in my analytical chapter. 
Organizational survey. My second data-gathering tool was an organizational 
survey, which I fielded between January and March of 2014. The survey was built using 
Qualtrics software, and was hosted on the Qualtrics server; I have included a full copy of 
the survey questionnaire and the accompanying consent form in appendix two. I initially 
contacted 48 of the 53 organizations under study with an e-mail invitation to participate 
in the online survey on January 6th, 2014. Four of the organizations under study, namely 
Gay & Lesbian Unions Eire, Gender Public Advocacy Campaign, Homosexual Law 
Reform Society, and Rainbow Support Services, did not have active websites providing 
e-mail addresses, only cached sites. One organization, Council for the Status of the 
Family, had no web presence at all. I attempted to contact these five organizations 
through other means, including the postal service, but was unable to connect with them; I 
believe the organizations in question to be defunct, and excluded them from my analysis.  
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Table 3.2: Summary of variables and methodologies 
Factor Method 
Adoption   
Promotion of shared identities 
Analysis of web content, assessment 
of offline activity 
Organizational structure 
Analysis of web content, 
organizational survey 
Framing 
Analysis of web content, assessment 
of offline activity 
Low-cost online action 
Analysis of web content, assessment 
of offline activity 
Data-gathering and data-mining 
Cookie monitoring software, 
analysis of privacy policies, 
disclosures, and terms of use, 
organizational survey 
Internet-based activism 
Analysis of web content, assessment 
of offline activity 
Organizational connectedness 
Analysis of web content, link 
analysis, news coverage analysis, 
organizational survey 
Member characteristics 
Public opinion poll data, 
organizational survey, analysis of 
web content 
Organizer characteristics  
Analysis of web content, news 
coverage analysis, organizational 
survey 
Ideological orientation  
Analysis of web content, news 
coverage analysis 
Out-party status Analysis of incumbent party policy 
First-mover advantage 
Analysis of web content, 
organizational survey 
 
I made follow-up contacts by e-mail with the organizations that had not yet 
completed the survey on January 27th, 2014, and again by e-mail and phone between 
February 24th and February 26th, 2014. Twenty-six organizations initiated the survey 
(49% of the total), but only sixteen fully completed it, giving me a 30.2% response rate. 
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Of the sixteen complete surveys, liberal organizations completed ten and conservative 
organizations completed six. Note that my measure of the ideological orientation of an 
organization is straightforward; I considered an organization to be progressive if it favors 
marriage equality, protection from hate crimes, anti-discrimination legislation, and 
adoption rights for gay couples, and conservative if it opposes marriage equality, rejects 
anti-discrimination laws, or opposes allowing gay couples to adopt children. Importantly, 
many of the organizations under study are not primarily concerned with LGBTQ issues. 
Because I included organizations that were mentioned in news coverage of gay rights 
issues, some of the organizations included in the study are not ones that lobby exclusively 
around such issues, but rather organizations that take a generally liberal or conservative 
position on social issues and were solicited by reporters for comment on gay rights, or 
participated in some type of protest action on the issue. Thus, these organizations should 
not be thought of as exclusively gay rights organizations, but rather as organizations that 
have been involved in some capacity in gay rights issues. My assessment of the 
organizations’ ideological orientations was made based on data drawn from newspaper 
coverage and my analysis of online and to a lesser extent printed materials produced by 
each organization; Table 3.1, presented earlier, reflects my assessment of the ideological 
positions of the organizations under study based on my analysis.  
The organizational survey addressed a number of issues, including the structure of 
the organization, its target audiences and preferred means of engagement therewith, as 
well as issues of data-gathering and of the experiences the organization has had online (a 
full copy of the survey is included in appendix two). The survey data served to enrich my 
analysis and assessment of a number of the elements of my heuristic model, including 
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organizational structure, data-gathering and data-mining, organizational connectedness, 
member and organizer characteristics, and first-mover advantage (see Table 3.2). I will 
discuss the survey results and my analysis thereof, in the analytical chapters below.  
Elite interviews. As my goal is not only to evaluate the heuristic model I 
provided earlier, but also to inductively develop additional and supplemental 
explanations for why certain organizations use DICTs in particular ways, I conducted a 
series of in-depth interviews with subjects who work at several of the organizations under 
study (a copy of the consent form provided to all interview subjects is included in 
appendix three). By gathering this type of qualitative data, I was able to refine my 
interpretation of the data I gathered by other means, and to develop some fresh insights 
into organizations’ DICT-related choices and practices. I began the interview process by 
interviewing eight subjects at eight different organizations, five of them liberal and three 
conservative. As I gathered and began to evaluate survey and website data, I conducted 
further interviews. I re-interviewed two individuals employed at two of the conservative 
organizations I had previously interviewed, and conducted interviews with two more 
individuals, one at a liberal organization and one at a conservative organization. In total, I 
conducted twelve interviews with ten subjects, representing six liberal organizations and 
four conservative organizations. The initial wave of interviews I conducted in January 
and February 2014 primarily addressed questions related to my heuristic model, 
supplemented with fresh questions arising out of the conversations I had. My second 
wave of interviews, conducted in March 2014 and May 2014, served to reassess some of 
my conclusions and concepts, and to further develop some of my emerging ideas. The 
data gathered with these elite interviews informed my analysis of all aspects of my 
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heuristic model, and supplied me with data that enabled me to develop fresh ideas on 
what drives organizations to adopt DICTs; I will fully discuss these interviews and the 
data I gathered through them in my analytical chapters. 
Secondary sources. The final tool I used to gather relevant data was an 
examination of various secondary sources. First, I used the newspaper articles I collected 
when identifying subjects for my research to help identify organizations’ offline activities 
related to the promotion of shared identities, framing efforts, and propensity to organize 
low-cost online activities and to embrace internet activism. My analysis of these 
materials also informed my assessment of these organizations’ relations with other 
organizations, organizer and member characteristics, and ideological orientation (see 
Table 3.2).  
Second, I evaluated the policy statements of the incumbent political parties of the 
countries under study in January 2014 in order to identify their policies with respect to 
gay rights and same-sex marriage, with the goal of determining whether the organizations 
under study should be considered in or out parties (see Table 3.2). I defined the 
incumbent party as the party that controlled the most senior branch of the legislature. In 
the United States, the Senate was controlled by the Democratic Party in January 2014, as 
was the presidency, so I considered that the incumbent party. In the United Kingdom, the 
House of Commons and the Cabinet was dominated by a coalition between the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, with the Conservative Party holding a 
greater number of seats and ministerial appointments. I thus considered the Conservative 
Party to be the incumbents, but analyzed both Conservative and Liberal Democrat policy 
documents to determine the state of current British governmental policy on LGBTQ 
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issues. In Ireland, the incumbent 31st Dáil was a coalition between Fine Gael and the 
Labour Party, with Fine Gael holding more seats and having won a greater proportion of 
the vote. I considered Fine Gael to be the incumbent party, but analyzed both Fine Gael’s 
and the Labour Party’s policy documents to determine current Irish policy towards gay 
rights.  
Finally, I assessed previously collected public opinion data in order to draw some 
conclusions about the likely characteristics of the audiences for the various organizations 
under study (see Table 3.2). I assumed that organizations promoting gay rights would 
tend to target individuals whom they believe will be inclined to support them and vice-
versa for conservative organizations. Therefore, I assumed that by examining public 
opinion data indicating the demographic and other characteristics of individuals who 
supported or opposed various aspects of gay rights, such as marriage equality, I could 
draw some inferences about the type of individuals that conservative and liberal 
organizations were trying to communicate with. Happily, such data were freely available. 
In the United Kingdom, quarterly surveys have been conducted by public opinion polling 
organization YouGov that have measured support for gay marriage, broken down by age, 
gender, political partisanship, and socioeconomic status since 2011 (YouGov, 2013). In 
addition, in 2014, polling organization ComRes conducted a poll of British adults on the 
topic of gay marriage (ComRes, 2014), and a 2012 poll by Angus Reid Global examined 
attitudes to marriage equality (Angus Reid Public Opinion, 2012). In the United States, 
polls measuring support for gay marriage and other gay rights broken down by a range of 
demographic characteristics include polls by public opinion research firm Gallup (2013), 
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2011), the Public Religion 
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Research Institute (2014) and Quinnipiac University (2013). In Ireland, polls addressing 
support for gay marriage among the Irish broken down by various demographic 
characteristics include a 2011 survey by the Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform (2012) and a 2012 public opinion survey by polling organization MillwardBrown 
(2012). As I will discuss below, I examined all of these polls, and selected a single poll 
from each country that provided both detailed demographic data for those who support 
and oppose gay rights and information on methodology, and that was conducted in the 
months before my data collection period began, thus ensuring that the data were relevant 
to the period I examined. I will discuss the details of these various data in the analytical 
chapters below, when I address the issue of the relationship between member or 
supported characteristics and the propensity to adopt DICTs.  
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLORING THE HEURISTIC MODEL: DICT ADOPTION AND 
FACTORS THAT PREDICT IT 
The first analytical task I face is exploring how well the heuristic model I 
developed earlier explains what I found when I examined my data. In the model I 
proposed five drivers of DICT adoption by social movement organizations: diffusion, 
group characteristics, ideology, out-party innovation, and first-mover advantage. I further 
proposed that there would be differences between organizations grouped by country, 
arguing that national context was likely to play some role in the degree to which 
organizations hosted in a particular nation adopted DICTs. Per this model, DICT 
adoption is my key dependent variable, which is to say, it is the outcome that I am 
primarily interested in explaining. Therefore, I will begin this section with a discussion of 
how I developed an assessment of the degree to which different organizations adopted 
DICTs. I will then move on to a discussion of the other elements of my model, namely 
the factors that I anticipate will influence the degree to which organizations adopt DICTs.  
DICT Adoption 
My analysis of the organizations’ DICT adoption was informed primarily by my 
assessment of their websites, supplemented with other forms of data as I will discuss 
below. The first step was determining whether or not each organization listed above did 
or did not have a website. As noted earlier, 48 out of the 53 organizations under study did 
indeed have websites. Four of the organizations under study, namely Gay & Lesbian 
Unions Eire, Gender Public Advocacy Campaign, Homosexual Law Reform Society, and 
Rainbow Support Services, did not have active websites, only partial, cached sites. One 
organization, Council for the Status of the Family, had no web presence at all that I was 
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able to find. As all my offline efforts to locate these organizations failed, I considered 
them to be defunct, and excluded them from my analysis, as I was unable to gather any 
meaningful data about them. However, the study of organizations that eschew the use of 
online tools would doubtless add a great deal of insight into the processes of DICT 
adoption, and future research should be directed at such organizations.   
Using the codebook reproduced in appendix one, I evaluated the remaining 48 
organizations’ online activities. I noted the degree to which different organizations used 
various forms of social media, including their proclivity to post and the number of likes, 
followers, or views they collected. I considered the features of their websites. As 
discussed in the literature review, one of the ways in which DICT adoption can serve 
organizations is by providing them with a range of low to no-cost actions that individuals 
can take that will move them towards full participation in the organizations’ work. Thus, 
I measured elements such as the inclusion of an online donation option, the invitation to 
subscribe to an e-newsletter, and the provision of information about concrete actions site 
visitors could take to support the organization (other than donation). I was also interested 
in interactive elements, as much of the literature is concerned with the ways in which 
online affordances can make social movement organizations more interactive and open to 
member input. Thus, I measured elements such as the incorporation of user-generated 
content, the provision of a forum in which site visitors could interact with one another, 
and the presence or absence of contact details that would make it relatively simple for a 
site visitor to contact the organization directly. I measured organizations’ use of cookies, 
as detailed earlier, as one of the elements in my analysis of their data gathering 
sophistication. In the pages that follow, I will begin by discussing my specific findings 
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with respect to the various elements of organizational DICT adoption that I gathered in 
the course of my analysis of online materials. I will then describe how these relate to my 
heuristic model, and explain how I developed my overall evaluation of organizations’ 
degree of DICT adoption.  
Use of basic web affordances. The first dimension along which I explored DICT 
adoption was what I called the use of basic web affordances. In order to examine this 
dimension, I combined my dichotomous measures of whether or not a site had a media 
section – I interpreted this as a marker of sophistication as it indicated that the site was 
built to serve multiple audiences – along with my dichotomous measures of whether or 
not the site included an online donation option, whether or not the site included video (as 
an indicator of multimedia sophistication), whether or not the site included an 
organizational blog, whether or not the site included a section with options for taking 
action, and whether or not the site offered the option to sign up for an e-mail newsletter.  
Table 4.1: Use of basic web affordances 
  Yes No 
Online donation option 77% 23% 
Blog 77% 23% 
Take action section 69% 31% 
E-mail newsletter signup 65% 35% 
Video 58% 42% 
Media section 50% 50% 
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Table 4.1 provides a summary of my results for each measure. As you can see, the 
majority of sites offered each of the elements considered. However, few sites included all 
of them.  
As Figure 4.1 shows, over half of the organizations under study used five or six of 
the basic web affordances described above. However, 38% of organizations used just 
one, two, or three of these affordances, suggesting meaningful variation on this 
dimension – some websites were much more sophisticated and complex than others. As 
part of my evaluation of organizations adoption of DICTs, I used my dichotomous 
measures of whether or not each organization used each of the web affordances listed in 
Table 4.1 to create a single measure of web affordance usage use scaled from 0 to 6. The 
mean score on this dimension for all organizations was 4.11.  
Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of web affordances 
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In terms of my qualitative evaluation of these sites’ contents, one of the things 
that struck me was the extent to which organizations that included blogs used those blogs 
to discuss and interpret news articles and materials from elsewhere on the web. The vast 
majority of the posts published in organizations’ blogs referred to a news event or news 
articles, and discussed the implications and interpretation of that event. Indeed, as one of 
my interview subjects, Keith3, a man who founded and runs a conservative organization 
in the United States, said, the primary reason that his organization produces and 
maintains a website is to provide site visitors with an alternative interpretation of news, 
and to increase their awareness of news stories that did not receive significant attention in 
the mainstream media. Similarly, Sara, a young woman responsible for communications 
at an Irish organization that is lobbying for marriage equality ahead of the Irish 
referendum, said that one of the most important things her website does is to collect news 
stories related to LGBTQ issues from around the world and to share them with members 
and site visitors along with commentary highlighting the moral rightness of marriage 
equality and equal rights. Said Sara, “We want people to understand that this is a 
worldwide issue, and that Ireland needs to be on the right side of it. We want to show 
people that this is a human rights issue, and something that other people and really, other 
places and countries, that they’re wrestling with this too. We want to show that this is a 
moral issue, human rights, you know, an equality issue. People need to think about same 
sex marriage as being an issue about equality and equal rights. And so we write about 
these news and events and share these articles to help educate people on this.”  In other 
                                                           
2 Not his real name. My interview subjects all requested anonymity, and I have therefore used pseudonyms 
in the text in order to facilitate readers’ comprehension while maintaining the anonymity of my 
respondents. 
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words, the organizations that included blogs on their sites almost all used those blogs to 
frame issues for site visitors to a greater or lesser degree – blogging was the most 
prominent way in which organizations attempted to frame events and issues for their 
members.  
As discussed in the literature review above, one of the core tasks of an advocacy 
organization is building frames, or promoting a particular interpretation of a social 
problem, and a particular solution thereto. The organizations under study used their blogs 
to develop and promote frames, and to reframe news and events in such a way as to 
promote their perspective on the issue of marriage equality. Whether or not this is an 
effective strategy is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of the present study; I gathered no 
evidence on whether site visitors adopted organizational framing of the issue, or whether 
the frames developed in organizations’ blogs had an impact on the framing of gay rights 
issues in the mainstream media (for some evidence on this topic, see DeLuca, Lawson, & 
Sun, 2012, whom I cited earlier). While the ultimate question of whether or not attempts 
at alternative framing online are successful at altering social conversations around issues 
remains unanswered in the present study, it is nevertheless interesting to note that 
attempts at framing are a key feature of organizations’ online efforts.  
Social media. The second key dimension I evaluated using the data I collected on 
organizations’ websites was their use of social media. Table 4.2 indicates the proportions 
of organizations’ using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. I selected these three social 
media platforms, and no others, for two reasons. First, these are the most popular 
platforms among internet users in the three countries under study. According to a 
proprietary report by global digital media and marketing research firm eMarketer, in the 
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United Kindgom, Facebook and Twitter were the most popular social networking sites by 
unique visitors in 2012, and in the United States, Facebook and Twitter were the most 
popular social media sites by share of visits (eMarketer, 2013). The report provided no 
data on Ireland, however, the Irish government reports that Facebook and Twitter are the 
country’s most popular social networking sites (Passport to trade 2.0, 2013). 
Furthermore, a report by Sandvine, a Canadian broadband provider, showed that 
YouTube accounted for 15.43% of US internet traffic in 2012, second only to Netflix 
with 28.9%, and for 21.3% of internet traffic in Europe, making it the single largest 
online destination in the region (Sandvine, 2013). In other words, these three site are 
among the most popular web destinations in the countries under study. Second, these 
three sites were by far the most common social networking sites I encountered in my 
analysis of these organizations’ online web presence. Only very rarely were other sites 
linked to or updated, and when they were, it was typically a site like Digg, which 
aggregates news and allows for its sharing, but which does not allow for much interaction 
or community building beyond the sharing of web articles. Typically, certain 
organizations would include a Digg button on their blogs, to enable readers to share the 
content, but otherwise not engaging with the site at all. I therefore focused my efforts on 
the platforms that organizations use, namely Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. 
Table 4.2: Social media 
  Yes No 
Facebook 75% 25% 
Twitter 75% 25% 
YouTube  52% 48% 
  
 
 
82
As can be seen in Table 4.2, most organizations use Facebook and Twitter, and a 
majority have a YouTube channel. When looking at the distribution of organizations by 
social media usage, I found that 21% of organizations used no social media at all, 2% 
used one form of social media, 31% used two forms of social media, and 46% used all 
three of the social media tools I measured, indicating some variance in social media 
usage. As part of my evaluation of organizations adoption of DICTs, I used my 
dichotomous measures of whether or not each organization used each of the tools listed to 
create a single measure of social media use scaled from 0 to 3. The mean score on this 
variable was 2.02; the frequency distribution is graphed below in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution of social media usage 
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organizations that have a Facebook page, 86% update their pages weekly, and 75% 
update them daily; some organizations that have Facebook pages – some 14% – are thus 
relatively infrequent updaters. On Twitter, 92% of organizations with a Twitter feed 
Tweeted weekly, and 69% daily, while on YouTube, 52% of organizations loaded new 
video regularly. Thus, there was variation in how intensively organizations updated their 
social media outlets, with YouTube being the least frequently updated, which makes 
sense given the complexity of creating a video compared with the relative simplicity of 
writing a short Tweet or Facebook update. Furthermore, there was a great deal of 
variation in the attention organizations managed to garner on social media. Among 
organizations that maintained Facebook pages, the number of likes their pages attracted 
ranged from 74 for Ireland Stand up to 1,603,798 for the Human Rights Campaign; 
among organizations that maintained a Twitter feed, the number of followers they 
attracted ranged from 233 for OutWest to 372,000 for the Human Rights Campaign; and 
among organizations that maintained a YouTube channel, the number of subscribers they 
attracted ranged from 56 for the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children to 21,228 
for the Human Rights Campaign. Thus, organizations displayed varying degrees of social 
media success, despite the widespread use of social media, with the Human Rights 
Campaign clearly dominating the social media space among these organizations.  
Interestingly, the Human Rights Campaign, which had almost 500,000 more 
Facebook likes than the next most-popular organization, Focus on the Family, with 
1,116,649, is an organization that attracted a lot of attention with its viral Facebook 
campaign in March, 2013. The organization devised a simple red and pink logo (see 
Figure 4.1), that it encouraged followers to use as their profile pictures on Facebook in 
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the weeks immediately preceding two US Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of 
marriage equality, namely United States v. Windsor and Hollingworth v. Perry (Human 
Rights Campaign, n.d.). Although I do not have historical data, the Human Rights 
Campaign itself notes that its social media following grew significantly following the 
success of the profile picture campaign and the media attention that the campaign 
garnered, a powerful illustration of the power that virality can have on the internet.  
Figure 4.3: Human Rights Campaign Facebook logo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactivity. The third dimension that my analysis of organizations’ web 
presence explored is interactivity. My data included a number of measures of 
interactivity, including dichotomous variables measuring the provision of forums that 
enabled unmediated or minimally edited debate and discussion between site visitors, the 
inclusion of user-generated content on the website in blog posts or other areas, comments 
functionality on blog or other posts that allow site visitors to leave comments about 
website content, and the inclusion of contact details and media contact details to enable 
different audiences to engage directly with organizational staff. Table 4.3 summarizes the 
proportions of organizational websites incorporating these elements. As you can see, 
interactive elements were much less common than the other elements I have thus far 
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described. Although most sites included contact details, few sites allowed comments or 
incorporated forums or user-generated content, and the majority of sites did not provide 
media contacts. It is interesting that so few organizations appear to be taking advantage 
of the opportunity for interaction permitted by contemporary DICTs. I was concerned 
that perhaps there was a substitution effect occurring, and that organizations were 
interacting primarily through social media rather than through their web portals. 
However, I examined all the organizational Facebook pages, Twitter feeds, and YouTube 
channels, and found very little evidence of interactivity. While the organizations with the 
biggest following on each social medium did attract some comments, I found only a 
handful of examples of organizations responding to Facebook or YouTube comments, 
and very little interaction on Twitter beyond organizations retweeting, saying “thank 
you” for retweets, or acknowledging mentions.  
Table 4.3: Interactive elements 
  Yes No 
Contact details 94% 6% 
Media contact details 46% 54% 
Comments 25% 75% 
User-generated content 13% 88% 
Forum 10% 90% 
 
My overall impression was that only a few organizations truly embraced online 
interactivity and invited site visitors or followers to interact with them and co-create 
online content or messages. Despite the interactive power of the web, organizations 
primarily seem to use the internet as a one-way medium. As I will discuss below, I do not 
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believe that this is the result of organizations being unaware of the potential for 
interactivity online, or resistant to engaging with external audiences, but rather it is a 
consequence of the fact that organizations have limited time and resources, and cannot 
afford to devote staff time to responding to comments and monitoring online feedback.  
In order to further summarize organizational adoption of interactive elements, I combined 
my dichotomous variables for the inclusion of forums, UGC, and comments in a single 
variable ranging from 0 to 3 that I describe as web 2.0 interactivity. This variable is 
intended to capture how much the organization engages with the unique interactive 
affordances that the internet provides; I excluded contact details and media contact details 
from this variable as these serve to facilitate offline or e-mail interaction, which I do not 
consider to be unique web affordances.  
Organizational structures and DICTs. The fourth aspect of DICT adoption that 
I considered was the extent to which organizations displayed internal structures 
influenced by digital tools like those Karpf (2012) describes as characterizing 
Moveon.org. According to Karpf (2012), DICTs allow organizations to operate with 
much lighter staff complements than previously, and to take on decentralized and 
diffused structures with limited staff co-presence. I do not have systematically organized 
data on staff numbers, as this information was not always available. Thus, the data I 
collected on this aspect of DICT adoption includes staff details taken from the websites 
where available, data from the survey I conducted, and supplementary data taken from 
my interviews and in some cases from newspaper accounts. Overall, I found that there 
was a lot of variation in the number of staff members at each organization, ranging from 
a single full-time staff member at MassResistance to around 650 full-time staff members 
 
 
87
at Focus on the Family. There was also a loose correlation between staff numbers and 
other aspects of DICT adoption. In other words, the more staff members an organization 
employed, the more sophisticated its adoption of DICTs tended to be as measured by the 
other dimensions I have discussed. This is contrary to what one might expect based on 
the existing literature, which suggests that organizations that intensively use and adopt 
DICTs can operate with a lighter staff complement than traditional organizations. As I 
will explain in my discussion section, there are a number of reasons why, in my 
assessment, these organizations display this pattern, primary among them being that 
often, the sophistication with which an organization adopts DICTs is in fact a function of 
the resources the organization is able to devote to DICTs.  
Online data-gathering and analysis. Finally, I gathered data on organizations’ 
use of cookies, and of third-party cookies, which are cookies that do not belong to the 
host website, but to a third party, typically an advertising firm (Turow, 2010, 2013). 
While first-party cookies typically are used to track users within the website visited and 
to remember their preferences and login data, third-party cookies allow the third party to 
track users across websites, building a profile of their web browsing habits and enabling 
third parties such as Google to serve targeted advertising to web users. The average 
number of cookies that the organizations’ websites inserted into my browser was 4.5, 
with a minimum of 0 from LGBT Noise and LGBT+ Liberal Democrats and a maximum 
of 13 from Americans for Truth about Homosexuality, Concerned Women for America, 
and Freedom to Marry. Furthermore, 92% of organizations’ cookies included third-party 
cookies. However, these results should not be interpreted as indicating a high degree of 
sophisticated data gathering and analysis by the organizations under study. The majority 
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of sites inserted third-party cookies from Google, Google Analytics, Facebook, and 
Twitter. Many of these organizations rely on blogging software to design their sites, and 
such software often includes Google Analytics and social media cookies as a matter of 
routine. In addition, many of these organizations use free Google services in building, 
hosting, and maintaining their websites, and Google routinely includes its cookies when 
such tools are used (Google, n.d.). Having spoken with people from these organizations, 
who uniformly said that their organization did not use online tracking tools, and having 
examined my survey data, which indicate that most of the data that organizations gather 
and use about their members is related to donors, and includes personally identifiable 
data such as names, addresses, phone numbers and so on – data which are not collected 
by cookies – I conclude that online data gathering tactics are relatively underdeveloped 
among these organizations. Indeed, among my survey respondents, only 30% reported 
using online tracking tools (with 54% saying they did not use such tools and 15% saying 
they weren’t certain if their organization did or did not use them), and among the 
organizations that reported using online tools, all of them cited Google Analytics as the 
data tool they used. Unless users subscribe to premium services, Google Analytics offers 
websites information about how many visitors their site has, what devices they are using 
to access the site, and where in the world they are accessing the site from; the basic data 
are neither complex nor comprehensive, and do not constitute the kind of in-depth, 
behavioral tracking with which experts are concerned. Furthermore, all organizations 
denied using data gathered by other organizations to target users online, which is the 
primary use of third-party cookies. Thus, with respect to online data gathering, I found 
that these organizations generally do little to no structured online data gathering and 
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display relatively low levels of sophistication around online data gathering tools and 
technologies. It is possible that there is a degree of deception involved on the part of my 
respondents and interview subjects; however, I noticed that I did not see any Google 
advertisements for the sites I had visited after visiting them with my usual browser, 
which allows and monitors cookies, nor did I receive any communication from those 
groups on any social media that I did not directly request. Thus, the data from my web 
analysis, interviews, survey, and my qualitative experience of engaging with these 
organizations online and through social media all suggest that they do not engage in 
sophisticated online data gathering, nor do they use third-party data to track and monitor 
online activities and develop targeted messages. Although I will again touch on issues of 
online data-gathering when I address cross-national differences, for the purposes of 
assessing organizations’ overall adoption of DICTs, I did not find the data I gathered on 
online data-gathering to be a useful addition to my analysis, and I thus did not include it 
in my overall assessment of organizations’ DICTs adoption.  
Overall assessments of organizations’ DICT adoption. Taken together, the 
findings described above informed my overall analysis of the organizations’ DICT 
adoption. My heuristic model served to inform the types of data I gathered. As discussed 
in my literature review, one of the ways in which organizations can use DICTs is to foster 
shared identities. In order to incorporate this in my assessment of DICT adoption, I 
included the measures of interactivity that I described above, which captures the degree 
to which organizations create online communities and allow their audiences to interact 
with them and with others to foster a sense of shared identity. I also included the use of 
web affordances like blogs, which as I explained earlier, organizations tended to use to 
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promote interpretations of events and thus to foster a shared interpretation of the world 
among members. A second aspect of organizational DICTs adoption, as indicated in my 
model, is the use of DICTs to develop and disseminate frames. In order to capture the 
extent to which organizations use DICTs to build frames, I measured their use of blogs, 
which were typically used to provide interpretations of events and promote solutions to 
social problems, which is the essence of framing. I also considered organizations’ 
tendencies to use social media, which are a way for organizations to expand their reach 
beyond people who visit their website and to reach broader audiences with their frames, 
helping to disseminate them. As my model illustrates, the internet offers organizations a 
unique opportunity to engage potential members and interested audiences through the 
provision of accessible and often low-cost actions that individuals can take, and the 
inclusion of options for online activism. For example, by offering options for people to 
donate online, to subscribe to e-mail newsletters, and to take other forms of action, 
usually organized under a “Take Action” button on organizations’ web pages that link to 
online e-petitions, upcoming events and so on, organizations can engage interested 
parties, and deepen their involvement with organizational goals related to social 
movement priorities. I thus measured the extent to which the various organizations under 
study provided these tools and opportunities. Finally, as described above, I gathered data 
on organizations’ internal and staff structures to determine the extent to which DICTs 
adoption had influenced how they arrange their work, and I gathered data on the use of 
cookies to assess their online data-gathering practices. As you can see, several of the 
individual items I measured related to multiple aspects of my heuristic model, and thus I 
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sought to build an overall assessment of organizations’ adoption of DICTs based on my 
data. 
Specifically, to facilitate the rest of my analysis of my heuristic model, I 
summarized much of the data I collected in a single score, which considered the degree to 
which each organization under study used the basic web affordances, social, and 
interactive elements that captured the key dimensions of DICTs adoption as summarized 
in my heuristic model. In particular, the score incorporated my dichotomous measures for 
the following: the inclusion of a separate media section, the inclusion of an online 
donation option, the inclusion of video, the inclusion of blogs, the inclusion of a ‘take 
action’ section, the provision of an e-mail newsletter, the use of an organizational 
Facebook page, the use of an organizational Twitter stream, the use of an organizational 
YouTube channel, the provision of contact details, the provision of media contact details, 
the inclusion of comments, the inclusion of user-generated content, the inclusion of a 
forum, and finally, five dichotomous variables measuring the frequency with which 
organizations updated their social media pages (see appendix one for details). These 
nineteen dichotomous variables were summed to form a new variable, which was then 
rescaled to run from 0 to 10. Table 4.4 provides the scores for all of the organizations 
under study. Note that these scores do not include any measures of data gathering or of 
DICT-influenced organizational structures. As discussed, I do not believe that any of 
these organizations engage in sophisticated data-gathering and analysis, nor do I find the 
quantitative data I gathered on the subject to be a useful indicator of DICT adoption. In 
addition, due to the varying degrees of information I was able to gather about each 
organization’s internal structures, it was not possible to include those data in this score. 
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Table 4.4: Overall DICT adoption score (out of 10) 
Organization Score 
Concerned Women for America 8.9 
Freedom to Marry 8.9 
Human Rights Campaign 8.9 
Lamda Legal 8.9 
Marriage Equality Ireland 8.9 
DignityUSA (Catholic Church) 8.4 
Focus on the Family 8.4 
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) 8.4 
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) 8.4 
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children 8.4 
La Manif Pour Tous (French organization active in the UK) 7.9 
National Organization for Marriage 7.9 
Stonewall 7.9 
The Lesbian & Gay Foundation (LGF) 7.9 
Campaign for Children and Families 7.4 
Evangelical Alliance 7.4 
Family Equality Council 7.4 
Irish Episcopal Conference 7.4 
Out & Equal 7.4 
Youth Defence 7.4 
Americans for Truth About Homosexuality 6.8 
Marriage Equality USA 6.3 
American Family Association 5.8 
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BeLoGTo 5.8 
LGBT Noise 5.8 
MassResistance 5.8 
L.inC 5.3 
Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement 5.3 
LGBT+ Liberal Democrats 5.3 
LGBT Network 4.7 
Outhouse 4.7 
Family & Life 4.2 
Gay & Lesbian Equality Network 4.2 
Iona Institute 4.2 
Queer Youth Network (Q.Y.N.) 4.2 
Evangelical Alliance Ireland 3.7 
Anglican Mainstream 3.2 
Gay and Lesbian Humanist Association (GALHA) 3.2 
Ireland Stand Up 3.2 
OutWest 2.6 
Catholic Truth 2.1 
Institute for Marriage and Public Policy 2.1 
Campaign for Homosexual Equality 1.6 
Gay marriage no thanks 1.6 
Changing Attitude Ireland 1.1 
Defend the Family 1.1 
Heterosexuals Organized for a Moral Environment 1.1 
OutRage! 1.1 
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To compensate for these limitations, in addition to calculating these scores, I 
revisited each organization’s website, considered my notes on each, and compared my 
subjective impressions, including my data on their internal structures, to the score I had 
calculated for each organization. Overall, I found that there was a strong relationship 
between my impression of how intensively an organization had adopted DICTs, and the 
score that organization received. Although these scores constitute a quantitative measure 
of organizations’ DICTs adoption, their primary utility was as a shorthand that I used 
when exploring various aspects of my heuristic model. I did not do any sophisticated 
statistical modeling of these scores, but instead used them to guide my analysis of the 
relationships between my explanatory factors and DICT adoption, and for some basic t-
tests. In the discussion that follows, I will provide some numbers, drawn from these 
scores, to bolster my arguments. However, I will also discuss the extent to which my 
qualitative data support or contradict my expectations, and I do not consider this 
quantitative measure to be an absolute indicator of DICT sophistication, but rather one 
suggestive piece of evidence among several. Having developed a sense of the degree of 
DICT adoption displayed by each of the organizations under study, summarized by the 
score given in Table 4.4 and supplemented by my notes and my qualitative evaluations, I 
can now move to exploring at the next key element of my heuristic model, namely those 
factors that the literature suggests should influence the degree to which a given 
organization adopts available DICTs. 
Diffusion  
The first factor that I anticipated would play a role in DICT adoption is diffusion, 
or the degree to which an organization interacts with other organizations and thus has an 
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opportunity to learn from other organizations’ experiences with digital technologies. 
Measuring this proved to be challenging. One of the tools I used was my organizational 
survey, which included a question asking whether or not the respondent’s organization 
interacted with other organizations. Of the sixteen organizations that completed the 
survey, 75% said that they did interact with other organizations, with 6% saying they did 
not know whether or not their organization interacted with other organizations, and the 
remaining 19% saying that they did not interact with other organizations. There is some 
evidence of a positive relationship between whether or not organizations reported 
interacting with other organizations in the survey and their overall DICT adoption score.  
The adoption scores of the organizations that reported interacting with other 
organizations ranged from 1.1 to 8.9 and averaged 5.5, while the scores for the few 
organizations that reported not interacting with other organizations ranged from 2.1 to 6.3 
and averaged 3.9.  
Clearly, the organizations that reported interacting with other organizations 
tended to have slightly higher adoption scores. However, the number of observations here 
is naturally too small to allow for any reliable inferences to be drawn. Furthermore, my 
survey questions simply asked whether or not interaction took place, and did not address 
the complexity, frequency, or depth of that interaction, all of which are key to 
understanding the structure of the networks in which the organizations operate. Thus, my 
survey provided very limited evidence of the role of diffusion in DICT adoption. 
I then turned to my analysis of news accounts and online materials. For all of the 
websites I examined, I noted whether or not the site linked to the websites of other 
organizations. With no exceptions, the sites I examined included links to external sites, 
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including the sites of other organizations lobbying on similar issues. Given the 
widespread inclusion of such links, I concluded that they were an unreliable indicator of 
the degree to which organizations interacted meaningfully with other organizations. I 
then examined organizational press releases where available, looking for mentions of 
partnerships with other organizations and participation in joint events, as well as any 
mention of conferences or workshops. This was a somewhat more fruitful approach. I 
found a number of references to participation in shared events. For example, BeLonGTo, 
an national Irish organization that supports LGBTQ youth, organizes an annual Stand Up 
Against Homo/Transphobic Bullying week in Ireland, which a number of other 
organizations participate in, particularly school and government groups, indicating that 
BeLonGTo has strong relationships with other organizations. Similarly, Concerned 
Women for America, a conservative Christian women’s activist group that lobbies on a 
number of issues including marriage equality, hosts a number of events in which multiple 
organizations participate, including other conservative organizations and churches. Not 
all organizations provided press releases or such data, but for the organizations that do 
provide that type of information, I made note of their activities, and then examined the 
degree to which such activities were associated with increased DICT adoption. This 
process revealed a reasonably clear degree of association between interaction with other 
organizations and DICT adoption. In particular, I found that there were a number of 
organizations that were highly involved in planning and participating in multi-
organization events, and that those organizations, which appeared to act almost as a node 
connecting multiple other organizations, typically displayed a sophisticated degree of 
DICT adoption. For example, Freedom to Marry is an organized coalition of US 
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organizations that promote marriage equality. Freedom to Marry has arranged a number 
of multi-organization events, frequently holds conferences for gay rights organizers, and 
engages deeply with multiple organizations; it is also an organization with one of the 
highest DICT adoption scores in my study. Similarly, the Human Rights Campaign, 
which I have previously mentioned, displays both a high propensity to engage with other 
organizations and a high degree of DICT sophistication. However, as I will discuss more 
comprehensively in the discussion section below, this does not necessarily indicate a 
causal relationship. Instead, it may be that large, well-funded organizations with 
significant staff complements are able to devote resources to cultivating relationships 
with other organizations and developing DICT capacity. Furthermore, the data I collected 
are insufficient to fully explore the role of diffusion in DICT adoption by organizations. 
In order to properly assess the effect of diffusion, it would be necessary to gather detailed 
information on the nature, frequency, and depth of inter-organizational interactions. Such 
data would enable me to build a network map for the organizations under study, and to 
then trace the ways in which practices and ideas migrate through the network. I was able 
only to gather limited information on whether or not interactions occurred. Overall, the 
data I was able to gather suggest that my expectations with respect to the relationship 
between inter-organizational interaction and DICT adoption have been met, and that 
organizations that interact more with other organizations are also more likely to 
intensively adopt and deploy DICTs. However, further study is needed to properly assess 
the role of diffusion in DICT adoption.  
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Group Characteristics and Ideology 
As noted, the literature I reviewed led me to anticipate that the characteristics of 
the types of people that organizations employ and try to reach will influence the degree to 
which those organizations adopt DICTs.  
The role of audience characteristics. I will begin by discussing the data I 
gathered about the external audiences that these organizations targeted. My first step was 
to examine data drawn from public opinion surveys in the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Ireland. I will describe the findings of each in turn. In the course of the 
discussion, all the differences among groups to which I refer are statistically significant, 
unless other specified.  
First, for the United Kingdom, I examined a number of polls, including those 
mentioned earlier by YouGov, Angus Reid Public Opinion, and ComRes. The data across 
most of the polls was broadly consistent, but I elected to rely primarily on a YouGov poll 
conducted in May 2013, as this was the poll that most immediately preceded the start of 
my data collection process, and thus captured the distribution of public opinion about 
marriage equality in the United Kingdom at the time of my data collection (the findings 
closely mirror those of the later ComRes poll).  Table 4.5 provides a summary of support 
for gay marriage by various demographic characteristics for the three countries under 
study. Note that “social grade” refers to a set of measures developed by the National 
Readership Survey and used widely in public opinion polling in the United Kingdom; it 
measures respondents’ social status based on their occupation, and is used as a proxy for 
income and education (National Readership Survey, 2013).  
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Category A includes those in higher managerial, administrative or professional 
occupations, B refers to those in intermediate managerial, administrative and professional 
occupations, category C1 refers to those in supervisory, clerical and junior management, 
administrative and professional occupations, category C2 refers to skilled manual 
laborers, category D refers to semi-skilled and unskilled manual laborers, and category E 
refers to those receiving a state pension, casual workers, and the unemployed receiving 
state benefits (National Readership Survey, 2013). As can be seen, in terms of significant 
differences, conservative Britons are more likely to oppose marriage equality than their 
more-liberal counterparts, women are more likely to support marriage equality than men, 
and younger people (under 40) are more likely to support marriage equality than those 
over 40. There is no significant difference in support for marriage equality between those 
with a higher socioeconomic status and than their lower-status peers, and they are equally 
likely to oppose it.  
Turning to the United States, I had a wealth of public opinion data to choose 
from, and I elected to focus on a 2013 poll by the Public Religion Research Institute. This 
organization provided in-depth detail about its methodology, as well as a detailed 
breakdown of its results, and the poll was conducted in mid-2013, meaning that it 
immediately preceded my data collection period and thus captured the characteristics of 
the people who would be targeted by my organizations during the period under study 
(Public Religion Research Institute, 2014).  
As can be seen in Table 4.5, there are many similarities between American 
marriage equality supporters and opponents and their British peers. As was the case in the 
United Kingdom, liberals are more likely to support marriage equality than conservatives, 
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women are more likely to support marriage equality than men, and the young are more 
supportive of marriage equality than those over 49. The U.K. did not provide data on the 
racial characteristics of those who favor or oppose marriage equality, but in the U.S., 
blacks are significantly less likely to support marriage equality than whites or Hispanics. 
Finally, in the U.S., those with a college education tend to be markedly more supportive 
of marriage equality than those with only high school; this is in contrast to the U.K., 
where socio-economic status, as measured by social grade, was not associated with a 
major difference in opposition to or support for marriage equality. The two measures are 
not directly comparable, but both capture some aspect of the socio-economic 
characteristics of gay marriage supporters and opponents, and it is thus interesting to note 
this difference. 
Finally, I examined public opinion data from Ireland. In contrast to the U.K. and 
U.S., there were far fewer opinion polls from which to select in the case of Ireland. I 
elected to use data from a November 2013 poll by Red C Research (Red C Research, 
2013). As can be seen in Table 4.5, Irish support for marriage equality is much higher 
overall than support in the U.K. and U.S.; however, there are some similar patterns. 
Liberals tend to be more favorably disposed to marriage equality than conservatives, 
women are more likely to support marriage equality than men, and those under 65 are 
significantly more likely to support marriage equality than those 65 and over. As was the 
case in the U.K., there is no significant difference among people of different socio-
economic status.  
Overall, and perhaps unsurprisingly, it is clear that there are some general 
differences between those who are more likely to support marriage equality, and those 
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who are more likely to oppose it in all three of the countries under study. Overall, 
conservatives, males, and older people are more likely to oppose marriage equality, while 
liberals, females, and younger people are more likely to support it. There is also some 
evidence that more educated people are more likely to support marriage equality in the 
United States, while there were no significant differences in support for marriage equality 
among different socio-economic status groups in the U.K. and Ireland This assessment of 
the typical characteristics of supporters of and opponents to marriage equality is echoed 
by much of the literature on the subject, and applies more broadly to issues of gay rights 
(see, for example, Herek, 2002; Lewis & Gossett, 2008; Romero, 2013). Furthermore, the 
data from my survey broadly support this assessment – liberal organizations were more 
likely to say that they targeted younger people and more educated people, and vice-versa.  
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Table 4.5: Public opinion poll data on support for or opposition to marriage equality  
United Kingdom     United States     Ireland     
Characteristic 
Total 
support 
Total 
oppose 
Characteristic 
Total 
support 
Total 
oppose 
Characteristic 
Total 
support 
Total 
oppose 
Voting intention     Party affiliation     Party affiliation     
Conservative 48% 41% Democrat 64% 36% Fine Gael 73% 27% 
Labour 60% 29% Independent 57% 43% Labour 96% 4% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
69% 24% Republican 34% 66% Fianna Fail 71% 29% 
Gender     Tea Party  32% 68% Sinn Fein 84% 16% 
Male 47% 40% Gender     Gender     
Female 58% 30% Male 48% 52% Male 76% 24% 
Age     Female 57% 43% Female 85% 15% 
18-24 68% 17% Age     Age     
25-39 70% 18% 18-33 69% 31% 18-24 89% 11% 
40-59 53% 35% 34-48 55% 45% 25-34 86% 14% 
60+ 28% 61% 49-67 45% 55% 35-44 89% 11% 
 
    68+ 37% 63% 45-54 79% 21% 
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Social grade 
  
Race     54-65 78% 22% 
ABC1 55% 36% White, non-Hispanic 55% 45% 65+ 60% 40% 
C2DE 50% 36% Hispanic 53% 47% Social class     
      Black, non-Hispanic 39% 61% 
Higher social 
grades 
84% 16% 
      
Educational 
attainment 
    
Lower social 
grades 
82% 18% 
      Post-graduate 66% 34%       
      College graduate 60% 40%       
      Some college 57% 43%       
      High school or less 46% 54%       
Source: YouGov, 2013; Public Religion Research Institute, 2014; Red C Research, 2013 
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Second, in order to link these data to my findings on DICT adoption, I assumed 
that the organizations that are involved with lobbying to preserve marriage as a 
heterosexual institution are likely to seek to reach and engage those individuals who are 
more likely to support their position and take action on the issue, which is to say, older, 
conservative, male, and perhaps less educated individuals, while organizations that lobby 
to expand the right to marry to same sex couples will target those likely to support and 
aid them, namely younger, liberal, female, and perhaps more educated individuals. At 
this point, it became clear that it is almost impossible for my analysis to clearly separate 
the effect of ideology from the effect of group characteristics. Earlier, I suggested that, 
ceteris paribus, conservative organizations might be innately less likely to adopt DICTs 
than their liberal peers. However, it is impossible, given the limitations of my data, for 
me to tell whether liberals are innately more likely to adopt DICTs or whether the rate at 
which the liberal organizations in my study adopt DICTs is a function of the fact that they 
are likely to target people who have a higher propensity to support gay marriage. In 
particular, it is difficult to separate the effects of age and ideology. In the U.S., younger 
people are more likely to describe themselves as moderate, while older people are more 
likely to describe themselves as conservative (Gallup, 2012); in the U.K., support for the 
Conservative Party is significantly higher among those 55 and over, while support for the 
Liberal Democrats is significantly higher among those under 44 compared to those over 
55, indicating that younger Britons tend to be more liberal than older Britons (Ipsos 
MORI, 2010); finally, in Ireland, I was unable to obtain data indicating the relationship 
between age and ideology or party affiliation, but it is likely to follow a similar pattern.  
Thus, conservative organizations are likely to target conservatives, who are likely to be 
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older, and liberals are likely to target liberals, who are likely to be younger. I therefore 
folded my analysis of the effect of ideology into my analysis of the effect of group 
characteristics. 
Proceeding with my analysis, then, I sought to determine whether there were 
patterns of internet and DICT usage associated with any of the characteristics I found to 
be related to propensity to support marriage equality. For example, if data indicate that 
women are significantly less likely to use DICTs than men are, organizations that target 
women may favor offline methods of communication over DICTs in order to reach their 
target audiences. According to data from the Pew Research Internet Project, in the United 
States, there is no significant difference between men and women when it comes to their 
usage of the internet, e-mail, or mobile internet (Pew Research Internet Project, 2014). 
There are, however, significant differences in internet usage among people 64 and 
younger and people over 65 – younger people are much more likely to use the internet 
than their older peers. In addition, those under 30 are more likely than those over 50 to 
use the internet. Furthermore, those with an income above $50,000 a year and those with 
at least some college are significantly more likely to use the internet than those who earn 
less than $50,000 a year and those with only a high school education. In the U.K., data 
from the Office for National Statistics found only minor differences between men’s and 
women’s propensity to engage in various activities online (Office for National Statistics 
2013). However, age was found to be significantly associated with the propensity to 
engage in different internet activities, with those under 55 much more likely to use the 
internet than those 55 and over. Finally, there was a small but significant difference 
between the propensities of those with a high income to use the internet compared to 
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those with a very low income, with the higher-income group more likely to use the 
internet in more ways. In Ireland, statistics from the Central Statistics Office indicated 
that, as was the case in the U.K. and U.S., there was no major difference in internet usage 
between men and women (Central Statistics Office, 2013). However, those under 45 were 
significantly more likely to use the internet than those 45 and older, and those aged 
between 45 and 59 were much more likely to use the internet than those aged 60 and 
over. In terms of the relationship between socio-economic status and internet usage, the 
Central Statistics Office reported that university students and the employed were more 
likely to use the internet than the unemployed, homemakers, and the retired. In short, 
then, in all of the countries under study, younger, wealthier, and more educated people 
were more likely to use the internet and to use it for multiple purposes than older, lower 
income, and less-educated people. Combining these observations then, I would anticipate 
that organizations that oppose marriage equality would favor offline over online 
communication methods, while those in favor of marriage equality would be more 
intensive users of online communication tools. In order to explore this, I used several 
pieces of data. First, I considered the overall adoption scores of the pro- and anti-
marriage equality organizations under study. Second, I referred to my survey data, in 
particular, to the questions related to preferred methods of communication. Finally, I 
discussed the issue with my interview subjects.  
Looking at their overall levels of DICT adoption, I did not, in the course of my 
qualitative examination of the organizations’ online materials, note any clear and 
systematic differences in online sophistication between conservative and liberal 
organizations. Looking at their quantitative adoption scores too, there was only a modest 
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difference in the mean adoption scores of conservative (5.26) and liberal (5.87) 
organizations, though this small difference is in the expected direction4. However, in my 
qualitative exploration, I did note that some differences, specifically that the conservative 
organizations tended to have more sophisticated websites, and that the liberal 
organizations tended to offer more interactive online options and, to a degree, to use 
social media more intensively. I looked at the individual components of my quantitative 
adoption score to support this impression. In terms of website sophistication, by which I 
mean the use of basic web affordances, conservative organization did score slightly 
higher on average than liberal organizations, with an average of 4.1 to liberal 
organizations’ 3.95. When looking at organizations use of social media, I created two 
metrics. First, I had a simple 0 to 3 scaled measure of whether or not organizations used 
the three social media platforms I measures. Second, I created a measure that included the 
variables measuring the use of the social media platforms and the five measure of the 
frequency with which they are updated. On the first measure, conservative organizations 
scored 1.8 and liberal organizations scored 2.2, suggesting there was a small difference 
between organizations’ propensity to use social media by ideology6. On the second 
measure, however, there was a clearer difference – conservative organizations scored an 
average of 4.1, while liberal organizations scored an average of 5.27. Finally, when 
considering my measure of interactivity, on average, liberal organizations scored slightly 
                                                           
4 My sample was too small for meaningful statistical testing. However, I did run a t-test of the difference 
between the two means, and found that there no statistically significant difference between the means, 
which adds weight to my impression that there was little clear overall difference. 
5 This difference is not statistically significant, but it is suggestive.  
6 Again, the difference was not statistically significant, but was in the expected direction. 
7 This difference, too, was not statistically significant, but is in the expected direction. 
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higher with 2 than conservative organizations did with 1.78. Overall, then, conservative 
websites showed a slight tendency to have better developed websites, while liberal 
organizations showed a slight tendency to use and update social media more and to be 
slightly more interactive. The number of organizations under study is too small for formal 
statistical analysis – the small differences I found might reach statistical significance in a 
larger sample – but it is interesting that the differences are generally in the expected 
direction, even though they are not meaningful in size.  
However, overall, the online activities of conservative organizations were, on 
average, no less sophisticated than those of liberal organizations. This first piece of 
evidence, then, suggests that ideology and the characteristics of organizations’ target 
audiences are unrelated to the sophistication with which organizations adopt DICTs. 
However, without a comparison to offline activities, this analysis is partial at best. I thus 
turned to an analysis of secondary sources and to my survey and interview data to attempt 
to determine the extent to which organizations used offline communication methods. 
An analysis of my survey materials showed some interesting patterns. There was 
no difference between conservative and liberal organizations’ tendency to use online 
tools like e-mail, their websites, and social media. However, when it came to offline 
technologies like postal mail and the telephone, conservative organizations reported a 
greater tendency to utilize these tools9. My interview respondents echoed this finding. 
                                                           
8 Again, the difference is not statistically significant, but is in the expected direction.  
9 The sample size for my organizational survey is far too small for statistical analysis, what I report here are 
differences for which I did not test significance. For example, among the organizations I surveyed, no 
liberal organizations reported frequently using the postal service to communicate with members or the 
public, but four conservative organizations did; and while two liberal organizations reported never using 
the postal service to communicate with members or the public, no conservative organization did. Chi-
square tests were impossible due to the small cell numbers.  
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Ted10, who is responsible for updating and maintaining the website of an English 
organization that lobbies religious bodies to maintain traditional family values, noted that 
his organization frequently used postal mail to communicate with supporters and solicit 
donations, saying, “We put a lot of effort into maintaining and updating our site, of 
course, but a lot of our members are older folks who prefer not to bother with the 
internet. So, for them, we produce snail-mail stuff, and send it out to them in the post. We 
get good response from those mailing too, people will ring us up at the offices to chat 
over something we mentioned in the mailings.” 
Sara11, the young woman responsible for communications at a pro-marriage 
equality Irish organization, said, “We don’t really bother that much with the post. I mean, 
we find our members are mostly happier if we get in touch with them on e-mail – they’re 
responsive to that form. When we’ve tried a blanket mailing, we just haven’t found it to 
be worthwhile. No one responds, and it’s hard to know if it worked at all. So we like to 
stick with our e-mail, and our site.” 
I did not find a great deal of relevant secondary evidence; news reports tended to 
focus on mass events and on lobbying campaigns such as petition drives, and there did 
not seem to be any clear differences between liberal and conservative organizations’ 
propensity to engage in these behaviors. Nevertheless, based on my analysis of online 
materials and my survey data and of my interviews, I suggest that ideology and target 
audience do not significantly influence organizations’ propensity to use online tools, but 
rather their propensity to use offline tools. While liberal organizations targeting younger 
people were just as likely to use various DICTs as conservative organizations targeting 
                                                           
10 Not his real name, see footnote 2 
11 Not her real name, see footnote 2 
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older people, they were less likely to use offline technologies. Based on my interviews, I 
conclude that this is driven by two factors. First, conservative organizations are acutely 
aware of the imperative to have an online presence and to be engaged with new 
technologies. Although at present there is a sizeable gap between the use of the internet 
by the young and by older people, this gap is likely to shrink over the years as people age 
and as the internet becomes ever-more embedded in daily life. Thus, for organizations 
and advocacy workers that anticipate a long-term involvement in social issues, it is 
important to begin building online skills and capacities. Furthermore, as several of my 
interview subjects pointed out, large donors expect to see online efforts at the 
organizations that they fund. An organization that is not seen to be active online may find 
it more difficult to raise money from large donors and organizations. Therefore, 
conservative organizations have a number of incentives to make an effort to develop their 
online capacity.  
Second, however, they are also aware that many of their members are less 
comfortable online, and therefore of the need to communicate using offline tools. While 
conservative organizations have incentives to pursue online efforts, they are also aware 
that their members and supporters are often more comfortable with offline 
communication. Older people may, for example, be more comfortable donating with a 
check in the mail than through an online portal, and thus conservative organizations see 
value in maintaining their offline communications efforts. In contrast, the younger people 
who are more likely to donate to and participate in liberal organizations that promote 
same-sex marriage are likely to be more comfortable online. Liberal organizations, 
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therefore, have no incentive to engage in extensive offline communications efforts; 
instead, they have many reasons to focus on online communication.  
Angela12, a young woman responsible for communications activities at a 
conservative organization based in London, explained these pressures: “Well, we have to 
be online. Everyone is online these days, and if you don’t have a good website, or 
Twitter, then some members ask why not. They want to see you moving into the twenty-
first century, and talking to young people. But then, of course, a lot of our older members 
want their newsletters in the post and their donation forms. So we do both. We have to do 
both, and be seen doing both, if you understand me.” 
These findings have some interesting implications for conservative organizations, 
not least of which is that it could tend to impose higher costs on them. While liberal 
organizations may be able to minimize their use of offline technologies like the postal 
service, which tend to be more expensive than online equivalents like e-mail, 
conservative organizations must find room in their budgets both to develop their online 
presence and to deploy offline tools. Thus, social activism could potentially be costlier 
for conservative organizations than their liberal peers, at least at present. It is also 
interesting that I found little meaningful overall difference between conservative and 
liberal organizations’ online adoption practices, given that much of the literature suggests 
that there would be a notable gap. In chapters five and six I delve more deeply into this 
finding in my discussion section, as it made such a marked contrast to the existing 
evidence, and I propose some explanations as to why I found this. 
                                                           
12 Not her real name, see footnote 2 
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The role of staff characteristics. As discussed in earlier chapters, it was not only 
member characteristics that I anticipated may play a role in organizations’ propensity to 
adopt DICTs, it was also the characteristics of their staff. Specifically, I argued that it 
might be that younger, more-educated staff would be associated with a greater propensity 
to adopt DICTs. In order to explore this relationship, I gathered various types of data 
about organizational staff. First, when analyzing organizations’ web presence, I took 
notes about staff wherever possible. Not all websites offered this information, and in 
some cases, the only data on offer was a photograph of a staff event shared on Twitter, or 
a similarly unstructured piece of evidence. I made notes of all the online evidence I was 
able to find. Second, I considered the data from my survey, which inquired about staff 
characteristics. Third, I examined news coverage to try and identify staff members and 
their characteristics. Finally, I discussed organizational staff and their influence on 
communications processes with my interview subjects. Not all of the organizations under 
study were included in my survey and interviews, nor did they all provide information on 
their staff. I was therefore unable to gather comparable information on all of the 
organizations under study. However, by considering data drawn from my survey and 
interviews, and the data I was able to glean from organizational websites and press 
coverage of organizations, I was able to draw some tentative conclusions about the 
relationship between staff and DICT adoption.  
First, as I noted earlier, somewhat unexpectedly, organizations with a larger staff 
tended to score higher on DICT adoption than organizations with a smaller staff. While 
the literature hypothesized that organizations that engaged intensively with DICTs would 
tend to have smaller staff complements due to the cost savings and efficiencies generated 
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by DICTs, I found the opposite to be true; overall, the bigger an organizations’ staff, the 
better it tended to score in terms of DICT adoption. It seems that while DICT tools like 
Facebook or Twitter may, themselves, be free to use, the management and maintenance 
thereof demands a reasonably large organization that is able to devote time and resources 
to DICT-related tasks. I will discuss this insight further in chapter six. Second, in the 
course of my exploration of the relationship between staff characteristics and DICT 
adoption, I also found that organizations that employed more young people as a 
proportion of their staff showed a slight tendency to score higher on DICT adoption. This 
pattern was less clear, but this was primarily because it was challenging to get good data 
on staff age and so I could consider only the small number of organizations for such data 
were available. Nevertheless, I did find some relationship between having a more 
youthful staff and DICT adoption; in particular, organizations with a greater proportion 
of younger staff members tended to update their social media slightly more frequently. 
This impression was supported by a comment from Angela13, a young employee at a 
conservative organization, who said, “In a way it’s helpful to have younger staff. Like, 
for example, it’s easier to get our younger staff to just dash off some Twitter updates. 
They just do it without a fuss, whereas the older staff forget to do it or just don’t think 
about it. So, maybe, the habits that the younger staff people have are a little bit helpful.”  
Similarly, Keith noted, “Well, for me, it would be great to have someone younger 
and more interested in the social media onboard. I think that the lack of a young person or 
two in the team makes it – I don’t want to say harder – just makes it more instinctive to 
use those things.” 
                                                           
13 Not her real name, see footnote 2 
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There were no other clear patterns of relationships between staff characteristics 
and DICT adoption; for example, I was unable to find a relationship between staff 
education or social status and DICT adoption. However, it may be that I simply wasn’t 
able to detect the differences that exist due to the limitations of my data. Overall, the only 
patterns I was able to identify with respect the relationship between DICT adoption and 
staff characteristics was that a higher proportion of young staff members tended to be 
associated with more intensive use of DICTs, and a larger staff was associated with more 
intensive DICT adoption.  
Upon considering the data I had gathered and my qualitative notes, I further noted 
some suggestive patterns in the relationship between staff and DICT adoption and 
organizational ideology. Overall, conservative organizations tended to employ slightly 
more staff members than liberal organizations. This was not uniformly true; there were 
many liberal organizations with a large number of employees such as the Human Rights 
Campaign with its staff of around 160, and many conservative organizations with a very 
small staff. However, among the organizations for which I was able to determine staff 
numbers with some degree of certainty, including the organizations that responded to my 
survey, the conservative organizations tended to employ slightly more people than the 
liberal ones14. Further, the organizations with the biggest staffs were both conservative15. 
As noted, the more staff an organization has, the more sophisticated its DICT adoption 
                                                           
14 The difference in the average number of staff members between liberal and conservative organizations 
was 2 people, with the liberal organizations averaging 21 employees and the conservative organizations 
averaging 23. However, in calculating this I excluded the two biggest conservative organizations, Focus on 
the Family and Concerned Women for America, which both had several hundred staff members, and the 
Human Rights Campaign which had 160, as including these have a distorted picture of staff numbers. Most 
organizations had around 22 staff members.  
15 As noted in the previous footnote, Focus on the Family had around 650 staff members, and Concerned 
Women for America had around 540. These organizations, however, focus on a range of issues beyond gay 
rights, and are not therefore directly comparable to the other organizations I studied, many of which were 
focused exclusively on marriage equality.  
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tends to be. Yet, liberal organizations, which tend to employ slightly fewer staff members 
than conservative ones, perform as well as their conservative peers when it comes to 
DICT adoption. This conundrum is explained, in part, by the fact that liberal 
organizations show some tendency to employ younger people than conservative ones, 
which is unsurprising given my earlier argument that younger people are more likely to 
support the goals of gay rights organizations. Conservative organizations do employ 
young people, but young people tend to make up a smaller proportion of their staff than is 
the case at liberal organizations16. In other words, a typical conservative organization’s 
staff will be slightly larger than a typical liberal organization’s staff, and will have a 
slightly lower proportion of young people. As I will discuss in more detail in chapter six, 
this finding, together with data from my interviews with conservative organizations, lead 
me to tentatively hypothesize that conservative organizations have actively expanded 
their staff and sought out younger employees in part to improve their online profile. In 
other words, conservative organizations have compensated for any online disadvantages 
that their slightly older staff may have imposed by increasing the number of staff they 
employ. Again, this would tend to add to the costs that conservative organizations must 
incur in order to engage in activism, and explains in part why liberal and conservative 
organizations tend to score equally well on DICT adoption measures; liberal 
organizations have the advantage of younger staff members, while conservative 
organizations have the advantage of slightly larger staff complements. This is an 
                                                           
16 The data I was able to gather about staff age was limited. However, using the information I gathered in 
my organizational survey, and the elite interviews I conducted, I was able to determine some detail about 
the staff ages at twenty four organizations. Typically, liberal organizations were more likely to report 
having staff members aged 18 to 24 – some conservative organizations reported having no staff members 
aged 18 to 24, and fewer conservative organizations had staff members aged 25 to 34 than liberal 
organizations. They were, however, equally likely to report having staff members in all other age categories 
(see appendix two for details on age categories).  
 
 
116
interesting difference that was not apparent when I considered only the relationship 
between staff size and DICT adoption, because on average, the relationship between the 
two is, as described, a positive one. 
Out-party Innovation 
The fourth key factor that I anticipated would affect the degree to which the 
organizations under study adopted DICTs was their position in the political landscape. As 
discussed in the literature review, Karpf (2012) has argued that, according to Mayhew 
(1974/2004), one of the factors that may drive political entities to innovate online is the 
position that they hold in the field of discourse. Specifically, if an individual is promoting 
a policy or political position that is marginal in the politics of his or her country, he or she 
is more likely to look for innovative ways to spread his or her messages, including 
innovating online. Similarly, an individual promoting a policy or political position that 
enjoys widespread support in his or her country is less likely to innovate. The underlying 
idea here is that when a political entity like a campaign or an advocacy organization finds 
itself promoting an idea that runs contrary to the tide of popular opinion, it must look for 
innovative ways to reach and persuade people. Conservatives in the United States, for 
example, once found themselves struggling to get their messages into mainstream media 
outlets. In response, they engaged in innovative practices with direct mailing and talk 
radio (Jamieson & Capella, 2008; Viguerie & Frank, 2004). Similarly, Karpf (2009, 
2012) argues that when liberals found themselves marginalized by the political 
mainstream during the Bush years, they engaged in innovation online to try to build and 
reach constituencies. I therefore argued in the preceding chapters that organizations that 
found themselves marginalized by the tide of public opinion, legislative policy and media 
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coverage would have an incentive to find innovative ways to share their messages and 
reach supporters. I further argued that it was likely that some of this innovation would 
occur online, as DICTs offer organizations a way to reach mass audiences without the 
intermediation of mainstream traditional media outlets, and a way to activate and 
capitalize on the social networks of supporters. I thus anticipated that organizations that 
held out-party views would be more likely to adopt DICTs in innovative and intensive 
ways.  
The first step in analyzing the extent to which this was true, I had to determine 
which organizations would be considered out-parties. In order to assess whether or not 
the organizations under study would be considered in- or out-parties, I analyzed the 
positions of the governments of the countries in which these organizations operate with 
respect to gay rights, and considered the tone of public opinion, which I discussed earlier 
in my evaluation of public opinion polling data from the three countries under study. 
 In the US, as discussed earlier, the Democratic Party can be considered the 
incumbent party for the period under study. The Democratic Party explicitly supports 
marriage equality; the 2012 Democratic Party Platform states: “We support the right of 
all families to have equal respect, responsibilities, and protections under the law. We 
support marriage equality and support the movement to secure equal treatment under law 
for same-sex couples …We oppose discriminatory federal and state constitutional 
amendments and other attempts to deny equal protection of the laws to committed same-
sex couples who seek the same respect and responsibilities as other married couples. We 
support the full repeal of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act and the passage of the 
Respect for Marriage Act.” In addition, as the survey data cited earlier indicates, a slim 
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majority of Americans support marriage equality. Thus, I consider organizations in the 
United States that support marriage equality and gay rights to be in-parties, and those that 
oppose marriage equality to be out-parties. 
In the United Kingdom, a coalition government with the Conservative Party as the 
senior partner and the Liberal Democrats as the junior partner ruled during the period 
under study. The Liberal Democrats are long-time supporters of marriage equality and 
gay rights (Liberal Democrats, n.d.). The Conservative Party has a more mixed record of 
support for gay marriage, and while Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron 
endorsed gay marriage and supported Britain’s move to legalizing same-sex marriage, 
many Conservatives opposed the move (Taylor, 2014). Nevertheless, given the majority 
support for marriage equality in Britain, the position of the incumbent Liberal Democrats, 
and the position of the leadership of the Conservative Party, I consider organizations in 
the United Kingdom that support marriage equality and gay rights to be in-parties, and 
those that oppose marriage equality to be out-parties. 
In Ireland, a coalition government of Fine Gael and the Labour Party ruled during 
the period under study. At its 2012 annual meeting, Fine Gael, the stronger partner, 
endorsed a motion calling on government to prioritize consideration of same-sex 
marriage, an at its 2014 meeting, voted to support marriage equality in Irelands upcoming 
referendum (GLEN, 2012, 2014).  For its part, the Labour Party has long supported 
marriage equality and gay rights (Gilmore, 2009). The support of the incumbent parties, 
together with widespread support for gay marriage in Ireland leads me to consider 
organizations in Ireland that support marriage equality and gay rights to be in-parties, and 
those that oppose marriage equality to be out-parties. 
 
 
119
I therefore determined that, during the period under study, in all of the countries 
under study organizations that support gay rights were in-parties while their conservative 
counterparts were out-parties, in the sense that in all cases, the incumbent political parties 
supported marriage equality, as did majority public opinion. Per Karpf (2012) and 
Mayhew (1974/2004) , this would likely give organizations that oppose marriage equality 
an incentive to find new and innovative ways to communicate their messages.  
I then examined the relationship between out-party status and organizations’ 
tendency to adopt DICTs. Once again, it is difficult to separate ideology from out-party 
status, as the two are closely intertwined in the countries under study. Nevertheless it is 
worth noting that, while the literature leads me to anticipate that the out-party 
organizations will tend to adopt DICTs more intensively, in actuality, out-party 
conservative organizations displayed a comparable level of DICT adoption to their liberal 
peers; if anything, conservative organizations were slightly, but not meaningfully, less 
likely to adopt DICTs to favor potentially innovative tools like online interactivity and 
social media. In other words, it seems that conservative organizations did not react as 
expected to their out-party status. In terms of the literature, one would expect that as 
conservative organizations found themselves advocating for a position that was losing 
favor among the public and in the halls of power, namely the preservation of marriage as 
a heterosexual institution, they would turn to innovative online strategies to try and gain 
new supporters and turn the tide; this is the process that Karpf (2012) argues goes some 
way to explaining  Moveon.org’s success; progressives who found their goals and ideas 
out of favor turned to online innovation to reverse their fortunes. We might thus 
reasonably expect that conservative organizations, finding themselves the out-party in an 
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important debate, would have a strong incentive to innovate online in order to fight the 
tide of opinion. Instead, conservative organizations, while committed to a strong online 
presence, seem somewhat less eager to embrace potentially innovative tools like social 
media and online interactivity than their liberal peers. 
There are several potential explanations for this. First, it is possible that, in the 
period under study, conservative opponents of marriage equality were not, in fact, the 
out-party. Same-sex marriage was, at the time, still illegal in almost all cases in the 
countries under study, and thus in a sense, those who oppose it were, by default, 
victorious. However, I do not think this is an adequate explanation. While it is true that 
same-sex marriage was still illegal, in all of the countries under study, marriage equality 
advocates had won major victories. As I will discuss in detail in chapters five and six, 
public opinion had undergone major changes, swinging from disapproval to approval in a 
relatively short time, and in all the countries under study, major political parties had 
reversed their stance on the issue or made clear policy statements in support of marriage 
equality. A number of ballots, amendments, and new laws were either pending or being 
implemented permitting same-sex marriage, and there were moves in all three countries 
to permit marriage equality at the national level. Thus, I would argue that at the time, 
conservative organizations in fact felt their out-party status keenly, an observation that 
was substantiated by comments from my interview subjects to the effect that they felt 
themselves to be on the outside of the debate and losing ground. If, as Karpf (2012) 
explains, being the out-party means feeling that your organization’s stance on an issue is 
unable to gain traction in political debate and has little support, and that your 
organization is struggling to make itself heard in the public arena, I argue that in the 
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period under study, conservative organizations were certainly out-parties. I am furthered 
strengthened in this conviction by the fact that, in my interviews with gay rights 
organizations, they expressed a sense that they had the ears of the powerful, the support 
of the public, and momentum for their ideological victory, which qualities define in-party 
status. 
A second possible explanation is that it might be that conservative organizations 
believe that the fight around marriage equality is unwinnable and that it is therefore 
improvident to dedicate resources to it. However, this seems unlikely, given the deep 
conviction of many of these organizations. As Angela17 said, “We don’t pick our issues 
based on if we can win, they come from our convictions and from spiritual imperatives. 
It’s not that we think one thing is a good issue for us and another is hopeless, so we pick 
the first. We work on issues that matter to people of faith, no matter if they seem hopeless 
or what public opinion is.” This kind of dedication to social issues is fairly common at 
conservative organizations, as I found in my study of their web materials and in 
conversations with them. Thus, I do not believe that apathy is a plausible explanation of 
the failure of conservative organizations to innovate when they find themselves in an out-
party position.  
A third possible explanation is that conservative organizations may be responding 
to their position in the political landscape with innovation, but that this innovation is not 
occurring online. I found some evidence for this. For example, Ted explained that much 
of the work his organization does involves lobbying within the structures of the church 
and among political leaders. “The website matter to us, of course it does. We invest in it. 
                                                           
17 Not her real name, see footnote 2 
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But a lot of the real action of what we do is happening offline. We are in the churches, 
talking to church leadership and encouraging them to take a stand with parishioners. We 
are talking to local leaders who rely on support from parishioners, and telling them that 
this matters to us. We are face-to-face, a lot of the time, we’re talking face-to-face with 
people and building institutional levels of support.” Comments like this one, coupled with 
my finding that conservative organizations are more active with offline communication 
than their liberal peers, suggests that conservative organizations may be attempting to 
develop innovative strategies to counteract their position as an out-party outside of the 
online world. Given their imperative to target the older people who are more likely to 
support them, this would make sense; it may be that for conservative organizations, it is 
more important to innovate offline and attempt to reach older people who are more likely 
to support them than it is to innovate online and attempt to sway resistant young people. 
This is an area for future research, but I suggest that this tentative finding may indicate 
that online innovation is just one among many avenues open to organizations, even those 
in developed democracies, and that organizations invest resources and make strategic 
decisions based on what is likely to best serve their ends, even if that means neglecting 
online opportunities. In other words, despite the assumption in much of the literature that 
organizations will necessarily turn to DICTs more and more as time goes on because such 
tools have some obvious advantages for such organizations, it may be that the process is 
more complex, and that organizations will adopt DICTs only if they believe that such 
tools will in fact help them achieve their goals. Further study of organizations that choose 
to eschew online tools would be helpful in exploring this issue.  
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A fourth possible explanation is that conservative organizations would like to 
innovate online, but are unable to do so due to a lack of skills or opportunity. It seems 
unlikely that skills are a limiting factor for conservative organizations. As noted, they 
tend to have slightly larger staffs than liberal organizations, which suggests that they 
would have the resources to hire people with relevant online skills should they be needed. 
It is possible, of course, that their relative lack of younger staff members when compared 
to liberal organizations means that they tend to have a smaller pool of informal online 
skills among their staff, but the differences in staff ages did not seem stark enough for 
this explanation to suffice. In terms of opportunity, it is possible that, as a maturing 
phenomenon, the internet offers less potential for innovation than it did in the early 
2000s, the period during which much of the literature cited was produced. Being the first 
organization to deploy e-mail as a tool for political mobilization, as Moveon.org was, was 
only possible when e-mail was a relatively new technology; the same holds true for the 
use of Facebook and so on. However, innovations in mobile internet, the development of 
apps for mobile devices, and so on seem to offer the potential for innovation by advocacy 
organizations, and this seems an inadequate explanation for the failure of conservative 
organizations to innovate online in response to their out-party statues. As I will discuss in 
the next section, though, it is possible that conservative organizations’ ability to innovate 
online has been stifled by their opponents’ first-mover advantage. 
First-mover Advantage 
The present study is cross-sectional. I did not study the evolution of my selected 
organizations’ online activities over a period of several years, and thus it was difficult for 
me to gather good data the extent to which different organizations benefited from first-
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mover advantage. Nevertheless, by combining several sources of data, I was able to draw 
some conclusions about the role that first-mover advantage plays in the adoption of 
DICTs by the organizations under study. 
As outlined in the literature review, one of the explanations proposed for why 
some organizations fail to adopt DICTs was that, because they were slower to move 
online as the technology emerged, when they belatedly arrived in the online space, they 
found that it had already been colonized by their ideological opponents and that they 
were therefore unable to build their own ideological communities online due to trolling 
by the already-established communities of their opponents. In order to evaluate the extent 
to which this was a factor driving DICT adoption among my organizations, I gathered 
several types of data. First, I explored organizations’ online forums and the comments on 
their blogs, websites, and social media pages in order to note whether or not their posts 
attracted critics. Here, I made several interesting observations. Among the organizations I 
surveyed, a higher proportion of liberal organizations offered online forums (11.5%) and 
allowed comments (30.7%) than conservative organizations (9% and 18.2%, 
respectively). Overall, a very small proportion of the organizations under study included 
web 2.0 interactive elements (31.3%), but they were more common among liberal 
organizations18. In addition, in my qualitative evaluation of online materials, while I 
seldom found critical comments from conservatives on liberal forums or blogs, I found 
quite a number of critical comments from liberals on conservative blogs and forums. In 
other words, liberals were more likely to criticize conservatives on conservative pages 
                                                           
18 I ran statistical tests on each of the interactive elements, and for the combined interactive variable, and 
none of the differences were statistically significant. Nevertheless, the sample size is small, and a larger 
sample may have the power to detect significant differences; it is still suggestive that all of the differences 
were in the same direction, namely that liberal organizations were more likely to include each of the 
interactive elements I measured. 
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than vice-versa (it was, however, extremely common for conservatives to criticize 
liberals on their own forums and vice-versa). Karpf (2012) describes online trolling as a 
key mechanism through which first-mover advantage acts to limit the activity of 
ideological opponents, and the evidence I found that conservatives appeared to be 
avoiding  interactive options and that, where available, such interactive venues attracted 
liberal critics, suggests that liberals enjoy a first-mover advantage online when it comes 
to issues of gay rights and marriage equality in the three countries under study. This 
conclusion is supported by the other data I considered.  
My second data source here was my organizational survey, which is included in 
appendix two. In the survey, I asked respondents to rank their online communities’ 
strength and the strength of the online communities of their ideological opponents. Table 
4.6 summarizes my results. As can be seen, the liberal organizations I surveyed reported 
that their supporters’ online communities were relatively strong, and that the 
communities of their opponents were weaker than theirs. In contrast, the conservative 
organizations surveyed were confident of the strength of their supporters’ online 
communities, but evaluated the online communities of their ideological opponents as 
stronger than their own. The sample size here is, of course, small, but coupled with the 
earlier evidence I described, these findings strengthen the argument that supporters of 
marriage equality and progressive issues have a more robust online presence than their 
conservative peers.  
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Table 4.6: Organizations' perception of the strength of their supporters' and 
opponents' online communities  
  
Strength of your 
supporters' online 
community 
Strength of your 
opponents' online 
community 
  
Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative 
Very weak 
0 0 1 0 
Somewhat weak 
0 0 3 0 
About average 
5 1 2 0 
Somewhat strong 
5 3 3 4 
Very strong 
0 2 1 2 
 
Finally, my elite interviews confirmed this finding. For example, when asked why 
his organization’s website did not include comments from users, Geoff19, the 
communications manager for a conservative American group responded, “Well, what we 
deal with is controversial, obviously, and I find, that is, we find that if we allow 
comments then we get a lot of negative talk. We experimented a bit with this, and 
comments just don’t work for us. There are some organizations that have comments and 
it works great, but for us, it doesn’t. We get a lot of critical voices, not helpful critical 
people, you understand, just people who disagree with us. And that’s discouraging, you 
know, for the people who agree with us and who want to comment, they feel like they 
can’t comment if there are these negative things there. So we just find it doesn’t work for 
us.”  
Overall, then, the balance of my evidence suggests that the conservative 
organizations I studied have faced resistance as they try to build communities online from 
                                                           
19 Not his real name, see footnote 2 
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liberals, who appear to enjoy a first-mover advantage. Their forums and blogs have 
attracted liberal trolls, and they have thus been discouraged from offering forums or 
allowing comments. Although my lack of time series data makes it difficult for me to 
trace the sequences of events that lead to liberals’ stronger online communities, I have 
been able to identify what appear to be the consequences of first-mover advantage – 
liberals appear to have a robust online community of supporters who are able to act to 
limit the ability of conservatives to build similar interactive communities online. Thus, it 
appears that one of the reasons why conservative organizations have failed to innovate 
online, as might be expected given their out-party status, is the strength of the already-
established online community of liberals. In a sense, then, I find that first-mover 
advantage does indeed play a role in the adoption of DICTs; specifically, that when one 
group has a first-mover advantage online, it is difficult for another group to build 
interactive communities even when incentives exist to doing so, such as out-party status. 
Having thoroughly discussed the five factors that I anticipated would play a role 
in organizations’ propensity to adopt DICTs, I can now turn to the final element of my 
heuristic model, the role of national context. 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLORING THE HEURSTIC MODEL: THE ROLE OF 
NATIONAL CONTEXT IN DICT ADOPTION BY SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS  
As discussed, the literature contains little suggestion of how organizations’ 
adoption of DICTs may vary across nations. In much of the scholarship on DICTs and 
politics, there seems to be an implicit assumption that, given availability, these 
technologies will be universally embraced, and universally used in a way that promotes 
democracy, regardless of the broader national context (Pool, 1984). Although this view is 
more nuanced in recent scholarship, there has still been little systematic attention paid to 
the ways in which national context may influence DICT adoption by advocacy 
organizations within democratic countries. In an attempt to address this, I will discuss 
how DICT adoption varied across the countries under study, explore how the relationship 
between the factors I expected to influence DICT adoption and adoption itself varied 
across the countries under study, and suggests some additional reasons for the variation. 
Cross-National Differences in DICT Adoption.  
There were some clear differences in adoption across the three countries under 
study. As table 5.1 illustrates, organizations based in United States scored higher on their 
overall adoption scores and on their social media scores than the combined averages for 
their Irish and British counterparts; the differences in terms of interactivity were, 
however, negligible20.  
                                                           
20 My sample was too small for meaningful statistical tests. Nevertheless, in order to strengthen my 
assumption that the differences between organizations in the U.S. and their European counterparts were 
meaningful, I ran a t-test on the difference between the average for organizations in the United States and 
the combined average for organizations in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The differences between the 
U.K. and Ireland were very small and insignificant; while, the US scored significantly higher than both 
groups. I therefore elected to compare the U.S. to the combined scores for Ireland and the U.K., which 
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Table 5.1: Average adoption scores by country 
Country 
Average 
overall 
adoption 
score 
Average 
social 
media 
score 
Average 
interactivit
y score 
United States 6.8 5.8 2 
United Kingdom 4.8 3.7 1.8 
Ireland 4.9 4.3 1.7 
 
Qualitatively, I noted several differences between the US websites and their Irish 
and British peers (there were far fewer differences between the Irish and British sites). In 
particular, my exploration of web materials suggested that a greater proportion of U.S. 
sites were highly sophisticated than was the case in Ireland or Britain. An examination of 
the frequency distributions for the overall adoption scores of organizations based in the 
different countries offers some support for this impression. Figure 5.1 shows the 
frequency distribution of the adoption scores of U.S. organizations. As you can see, there 
are two distinct groups of organizations: a small cluster of unsophisticated sites, and a 
larger cluster of more sophisticated sites. In addition, there is a large group of sites right 
at the top of the range.  
Contrast this with figure 5.2, which shows the distribution for British 
organizations. As can be seen, the distribution of adoption scores is closer to a normal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
enabled me to combine all my cases in the t-test, giving it more power. I found that the difference in overall 
adoption score and social media score were statistically significant, while the interactivity difference was 
not. My sample included only 48 organizations, 19 of which were American and 29 of which were Irish 
and British. Thus, although this test should not be relied upon, it does strengthen my argument that 
American organizations outperformed their European counterparts. 
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distribution, with organizations spread more evenly along the spectrum of sophistication, 
and with relatively fewer organizations at the high-end of the range. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Frequency distribution of overall adoption score for American 
organizations 
 
Figure 5.2: Frequency distribution of overall adoption score for British 
organizations 
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Figure 5.3: Frequency distribution of overall adoption score for Irish organizations 
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Finally, consider figure 5.3, which shows the distribution for Irish organizations. 
Once again, there is a more even spread across the range of scores, with fewer 
organizations at the high and low ends. 
These are suggestive patterns. In my assessment, the pattern in Figure 5.1 
indicates that the typical American organization is likely to be a relatively intensive 
adopter of DICTs, and that the reason I did not find even more-striking differences in the 
scores when grouped cross-nationally is that my sample included three organizations that 
were clearly outliers. The three organizations that scored on the low end of the U.S. range 
were Defend the Family, Heterosexuals Organized for a Moral Environment, and the 
Institute for Marriage and Public Policy. These organizations are unusual compared to the 
rest of the organizations in the sample, including the British and Irish organizations. Both 
Heterosexuals Organized for a Moral Environment and the Institute for Marriage and 
Public Policy are organizations established and, as far as I was able to determine, staffed 
by a single person; Defend the Family is a religious group associated with Abiding Truth 
Ministries, an organization best known for promoting legislation in Uganda that imposes 
the death penalty for homosexual activity (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.).. A close 
reading of the content of these three sites and that of the sites of other conservative 
groups in all three countries revealed that these three sites tend to promote arguments that 
are more extreme than those of their conservative peers; they argue, for example, that 
homosexuals intentionally indoctrinate heterosexual young people into gay lifestyles, and 
that there is a secret homosexual agenda dedicated to abolishing the family unit and 
heterosexual relationships. None of the conservative American sites that had higher 
adoption scores included such extreme rhetoric, and none of the Irish or British sites did 
 
 
133
either; typically their arguments emphasized scriptural reasons for the prohibition of 
same-sex marriage and issues related to building and maintaining stable family units in 
the face of changing definitions of marriage. In the next chapter, which addresses 
supplemental organization-level factors that may drive DICT adoption, I will discuss how 
the DICT adoption of this organizations may be related to the relatively extreme rhetoric 
these three sites promote, and the position this places them in with relation to the broader 
political discourse. More generally, and pertinently to the issue of cross-national 
difference, the data indicate that American organizations are more sophisticated than their 
European peers; I will address some potential explanations for this in the sections below. 
Another set of cross-national differences that I noted related to social media 
usage. First, I noted that the U.S.-based organizations tended to attract more likes, 
followers, and subscribers on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube than their British and Irish 
peers. However, it is likely that this is in large part a function of the fact that the 
population of America is much larger than the population of the U.K. and Ireland. Social 
movement organizations based in these different countries would primarily be of interest 
to citizens of those countries, and thus Irish organizations would have a smaller potential 
audience of citizens than American organizations. According to the World Bank, in 2013 
the population of Ireland was 4.6 million, the population of the U.K. was 64 million, and 
the population of the U.S. was 316 million (World Bank, 2013c). This pattern is echoed 
by the pattern of social media popularity in my data. For example, the U.S. attracted the 
greatest number of followers on Twitter, with an average of 51,483, followed by the U.K. 
with an average of 15,244, and then Ireland with an average of 2,119; the number of 
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followers follows the pattern one might expect if it was driven, at least in part, by total 
population21.  
Table 5.2: Organizational social media use by country 
Country 
% using 
Facebook 
% using 
Twitter 
% using 
YouTube 
% 
updating 
Facebook 
daily 
% 
updating 
Twitter 
daily 
% 
updating 
YouTube 
fortnightly 
United States  79% 84% 74% 68% 68% 42% 
United 
Kingdom 
67% 67% 27% 33% 47% 27% 
Ireland 79% 71% 50% 64% 36% 7% 
 
Second, as I mentioned earlier, U.S. organizations scored higher on an index of 
social media adoption than their British and Irish peers. Table 5.2 breaks down some of 
the key elements of the index22; there are some clear differences that are in line with the 
overall finding that U.S. organizations are more intensive adopters of DICTs than their 
European peers. Interestingly, in terms of social media use, organizations in the U.K. tend 
to lag organizations in both the U.S. and Ireland, but, while fewer British organizations 
use social media than Irish organizations, they also tend to update them more regularly 
(with the exception of Facebook). However, U.S. organizations are more likely to use and 
update social media than organizations in either European country. 
In terms of issues of interactivity, I did not note any major cross-national 
differences. Interactive options were relatively rare across all organizations, and there 
was no clear pattern linked to national context. 
                                                           
21 The patterns were broadly the same for Facebook and YouTube, although the magnitudes of the 
differences varied. 
22 For brevity, I excluded my measures of whether or not the organization had updated Facebook and 
Twitter in the previous week. 
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Overall, then, my data shows clear cross-national differences. In particular, 
American organizations are significantly more sophisticated in terms of the DICT 
adoption than their peers in Ireland and England, and more engaged with social media. In 
the following section, I will note some key cross-national differences in the factors 
driving DICT adoption that were included in my heuristic model and how they relate to 
the cross-national differences in DICT adoption that I have identified; I will then move to 
a discussion of possible explanations for these differences. 
Cross-National Differences in the Factors Driving DICT Adoption 
There were a number of suggestive cross-national differences among 
organizations related to the factors in my heuristic model. For the purposes of this 
discussion, I will discuss only those differences that were meaningful, and that offer 
some insight into the different patterns of DICT adoption that I found in the three 
countries under study. 
Ideology. One difference that stood out upon analyzing my data was how the 
relationship between ideology and DICT adoption differed dramatically across the 
countries under study. Table 5.3 shows mean overall adoption scores for organizations 
grouped by country and by ideology. As you can see, there were no major differences 
between liberal and conservative organizations in Britain and Ireland, but overall, 
conservative organizations tended to score slightly higher than liberal organizations23. In 
the United States, in contrast, there was a stark difference between liberal and 
conservative organizations, with liberals scoring much higher than their conservative 
                                                           
23 I conducted t-tests of the group differences, and found that only the difference between conservative and 
liberal groups in the United States was statistically significant. However, once again, the small and non-
random nature of my sample means that this is not irrefutable evidence of a difference. It is, however, clear 
that differences were bigger in the United States, a finding that was echoed in my qualitative notes about 
the web materials I examined. 
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peers. In fact, liberal U.S. organizations were the highest scorers overall. This is an 
interesting finding. First, it suggests that the negligible ideology-related differences I 
found when examining all of the organizations pooled together was a function of the fact 
that in the U.S., conservative organizations score poorly compared to liberal 
organizations while in Ireland and the U.K., conservative organizations have a slight but 
not meaningful edge over their liberal counterparts. This underscores the fact that a 
pattern that applies in the U.S. context may not apply elsewhere, and that cross-national 
comparison has a role to play in identifying ways in which the use of DICTs varies across 
nations and in explaining why that may be so.  
Table 5.3: Mean adoption scores by country and ideology 
Country 
Mean adoption score: 
Liberal 
Mean adoption score: 
Conservative 
United States 8.1 5.5 
United 
Kingdom 
4.5 5.1 
Ireland 4.8 5 
 
However, these aggregates do not convey the whole story. As discussed earlier, 
three conservative organizations in the United States appeared to be outliers with respect 
to their DICT adoption, and these organizations skewed the overall results24. More 
importantly, I do not believe that the differences I have identified here are a consequence 
of ideology itself. If it were the case that liberals had an inherent, ideological advantage 
online then one would expect that advantage to manifest across all three of the countries 
                                                           
24 Excluding the three outlier organizations, the mean adoption score for conservative organizations rises to 
7.3, and there is no longer a statistically significant difference between conservative and liberal American 
organizations. This is in keeping with my impression of the sophistication of mainstream conservative 
organizations’ DICT adoption. 
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under study. Given that liberals enjoy a clear advantage in the U.S. and lag conservatives 
in the U.K. and Ireland, it seems clear that there is no inherent advantage accruing to 
organizations based solely on their ideological orientation. This is, I believe, positive 
finding as it suggests that there is no innate reason why groups espousing conservative 
rhetoric should find themselves at a disadvantage when attempting to use new 
communication technologies. From the perspective of encouraging broad political debate 
and allowing multiple viewpoints to impress themselves on public discussion, this is a 
positive finding.   
As I will discuss in the following sections, I suggest that, rather than springing 
from ideology, the differences in DICT adoption I have observed are  a consequence of 
several factors, including liberal first-mover advantage, and several unique characteristics 
of the U.S., British, and Irish political environments, and of the outlier U.S. conservative 
organizations. One interesting point to note here is that these findings provide evidence 
that it is not the characteristics of groups or organizational staff that lead to particular 
patterns of DICT adoption. In all three of the countries, individuals who opposed 
marriage equality shared the same relevant demographic characteristics, in particular, that 
they tended to be older; they were also more likely to be male and to an extent, less 
educated. Given the relationship between age and DICT usage, then, we might expect 
that, if it is the characteristics of the people that organizations target that drives their 
DICT adoption, conservative organizations would show a lower propensity to adopt 
DICTs than their liberal peers. However, this cross-national comparison shows clearly 
that this is not so, because although conservative individuals’ characteristics are very 
similar across all three countries, the patterns of difference between the adoption of 
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DICTs by liberal and conservative organizations vary. In other words, this study provides  
good evidence that it is not the individual characteristics of groups or their ideology that 
drives DICT adoption, but rather other factors related to the political environment and the 
historical development of online activism; this is an important finding that would not 
have been possible in the absence of a cross-national comparison. In the sections that 
follow, I will discuss some of these factors. 
Out-party status and first mover advantage. When I previously discussed out-
party status, I concluded that, overall, in all three of the countries under study 
conservative organizations were out-parties in the politics of marriage equality and gay 
rights. However, while this is true, the degree to which conservative organizations find 
themselves on the margin of the debates of the day differs by country. In Ireland, for 
example, public opinion is strongly in favor of marriage equality, with 76% of Irish 
voters expressing support for the upcoming referendum on the issue (Red C Research, 
2013). In the U.K., however, support is much lower, with 55% of voters saying they 
support marriage equality (YouGov, 2013). Finally, in the U.S., support for marriage 
equality is around 52%, although it should be noted that there has been a rapid and 
significant shift in American attitudes towards same-sex marriage; support for marriage 
equality increased by 21 percentage points between 2003 and 2013 (Public Religion 
Research Institute, 2014). In terms of political support, in the U.K, two of the three major 
parties have long advocated in favor of marriage equality, as has Conservative Prime 
Minister David Cameron; among the traditional opponents of marriage equality in the 
Conservative party, there is a split, and the party has no unified position on the issue. In 
Ireland, all of the major political parties have endorsed same sex marriage. Meanwhile, in 
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the U.S., the Republican Party has a firm and almost-unified stance on the issue; only 
eight of the 279 Republicans in Congress supported marriage equality in July 2014, and 
that number was lower during the period under study (Bradshaw, 2014). Thus, while Irish 
marriage equality advocates enjoy both widespread public and broad political party 
support for their cause, American advocates face a more-deeply divided electorate and 
unified opposition from one of the country’s two parties; British advocates face a mixed 
bag of moderate public opinion support and broad political party support. Irish 
conservative groups, therefore, are more of an out-party, in a sense, than their British and 
American peers. This has some possible consequences, as I will discuss in the next 
section of this chapter. 
For the purposes of this discussion, however, the logic of the arguments outlined 
in the literature related to the role of out-party status in the adoption of DICTs would still 
suggest that, in all of the countries under study, conservative organizations that oppose 
same-sex marriage would have a strong incentive to innovate online in pursuit of their 
political goals, as in all cases, they are either clearly a hopeless out-party, or are 
struggling to turn a rising tide of support for marriage equality. Thus, if out-party status 
were the primary driver of DICT adoption, one would expect that the gap between DICT 
adoption among organizations grouped by ideology to be largest in Ireland, where 
conservative organizations have an incentive to be innovating intensively online. One 
would expect a smaller gap in Britain, with conservative innovation leading to higher 
DICT adoption scores for conservative organizations. Finally, one might expect the U.S. 
to have a relatively small gap between the mean scores for DICT adoption of 
conservative and liberal organizations, with conservatives enjoying a modest lead. 
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Instead, the smallest difference is found in Ireland, and the largest in the U.S., and the 
gap is meaningful only in the U.S., where liberal organizations display a much more 
sophisticated approach to DICTs than their conservative peers. This is a noteworthy 
departure from what we might expect given the literature on out-party status and 
innovation.  
I believe that the explanation for this gap lies, in part, in the role that first-mover 
advantage plays in driving DICT adoption over time. According to Evan25, an organizer 
at a medium-sized U.S. organization that promotes marriage equality, the reason that 
liberal organizations have an online advantage in the U.S. is their long experience with 
web technologies. “I don’t think it’s a mystery, really, I think we were just there first. 
We, the community, the gay rights community, I guess, we were online right from the 
beginning. We had nowhere else to go, a lot of the time. Or nowhere to talk politics, in a 
way. So we were online. And then, you know, over the years, we just built on that and 
built on it. We had a big fight on our hands, and we had to use everything we could and 
that included the web, you know. So, it’s that, we were online early, and we kept trying 
things online, like forums or what have you, or meetups, and we just built it up. So today, 
we have a lot of experience, and just a lot of … spaces, maybe? Well, we have a lot of 
experience and capacity online. And that’s really why we’re doing good work. It’s just a 
long time of trial and error. Plus, you know, we could get funding. At first, of course it 
was informal online, but then, we could show early results, and that helped us get 
resources. So we built up the experience and we built up the resources.”  
                                                           
25 Not his real name, see footnote 2 
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What Evan’s comments suggest is that, years ago when web technologies were 
first emerging, progressives advocating for gay rights in the U.S., who were at the time a 
political out-party, moved into online spaces to meet, strategize, and organize. Over time, 
they developed expertise and skills, and importantly, strong online communities, which 
have been hard for conservative activists to replicate. In recent times, when conservatives 
have found themselves at a disadvantage in the politics of gay rights, any attempts on 
their part to innovative online have been stymied by the pre-existing liberal advantage, as 
discussed earlier and underscored by Geoff’s previously quoted comment. Thus, the 
initial role that out-party status played in stimulating DICT adoption has now been 
overshadowed by the role that first-mover advantage plays in inhibiting opportunities for 
innovation for later adopters. This interpretation is supported by comments from 
organizers based in Britain and Ireland. As Ted explains, “To some extent, I think we’re 
all fairly new to this. I think that, yes, the pro-marriage equality community moved faster 
into the web, certainly. But I also think we’re just quite new at it as a national 
community. It’s not that Britons aren’t online, and they haven’t been active online, it’s 
more that we just perhaps got a later start than the Americans, or some of the Europeans 
even. Not all around, I’m talking about the NGO community more. We just were a bit 
slower getting into things.” 
In other words, one of the reasons why the gaps in DICT adoption look different 
in Ireland and the United Kingdom than they do in the U.S. might be that in Britain and 
Ireland, neither group accrued a particularly strong first-mover advantage online. This is, 
of course, made complex by the fact that, particularly on interactive forums, people from 
around the world comment and engage online. Thus, it is possible that the early adopters 
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in the U.S. formed a ready-made community when British and Irish groups began to 
move online that helped to protect those groups from trolling and inhibit conservative 
groups. Unfortunately, the study of such dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
would make an interesting topic for future research. Nevertheless, these findings 
highlight the crucial role that first-mover advantage plays in DICT adoption. This has 
important implications for organizations seeking to increase their online efforts in 
contexts in which opponents already hold an online advantage. In particular, it suggests 
that organizations may need to work on strategies to negate the inhibiting impact of first-
mover advantage, such as the chilling effect that trolling may have on nascent 
communities of interest. Possible strategies might include using registration options to 
control commenting, and hiring staff that have obtained experience with DICTs in other 
contexts, such as in consumer products marketing, who will not be inhibited by their 
ideological convictions from sharing skills and experiences with the disadvantaged 
organization.  
Having considered some of the key ways in which the factors that my heuristic 
model indicated may affect DICT adoption operate in different national contexts, I will 
now offer some additional hypotheses on how national context may influence DICT 
adoption. One of my goals in conducting a cross-national study was to theorize on the 
role of national context, and in the section that follows, I will draw on my qualitative data 
to offer some possible explanations thereof. 
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Potential Alternative Explanations for Cross-National Differences in DICT 
Adoption 
As I have shown, organizations based in the U.S. tend to be more sophisticated 
adopters of DICTs than their European counterparts and the U.K. and Ireland tend to 
display similar patterns of DICT adoption. There are a number of potential explanations 
for these findings, including the explanation offered above related to the role of first-
mover advantage, and some are more convincing than others.  
At the most simplistic level, this difference could be attributed to internet 
penetration; if Americans used the internet more than Europeans, it would make sense 
that U.S. organizations display more online sophistication. However, this is unlikely to be 
the case. As noted, according to World Bank data, in 2011 U.S. had 78.2 internet users 
per 100 people, the United Kingdom had 81.7, and Ireland had 76.8 (World Bank, 
2013b). Furthermore, the data I gathered on individual usage of the internet by group 
characteristics indicated that patterns of internet usage were very similar across all three 
countries, even in terms of usage by age, sex, and socio-economic status. Any differences 
in internet penetration and access were thus marginal and inadequate to account for the 
differences in adoption. 
Differences in wealth and resources are perhaps a better candidate for 
explanation. According to the World Bank, in 2011 per capita income in US dollars in the 
United Kingdom was $37,780, it was $48,620 in the United States, and $39,150 in 
Ireland (World Bank, 2013a). As discussed earlier, at the individual level, wealth plays a 
limited or no role in internet usage. However, wealth could play a role in organizations’ 
adoption of DICTs. Specifically, greater wealth may allow Americans to devote more 
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resources to their advocacy organizations by giving more money and volunteering more 
time to help such organizations, which might help those organizations to devote more 
resources to DICTs, while similar levels of wealth in the U.K. and Ireland may lead to 
their similar patterns of DICT adoption. I found mixed evidence to support this argument. 
First, I compared the data I was able to collect on organizations’ staff across countries. 
US organizations typically had somewhat larger staffs than their Irish and British 
counterparts, and all of the biggest organizations, in terms of staff, were American. This 
suggests that American organizations were better able to mobilize resources in pursuit of 
their political goals than their peers in Europe. Second, I considered data on international 
giving. CAF America, a global grant making organization, produces an annual World 
Giving Index, which compares charitable giving and volunteering around the world (CAF 
America, 2013). According to the 2013 World Giving Index, the United States was the 
most charitable nation in the world in 2013, with Ireland and the United Kingdom 
ranking fifth and sixth respectively. A greater proportion of Irish people (70%) and 
British people (76%) donate to charity than Americans (62%); however, data from the 
Center for Civil Society Studies at the Johns Hopkins Institute for Health and Social 
Policy indicate that Americans give more (Center for Civil Society Studies, 2013). 
According to the Center for Civil Society Studies, Americans’ donations between 1995 
and 2003 were equal to 1.85% of GDP, while Irish donations equaled 0.85% of GDP, and 
British donations equaled 0.84% of GDP. Furthermore, according to the World Giving 
Index, a greater proportion of American individuals engaged in volunteering (45%) than 
the proportion of Irish individuals (37%) and British individuals (29%). However, I do 
not find this a totally convincing argument. The U.S., Britain, and Ireland are all wealthy 
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countries, and no doubt organizations that met a need in their respective political 
environments would be able to secure funding. Instead, based on my interviews and 
overall assessment of my data, I argue that the reason why U.S. organizations fare better 
online and may, perhaps, enjoy an edge in fundraising (as illustrated by their relatively 
larger staffs) is the nature of the competition over the issue of marriage equality in the 
U.S. compared to the U.K. and Ireland. Earlier, in my literature review, I suggested that 
differences in the political environment and in the intensity of competition over social 
issues may play a role in cross-national differences in DICT adoption, and in the course 
of my study, I found evidence that this is true.  
The competitive environment. As I mentioned above, the competitive environment 
in which the advocacy organizations under study differ in the three countries under study. 
Marriage equality enjoys broad public and political party support in Ireland, broad 
political party support and moderate public support in the U.K., and divided political 
party support and public support in the U.S.; the issue is therefore most competitive in 
America, where public support of marriage equality is closest to 50%, and where one of 
the country’s two political parties staunchly opposes it. In both Ireland and the U.K., the 
issue is much less competitive, and given the near-unanimous political party support for 
marriage equality, the battle for the right to marry is almost won in those countries. 
Events that occurred after the period under study bore out this assessment. Same-sex 
marriage was legalized in the U.K. in mid-2013 (“Same-sex marriage becomes law”, 
2013), the pro-marriage equality outcome of the Irish referendum on the topic is widely 
expected to be a foregone conclusion (“67% support the introduction of same-sex 
marriage”, 2014), and in the U.S., despite a number of legislative victories, the battle 
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remains relatively intense, particularly after a surprise appeal court decision upholding 
three state bans on same-sex marriage (“Appeals court upholds bans on same-sex 
marriage”, 2014). This state of affairs means that, during the period under study, 
American conservative organizations had the best opportunity to fight moves to legalize 
same sex marriage – the issue was competitive enough that it was not a foregone 
conclusion that marriage equality would become a reality. This also meant that American 
liberal organizations faced a more challenging task than their European peers in 
maintaining and expanding support for marriage equality. Therefore, in this study U.S. 
organizations on both sides of the issue should be, overall, better able to mobilize 
resources than their peers; not because of greater American wealth, but because the 
competitiveness of the battle over the issue motivates supporters of both sides to 
contribute resources. As Geoff expresses it, “The battle is being decided now, so we’re 
willing to put in whatever we can to make it a good fight, to win on this. And of course, 
our members support that, they want it, they are available to help out, and to give, and to 
participate.” According to Schervish and Havens (1997), charitable giving, which is the 
primary source of funding for the organizations under study, supplemented with grant 
money in some cases, is driven by what they call the identification model. Essentially, 
people are driven to contribute to organizations by virtue of the identification they feel 
with its goals and ambitions. In the Schervish and Haven (1997) model, through their 
formal and informal networks of relationships and motivated by their particular ways of 
thinking including political convictions, people build connection with particular 
organizations and are motivated to give to those organizations when they feel that by 
doing so they will further a goal they support. Thus, when there are roughly equal groups 
 
 
147
of people with strong convictions over an issue that is being debated in the public sphere, 
as there is in the U.S., both sides will be able to motivate their supporters to devote 
resources to the cause; hence the larger staffs at the American organizations and 
American organizations’ higher adoption scores. In contrast, in a place like Ireland and 
the U.K., where marriage equality enjoys wide support, particularly at the legislative 
level, those who support and oppose the policy have less incentive to contribute 
resources, and organizations have lower adoption scores.  
If this is correct, however, and in the U.S. both sides are able to mobilize 
resources, how then do I explain the finding that liberal American organizations adopt 
DICTs more intensively than their conservative peers? My proposed explanation has two 
parts. First, I emphasize that the gap in DICT adoption among liberal and conservative 
organizations in the U.S. is primarily the result of a small group of outliers; conservative 
organizations that display a very low level of DICT sophistication. This suggests that 
there are organizational level factors at play. In particular, I argue that the relatively 
extreme rhetoric that these organizations embrace places them outside the competitive 
mainstream of the debate. The small group of people to whom these arguments appeal is 
not large enough to provide the resource to support concerted advocacy action, and these 
organizations thus remain at the margin, a point I will expand on in the next chapter. As I 
noted earlier, when these organizations are excluded, the difference in DICT adoption 
between liberal and conservative organizations in the U.S. is much smaller. At this point, 
the second element of my argument becomes relevant; I argue that first-mover advantage 
plays a key role here, as discussed above. Liberal organizations advocating marriage 
equality in the U.S. are in the happy position of being able to mobilize resources 
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effectively thanks to the competitiveness of the issue, and of enjoying a first-mover 
advantage online that helps them to maintain their online edge in the face of motivated 
conservative organizations, which have the resources to innovate online and which are 
motivated by their out-party status to do so, but thwarted by pre-existing liberal 
advantages. In other words, as I anticipated, at the national level, the more competitive 
the political environment is around a particular issue, the higher the adoption scores of 
organizations advocating positions related to the issue are likely to be, in part because 
those organizations will be better able to mobilize resources. However, issues such as the 
history of lobbying around the issue and the legacy of advantage that history has given 
particular organizations will still play a role in determining individual organizations’ 
adoption of DICTs. 
The political environment. In terms of the political environment more broadly, 
there does appear to be a link between the political environment and a country’s political 
traditions and the extent to which organizations adopt DICTs. Consider, for example, the 
similarities in the adoption patterns in the U.K. and Ireland, and how they differ from the 
U.S.. I argue that these patterns are, in part, the result of certain aspects of the political 
environment in these two European countries. These aspects differ somewhat across the 
two countries, but have similar effects on the propensity of organizations within these 
countries to adopt DICTs. 
First, let us consider the case of Ireland. According to Sara, “You have to 
understand that this model of organizing around social issues is quite new in Ireland. We 
have a history of organizing of course, fighting the English and so on. But for so long, 
Irish society just relied on the Church as far as social issues goes, whether abortion, or 
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gay rights or anything really. So it’s only since the Church has lost its grip that we’ve 
really organized around these things in an organized way. I’m not saying there’s no Irish 
history of social mobilization, but it is true that the last few years have been 
transformative, the last few decades, in terms of how we are trying to shape Irish society. 
It used to be the parties and the Church only, you were a member of a political party and 
they dealt with politics and then you went to Church and lived that way, the Catholic 
way. Now, it’s different.”  
Sara’s point, which was echoed by much of the literature that I read on Ireland, is 
that for much of its history, Ireland saw relatively little organization around social issues 
that did not occur through the formal channels of the Catholic Church (Bartlett, 2010; 
Bew, 2007). This is not to say that Ireland has no history of social movements focusing 
on issues like women’s rights, but rather that the country has seen less spontaneous 
organization by citizens around such issues than has been the case elsewhere. 
Specifically, for many years debate on social and moral issues was dominated by the 
Catholic Church, which was long the most influential organization in Irish society, and 
activity around these issues was channeled through that institution. Over recent years, 
however, Church attendance and religious observance in Ireland have declined 
dramatically, and increasingly the Irish are looking beyond the Church for guidance on 
moral and social issues. This has meant that there has been an increase in efforts by 
secular, informal social movement organizations and political entrepreneurs to organize 
around social issues like marriage equality. Such efforts have borne fruit, as the success 
of attempts to encourage support for marriage equality demonstrate. However, Irish 
social movement organizations, and particularly those that focus on social issues, have 
 
 
150
less historical experience with organizing around these issues than their peers elsewhere. 
Thus, one of the reasons that Irish advocacy organizations display lower levels of DICT 
sophistication than their American peers is that these organizations are still developing 
their capacity to organize and lobby. As Sara puts it, “We’re figuring this all out, still. 
We’re learning how to do this work of building up the public to support something like 
same sex marriage, which was not something we were even thinking about thirty years 
ago, when the Church was really the only, or really the main game in town.” 
In the case of the U.K., as in Ireland, advocacy organizations tend to adopt DICTs 
less intensively than their U.S. peers, and again, this difference is, I argue, rooted in 
differences in the political environment. While DICT adoption in Ireland is influenced by 
the relative newness of non-Church organizing around social and moral issues in the 
political environment, in the U.K., DICT adoption by advocacy organizations is 
influenced by the British tradition of strong political parties and well-developed 
institutional channels for organization (Childs, 2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013). While the 
specific drivers of DICT adoption differ somewhat, the effect on average levels of 
adoption appears to be similar. 
According to Ted, “The British way of organizing is different, I think from the 
Americans. We, I would say we do a lot more through channels, through the political 
parties, through the Church of England, through maybe you could say formal channels. I 
believe that most of the really big marches in British history were political, it was Labour 
organizing the masses. In America, it seems to be different, they have more big marches 
by groups, if you see what I mean.” In other words, Ted’s comments suggest that one 
reason why American organizations achieve higher DICT adoption scores may be that the 
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political traditions of Britain have favored collective action around social issues 
expressed through traditional channels like churches and political parties.  
Indeed, both Ireland and the United Kingdom have long been dominated by a 
single church, the Catholic Church in the case of Ireland and the Church of England in 
the case of the U.K.; in contrast, the U.S. has long been a place of significant religious 
diversity among Christians (Bartlett, 2010; Jenkins, 2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013; 
Weaver, & Rockman, 1993). Furthermore, the U.S. has a relatively weak party system 
compared to the U.K. and Ireland (Bartlett, 2010; Bew, 2007; Childs, 2012; Kuklick, 
2009; Weaver, & Rockman, 1993). This has led to a greater role for social movements 
and extra-party political organizing in the U.S. than in Ireland and Britain. Furthermore, 
in Ireland, there has been relatively little tradition of citizens organizing around issues 
considered to be moral matters by the Church like same-sex marriage, while in the U.K., 
much organization around social issues has traditionally occurred through well-
developed, formal political party channels. Thus, in both countries, social movement 
organizations have less depth of historical experience of extra-institutional organization 
than their American peers.  
One might anticipate that this would give British and Irish organizations a further 
incentive to adopt DICTs, in order to develop new modes of extra-institutional 
organization in the absence of a long tradition thereof. However, I argue that instead, a 
tradition of fierce extra-institutional competition in the U.S. drives organizations to more 
actively seek out new tools for organizing. Thus, one national level factor that may drive 
DICT adoption in a country is the degree to which the country has a tradition of strong 
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parties or strong institutions like the Catholic Church in Ireland, or a tradition of extra-
institutional political organization.  
A second aspect of the political environment that may influence organizations’ 
propensity to adopt DICTs is the structure of the media system and the partisan history of 
various forms of media. For example, as noted earlier, in the U.S., conservatives have a 
strong tradition of using direct mail and talk radio as platforms for expression, while 
liberals have tended to have less tendency to use such tools (Jamieson & Capella, 2008; 
Karpf, 2012; Viguerie & Frank, 2004). Mainstream media in the U.S. generally tend to 
adhere to principles of balance and objectivity, and thus to offer a platform that is not 
particularly friendly to either ideological orientation. Thus, in the U.S., it is possible that 
conservatives feel less pressure to innovate online because they have access to channels 
like talk radio, and this may help to explain their relatively unsophisticated adoption of 
DICTs. In contrast, in the U.K. and in Ireland, broadcast media are dominated by state-
owned, public service broadcasters – the BBC in the U.K. and RTE in Ireland – while 
newspapers tend to embrace partisan identities and offer political parties and ideologues 
platforms for their views (Doyle, 2002; Horgan, 2001). Thus, in those countries, neither 
side of the political spectrum has a particular advantage in any medium, and therefore 
neither has a strong incentive to claim online spaces. Although I have gathered no data 
that would specifically address the extent to which this explanation works to explain 
variation in DICT adoption across the three countries under study, this may offer a 
fruitful avenue for future research.  
Similarly, there are important differences in the legislative practices and 
structures of the three countries under study (Bartlett, 2010; Bew, 2007; Childs, 2012; 
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Jenkins, 2012; Jones, & Norton, 2013; Kuklick, 2009; Weaver, & Rockman, 1993). 
While the U.S. has a federal, presidential system based on a constitution, the U.K. is a 
unitary, parliamentary, constitutional monarchy, while Ireland is a unitary, parliamentary, 
constitutional republic. The particulars of how laws are made and implemented in these 
different systems may also play a role in patterns of DICT adoption by advocacy 
organizations domiciled therein. This issue is beyond the scope of the present project, and 
should be explored in future research.  
It is also worth noting that I found no evidence that different internet regulation 
regimes played a role in the extent to which DICTs were adopted by organizations in the 
three countries under study. Although European law requires websites domiciled in 
European Union countries that are signatories to certain E.U. statutes, which includes the 
U.K., to alert visitors to their use of cookies and obtain permission from visitors to place 
cookies in their browsers, many of the European sites I visited did not provide such 
warnings despite their use of cookies. Further, although as I noted I did not include my 
measures of cookie usage and other online data-gathering practices in my overall 
analysis, I did note that there were no meaningful differences among organizations 
domiciled the three countries under study with respect to the number of cookies used or 
their propensity to use third-party cookies. Given the European countries’ disregard of 
the regulations around cookies, and the absence of any cross-national differences in data-
gathering practices, it seems unlikely that such regulations are having a chilling effect on 
organizations’ use of DICTs. Furthermore, none of my interview subjects made any 
mention of issues with internet rule regimes or even awareness of particular rules and 
regulations. Thus, I do not think that such rules make any meaningful difference to DICT 
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adoption in developed democracies with free speech regimes. It is possible that such rules 
play an important role in DICT use in countries in which speech is curtailed, but that is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
In conclusion, then, I have identified two major national-level factors that I argue 
may account for the cross-national differences in DICT adoption that I have identified. 
Specifically, I argue that the intensity of competition around a given social issue will play 
a role in determining how intensively advocacy organizations working on that issue will 
adopt DICTs, such that the more intense the competition, the more intensely 
organizations will adopt DITCs. Further, I argue that the political traditions of a country, 
in particular the extent to which it has a tradition of extra-institutional political 
organizing, will play a role in organizations’ adoption of DICTs such that countries with 
a strong tradition of extra-institutional organization will produce organizations that adopt 
DICTs with greater intensity.  
My final goal in this project was to assess my overall heuristic model, and to 
identify additional factors that may drive DICT adoption at the organizational level and 
could therefore be included with group characteristics, ideology, out-party innovation and 
first-mover advantage. It is to this final task that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE UTILITY OF THE HEURISTIC MODEL 
As discussed earlier, the goal of this project was threefold. First, I planned to 
explore the heuristic model I built based on the literature, gathering data and determining 
how well the patterns I observed fit those I theorized would exist. Second, I planned to 
evaluate the extent to which national context shapes the adoption of DICTs by social 
movement organizations by grouping them by country and comparing those groups. 
Finally, I planned to evaluate the usefulness of my heuristic model and suggest 
refinements thereto; this is the task of this final chapter. 
Refinements of the Heuristic Model 
Overall, I found the heuristic model to be somewhat useful, but in need of 
modification. First, given the strong relationship between group characteristics and 
ideology, such that people with particular demographic qualities are likely to also have 
particular ideological qualities, and that the demographic attributes associated with 
particular ideologies are also associated with web use, it was impossible for me to treat 
those aspects of the model as distinct drivers of DICT adoption, and this is likely to be 
the case in most developed democracies at this time. In decades to come, this may 
change, but currently, there is an unavoidable overlap between age, internet proficiency, 
and ideology in developed democracies. Nevertheless, based on my data and particularly 
on my cross-national comparison, it appears to me that these factors play a relatively 
minor role in organizations’ tendency to adopt DICTs. All of the organizations under 
study and all of the people I engaged with recognized the need to maintain a web 
presence, and strove to do so. The differences I noted in organizations’ tendencies to 
adopt DICTs appeared to be largely unrelated to their ideological orientation or to their 
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particular target audiences, although target audience appeared to play a role in 
organizations’ tendencies to use offline communications tools, as discussed earlier. 
Ideology was, however, a useful way to position organizations in the political landscape 
surrounding the issue of interest. The degree of political competition around an issue is 
one factor that I argue influences organizations’ tendencies to adopt DICTs, and 
understanding where organizations are positioned vis-à-vis the issue through 
understanding their ideology helps one understand how the political environment has 
influenced that organization’s propensity to adopt DICTs. Thus, I would not remove 
ideology from the model, but I would argue that it is important primarily because it gives 
the position of the organization relative to the issue and the political debate around it. 
Given an adequate understanding of the political environment and nature of an issue, 
organizational ideology can serve as a useful proxy for the organization’s relative 
political position, in- or out-party status, and for the group characteristics of its audience. 
Group characteristics, meanwhile, I would consider to be of interest primarily in terms of 
how they relate to the total communications strategy of an organization, beyond its online 
activities. As I noted earlier, conservative organizations appear to do more offline 
communication work than liberal ones, and I argue that this is related to the 
characteristics of the groups that they are targeting. Thus, organizational ideology is not, 
in itself, a useful variable, but it serves as a useful proxy for other important variables, 
and helps locate organizations in the political landscape. 
Second, it appears that the existence of first-mover advantage accruing to one 
ideological party may be enough to stifle innovation in the other, even when the other 
finds itself to be a political out-party with a strong incentive to innovate; this finding was 
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consistent when comparing all of the organizations and when comparing them grouped 
by country. Thus, I would argue that historical processes are important to understanding 
how and why organizations use DICTs. Among the organizations in my study, for 
example, it appears that the liberal organizations were at one time an out-party, and that 
in that period, they moved online aggressively. According to Lisa, a community manager 
at a U.S. organization that manages a forum for LGBTQ people, “We started about 
twelve years ago, I would say. Back then, it was very different for people, if they wanted 
someone to talk to or a place to go, there weren’t that many places. So we went online 
because we had to, it was a place we could go that was safe and we could talk and just 
interact. So the reason we have the great community we do, I think, is because we’ve 
been around for ages, and so people know about us, and they know they can come and be 
welcome. And so even though things are so different now, and the politics have changed 
a lot, we still have this community and this role to play.”  
As this quote illustrates, people with an interest in gay rights were initially drawn 
to the internet and its affordances because they were an out-party, just as Karpf (2012) 
suggested. Their communities were therefore able to grow as outlined in his discussion of 
Wikipedia (Karpf, 2010b); from a small dedicated core, the community expanded slowly, 
attracting supporters while remaining unnoticed by opponents, who as yet had no 
incentive to move online to organize, because their position vis-à-vis gay rights was, at 
the time, the dominant one, particularly related to marriage. Over time, the online gay 
rights community gained scale, and was then able to resist malicious trolling and other 
attacks by opponents, and to stifle the development of oppositional communities by 
intervening in them when they are still small and growing. This pattern was particularly 
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notable in the U.S.; in Ireland and the U.K., organizations did not display any meaningful 
differences in DICT adoption when grouped by ideology, and it appeared that their online 
organizing efforts were less robust than their American peers’. However, I tentatively 
hypothesize that it is possible that the existence of a robust online community in the U.S. 
had a spillover impact on the nascent communities in the U.K. and Ireland. As I 
mentioned earlier, I seldom found hostile comments from conservatives on liberal forums 
or blogs, but did find hostile comments from liberals on conservative forums and blogs, 
and this pattern was relatively consistent across the countries under study. Given the fact 
that there was little difference between conservative and liberal organizations’ adoption 
of DICTs in the U.K. and Ireland, I would tentatively suggest that perhaps the strong 
online community of liberal Americans played some role in this online trolling. It is hard 
to find evidence of this, as people do not typically declare their nationality when 
commenting anonymously (or with a name) on forums or blogs. However, I did notice 
several instances in which U.S. spelling appeared on Irish and British forums (colour vs. 
color, for example), which suggested that at least some Americans were visiting these 
online communities. More research would be needed, but I suggest that, particularly 
when language is not a barrier, there may be some spillover online in communities built 
around issues of cross-national interest, such that a robust community supporting an issue 
in one jurisdiction may spill into the online environment in another jurisdiction, offering 
support to online peers and opposition to online opponents in the new jurisdiction. This 
would further complexify the processes driving DICTs adoption by social movement 
organizations.  
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Taken together, these findings suggest that it is possible that, for latecomers, 
online innovation and expansion will be difficult, even when they are motivated to 
innovate by their position as political outsiders, due to the historical first-mover 
advantage their opponents enjoy. This would explain a contradictory finding of mine. As 
I noted in my discussion of the data I gathered on DICT adoption, overall, conservative 
organizations scored slightly higher than liberal ones on the non-interactive, non-social 
media aspects of their web presence, but slightly lower on the interactive and social 
media fronts. It is possible that conservatives, in response to their position in the political 
landscape, have attempted to strengthen their online presence, but the first-mover 
advantage that liberals enjoy has reduced conservative organizations’ ability to expand 
into interactive options and social media. In other words, DICT adoption may be the 
result of complex processes over time, and certain factors that propel organizations to 
innovate may be countered by other factors that retard their innovative ability. Thus, due 
consideration of the historical evolution of the political landscape is important in 
understanding why organizations do and do not adopt DICTs. 
A third, and crucial revision that I would make to my heuristic model would be to 
include material resources as a key driver of DICT adoption. It is curious, but the 
literature makes no mention of the role that resources might play in the use of DICTs, 
except to note that their lower cost makes them more accessible to people and 
organizations with limited access to resources. To the extent that the relationship between 
material resources and DICTs is considered, the literature typically assumes that the fact 
that these tools are frequently free or low-cost means that they are almost costless to use 
and that they will lower the overall resources required to engage in organization. 
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However, I did not find this to be so. Instead, I found that the more resources an 
organization had access to, the more sophisticated its DICT adoption tended to be. The 
reason for this seems to be that fully utilizing the tools that the web offers requires 
knowledge, skills, and, especially, a significant investment of time. It seems that only 
organizations that can afford to hire staff members who have relevant skills and 
knowledge to work full-time on DICTs can fully utilize these tools. Amanda26 is a 
communications manager at a medium-sized, liberal American organization. “If you want 
to run a tight ship online you have to have the people. I mean, just consider what it takes 
to have a good Twitter feed. You have to have someone whose job it is to run the feed, 
because if you do it right, it’s almost a full-time thing. OK, the same person could also do 
Facebook, but you have to have someone who is responsible for it all the time. On the 
weekend too. Because you have to be writing tweets all the time, because Twitter is so 
ephemeral, you have to be in conversation basically all the time. And you have to 
monitor it, to see what’s trending, look for stuff to tweet about, like things to share, and 
respond to people too, if they tweet you... So it’s quite non-stop. And so we have to have 
someone whose job it is to just deal with Twitter. Or else why bother, if you’re only 
going to use it every now and then, there’s no point. No one will follow you, and then 
there’s no point. OK, you have to have the people to do the work.” 
As this quote illustrates, using DICTs can be a labor-intensive enterprise. While e-
mail costs less to send than postal mail, switching to e-mail can often compound an 
organization’s costs because messages must be compiled more frequently, a-b testing 
must be conducted, vast databases of names and addresses must be managed, and 
                                                           
26 Not her real name, see footnote 2 
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responses must be monitored and managed. Online, blogs must be written and updated, 
content must be discovered and shared, and new tools and technologies have to be 
considered and incorporated all the time. For example, according to Angela, “We send 
people to events all the time, to conferences and such, to keep up-to-date. We have to be 
there to find out what’s happening, just so that we can keep up online, and be part of the 
next big thing. It takes a lot of work.” In order for an organization to incorporate and 
effectively utilize DICTs, it must dedicate staff to the task, which costs money. Thus, 
organizations that have few staff members, and are run by passionate individuals on a 
volunteer basis, tend to be much less consistent users of DICTs. In my sample, for 
example, among the smaller organizations, many had social media pages, but updated 
them infrequently, or would publish a lot of website content one day, and then very little 
for the next two weeks. The lack of resources made it difficult for small organizations to 
use DICTs consistently, which weakened their overall online profile; typically there is a 
correlation between how frequently social media are updated and how many followers 
they attract (Schonfeld, 2009). 
It is, perhaps, surprising that resources play such a key role in DICT adoption 
given the literature’s assumption that they are low-cost communications tools and the 
relative neglect of the role of resources in new social movement theory, but my data 
clearly point to this. Although I did not initially anticipate this finding, I nevertheless 
attempted to test it after noting the pattern. I attempted to gather revenue data for the 
organizations in my sample. Many of them made such data easily available, and public 
records were available for many others, but the data were not available for all of the 
organizations in my sample. By combining these data with the data I was able to gather 
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on staff (assuming that organizations with many staff members had access to more 
resources) and I was able to divide 30 of my organizations into three categories: low 
resources, average resources, and high resources. I found that the average DICT adoption 
score for the low resources category was 2.4, for the average resources category, 4.6, and 
for the high resources category 8.1. Although the sample is small,  this is further evidence 
of a relationship between resources and DICT adoption. In addition, as I mentioned 
earlier in the section of the relationship between diffusion and DICT adoption, I noted 
that there were a handful of very large organizations that were highly networked, had 
access to significant resources, and were very sophisticated adopters of DICTs, such as 
the Human Rights Campaign and Focus on the Family. It seems that these organizations 
have succeeded in attracting and deploying resources in a way that has enabled them to 
take a place at the center of organizing efforts by organizations in the issue space. Many 
smaller organizations partner with these large ones, and rely on their resources to learn 
about DICT best practice and so on. Again, the role of resources is crucial, and is an 
element that is missing from my original model. I would therefore argue that, while the 
insights of new social movement theory have greatly enhanced our understanding of how 
social movements form and act, it is unwise to discard the contribution of the resource 
mobilization paradigm. Resources play a crucial role in how effectively organizations are 
able to undertake the labor of organizing, even in the supposedly costless realm of DICT 
tools. Any consideration of the strategies that organizations use to achieve their goals 
must incorporate a clear sense of the role that resources play therein. As Lisa points out, 
“We definitely spend money and time on our online forum. It’s not free. And I don’t 
mean, like, the cost of hosting or anything. I mean that we have to have people whose job 
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it is to manage the forum. We have to pay these community managers. We have 
volunteers, sure, but you can’t just run on volunteers. Not for long, anyway. I mean, we 
used to just use volunteers but we, to keep it going and to build it, we have to spend 
money, spend time. It’s not free.” 
In addition to including resources in a revised model, I would also like to note that 
there is an interrelationship between an organizations position in the political landscape 
and the resources it is able to attract. Earlier, I pointed out that conservative 
organizations’ relatively weak DICT performance in the U.S. was primarily driven by the 
inclusion of three outlier conservative organizations that had particularly low DICT 
adoption scores. These organizations, Defend the Family, Heterosexuals Organized for a 
Moral Environment, and the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, were all outliers 
both in terms of their DICT adoption scores, their access to resources, and their rhetoric. I 
suggest that one of the reasons why these organizations underperform the way that they 
do is that their extremist rhetoric attracts only marginal support in the U.S. political 
context. “OK, so, yes, there are some crazy folks out there who make these crazy 
arguments about why people should reject marriage equality – I’m talking about the kind 
of folks who say that gays target kids, or have some weird agenda. But those people 
actually aren’t our enemy, OK, because they are so off-the-wall that they just don’t have 
the support. OK, who is going to give money to them? Very few people. Who’s going to 
read their stuff? Very few people. They just aren’t in the real debate. The real debate, the 
real enemies, or, OK, opponents that we have are the people who make the pro-family 
argument, about strong families. They get the supporters, and they are the ones we have 
to talk back to,” explained Dennis, an organizer at a liberal U.S. organization. By arguing 
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for a particularly extreme position, these three organizations have reduced their potential 
support base, and thus struggle to attract resources. This, in turn, limits their ability to be 
effective users of DICTs. This is again in contrast to what one might expect from the 
broader literature, which suggests that DICTs offer particular advantages for those with 
extreme or marginal views. It is, of course, plausible that without their digital platforms, 
these extreme organizations would not be able to attract the news coverage that they have 
attracted. However, they are still limited online because of their scant resources. They 
may have been able to build a bigger community using online tools than they would have 
without access to such tools, but there relative inability to attract resources has meant that 
they have remained relatively unsophisticated users of DICTs compared to other, larger, 
and better-resourced organizations. In other words, I argue that the political environment 
shapes the extent to which organizations are able to secure resources , which in turn 
affects the extent to which they are able to effectively use DICTs. This is, perhaps, why 
organizations that make the most politically palatable arguments are the largest and have 
the most resources. For example, the Human Rights Campaign deploys human rights 
arguments in favor of marriage equality, asserting that the prohibition against gay 
marriage is a form of discrimination, and prevents gay citizens from enjoying full 
equality before the law. Meanwhile, Focus on the Family deploys arguments related to 
the social importance of strong families, and scriptural guidelines for the patterns families 
should follow to advocate against marriage equality. Both of these positions are widely 
palatable to Americans, and these organizations have succeeded in attracting significant 
resources and in achieving high DICT adoption scores. There is, I argue, a crucial 
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interaction between the political environment and the organization that determines how 
effective the organization will be at securing resources and effectively using DICTs.  
Finally, there is another key factor that should be added to any model that seeks to 
understand how and why social movement organizations adopt DICTs. Among the many 
differences that I noticed when speaking to representatives of conservative and liberal 
organizations in the three countries under study, one of the most striking was the 
difference in how they understood their networks. Many of the conservative 
organizations in my sample are very closely linked to religious communities. Indeed, 
given the nature of the selected issue, gay rights, religious groups make up the most 
important group of that oppose their extension. One of the factors most closely associated 
with support for or opposition to marriage equality is religious conviction. In the U.S., for 
example, while 52% of Americans support same-sex marriage overall, only 27% of white 
evangelical Protestants do so ( Public Religion Research Institute, 2014). In the 
U.K., University of Leicester professor Ben Clements reports that while 52% of Britons 
who claim no religious affiliation supported marriage equality in 2007, that number fell 
to 32.3% among Anglicans, 40.9% among Catholics, and 38% among other Christians 
(Clements, 2012). I was unable to find data for Ireland, but as the Catholic Church 
opposes marriage equality, it is likely that devout Irish Catholics are more likely to 
oppose it than their less devout peers. Indeed, it is possible that the relationship between 
age and support for marriage equality is, in large part, a function of the relationship 
between religion and marriage equality, as older people tend to be more devout in all of 
the countries under study. The reason that this is important for the purposes of my study 
is that this close relationship between the issue position (opposing gay marriage) and 
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organized religion means that many of the organizations that oppose same-sex marriage 
have their roots in religious communities. Many of them therefore view their target 
audiences primarily in terms of faith; for example, one Catholic group in Ireland 
responded to survey questions about how they defined their target audiences saying “We 
target all Catholics, of all ages, everywhere!” Clearly, then, these organizations are able 
to tap into the networks that exist within organized religions, including churches, 
devotional groups, action committees and so on. Although many of the organizations 
were independent of formal church control, many were very closely affiliated with 
various churches, and active within formal church networks. In contrast, the liberal 
organizations tended to think of their target audiences in broader terms as people 
interested in equality, for example. There are no pre-existing, formal, institutionalized 
networks of such people, and even the networks of gay advocacy groups and 
communities that do exist today had to be built from almost nothing over the last few 
decades. Therefore, while conservative groups could, to an extent, rely on pre-existing 
networks to structure their organizing attempts, liberal organizations had to build 
networks from scratch. This is, potentially, another reason why liberal organizations 
moved online more aggressively than their conservative counterparts over the years, in 
the U.S. particularly. Just as I noted that political traditions such as a history of strong 
institutions may influence organizations’ tendencies to use DICTs, it is possible that, at 
the mezzo-level, organizations’ ability to tap into institutional structures may play a role 
in their use of online tools. Conservative organizations may, for example, choose not to 
include many online interactive options because they prefer to interact face-to-face at 
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church gatherings; access to formal networks may influence the strategies that 
organizations use to reach their target audiences. 
I therefore propose a number of changes to my heuristic model. I would de-
emphasize the importance of ideology and group characteristics as isolated drivers of 
adoption, instead positioning them as interacting with environmental factors to shape 
organizations’ relative positions in the landscape. I would highlight the importance of the 
historical evolution of the issue, in terms of the history of public opinion thereof, and of 
organizations’ historical activities related thereto. I would place resources as a central 
factor in determining organizations’ ability to mobilize DICTs. Finally, I would 
emphasize that institutional and external networks may play a role in the communication 
strategies organizations choose to pursue, particularly for organizations that are already 
closely embedded in formal institutional networks such as churches. 
A Revised Heuristic Model of DICT Adoption by Social Movement Organizations 
Taking into account the refinements I have outlined above, I propose a revised 
heuristic model that may help researchers understand the processes that influence 
organizations’ tendency to adopt DICTs in developed democracies. Again, the model is 
intended as a contingent device to help guide understanding and analysis, rather than as a 
firm statement of how organizations operate. I hope that, by highlighting the importance 
of context and certain organizational characteristics, this model will enable researchers to 
approach questions related to organizations’ use of DICTs in fresher and more sensitive 
ways.  
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Figure 6.1: Revised model of social movement organizations’ DICT adoption 
As can be seen, the revised model shown in figure 6.1 is more complex and less 
linear than my original heuristic model, and allows for interactions between all of the 
factors. I will now briefly explain the elements of the revised model, and how they work 
together to drive organizations’ communications strategies. At the center of the model, I 
have placed the organization and its environment, by which I mean the context in which 
it finds itself. It is the interaction between environment and organization that influences 
the particular communication strategies that the organization will pursue. Various aspects 
of the organization are crucial in understanding how it will interact with its environment. 
Organization 
Environment 
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issue space 
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Historical 
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First, it is important to understand the organizations’ position in the issue space. For 
example, in the case of my study, I had to understand how each organization was 
positioned relative to public opinion on the issue of gay rights, how its rhetoric compared 
to broader public discourse, and how it was positioned relative to political parties’ 
policies on the issue. Thus, this factor incorporates the ideas I discussed around ideology, 
group characteristics, and out-party innovation. This factor also interacts strongly with 
the second key factor in my model, organizational resources. As I explained, resources 
are a key determinant of how intensively organizations are able to deploy DICTs that was 
omitted from my earlier model. Further, to a large extent, organizations’ ability to 
mobilize resources is linked to their relative position in the issue space, as discussed 
above. Thus, these two factors are closely linked. The third organizational factor in the 
model is the organization’s relationship to preexisting networks. When organizations 
have strong roots in or strong connections to existing networks, particularly formal, 
institutional networks such as churches or labor unions, this connection can influence 
DICT adoption in several ways. First, it can help organizations access resources, both 
financial and in the form of volunteers. Second, it can shape how the organization choses 
to communicate with its target public by, for example, encouraging face-to-face models 
of interactivity rather than online ones. Finally, the organization’s historical activities 
influence its choices with respect to communication strategies. For example, an 
organization that has historically built a strong online presence during a period of relative 
political insignificance may be more likely to pursue sophisticated DICT policies today, 
while an organization that has historically eschewed DICTs may find it challenging to 
move into online spaces, particularly if opponents have already colonized the internet. 
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This factor thus incorporates the idea of first-mover advantage, but emphasizes its 
historical dimensions.  
Turning to the bottom half of the model, there are three important environmental 
factors that must be understood if one hopes to understand why some organizations adopt 
DICTs and others don’t. First, there is the level of competition over the issue. As 
discussed, when there is more intense competition over an issue, it is easier for 
organizations – at least those with relatively broad, mainstream appeal on either side of 
the issue – to mobilize resources and, thus, to engage in complex and sophisticated DICT 
usage. Competitive issues will also tend to lead to more engagement from the public, and 
thus help to drive the spread of online messages. The second key factor is the historical 
evolution of the issue. Understanding how opinions have changed, how organizations 
have influenced the debate, and how the issue has played out online over time will help 
the researcher to position the organizations under study in the issue environment, and to 
understand their historical activities. Once again, the inclusion of this factor underscores 
the importance of understanding the history of the issues and organizations under study, 
and how that history has affected the communication strategies organizations deploy. 
Finally, the last important environmental factor is the political traditions of the nation in 
which organizations are domiciled. As discussed earlier, countries with a strong tradition 
of extra-institutional organization may find that their social movement organizations are 
more aggressive in utilizing new affordances for the furthering of political agendas. 
Furthermore, differences in media systems and legislative norms and structures may also 
influence organizational practices.  
 
 
171
By understanding the environment in which the organization operates, how that 
organization relates to the environment, how it has influenced the environment, and how 
it is internally structured, one can begin to understand why that organization adopts the 
particular communication strategies it does, and especially why the organization does or 
does not move aggressively to use DICTs. This model summarizes my findings on how 
these processes work, how organizations negotiate their positions, resources, strategies, 
connections, and environment in the pursuit of their broader goals, and why organizations 
choose, or choose not, to use DICTs. 
CONCLUSION 
This project is rooted in the study of the ways in which the development of DICTs 
has influenced the practice of politics. At their advent, digital technologies were 
celebrated for their political promise; they offered hopes of empowerment for ordinary 
citizens, the ability to organize without organization, the ability to mobilize people for 
global change, and the potential for the freer and more open flow of information. 
However, as these technologies have matured, much of this early promise has been 
caveated or qualified. As DICTs become a routine part of people’s daily lives, and as a 
small handful of companies and sites capture an ever-larger proportion of web traffic, the 
revolutionary potential of these technologies seems diminished, high hopes for the 
potential of social media notwithstanding.  
In the course of this study, I have learned that, rather than remaking public and 
political life, DICTs have instead been incorporated into extant routines of public protest 
and political movements. While some organizations, like Moveon.org, appear to have 
developed fresh models based exclusively on DICTs, my study of more-traditional 
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advocacy organizations that are not superstars in their fields, but that have been effective 
at mobilizing people around topical issues, underscored how these technologies are, for 
organizers, another set of tools among many, offering advantages and disadvantages, 
requiring resources, and demanding active decisions from organizations. Their use has 
not completely revolutionized the process of social movement organization. Rather, 
organizations use these tools, to a greater or lesser extent, as a result of a host of internal 
and external factors as outlined in my revised model. My model highlights the 
importance of the interaction between organizations and their environments, and of the 
multiple, interdependent factors that influence how organizations integrate these tools 
into their routines.   
Understanding this process is important, both for scholars interested in DICT 
adoption, and for social movement organizers who wish to understand how and why 
organizations lag behind in DICT adoption. As DICTs become ever-more important in 
daily life, it will become ever-more important for organizations to use these tools to 
engage with the public in order to achieve meaningful social change. In cases where 
organizations underperform their peers or opponents in the use of DICTs, understanding 
the roots of this underperformance could suggest strategies for overcoming it. As I 
suggested earlier, understanding that the first-mover advantage accruing to an ideological 
opponent who was online early can inhibit an organization’s ability to adopt DICTs may 
encourage that organization to develop strategies specifically targeted at solving this 
problem. For new entrants, too, understanding the forces driving DICT adoption can help 
them to adapt their own organization to better utilize these tools. 
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Although this paper presents a model for helping researchers and activists 
understand the process of DICT adoption, it is by no means the final word on the topic. 
Instead, this project represents an important first step in building scholarly understanding 
of how average, contemporary advocacy organizations adopt and deploy DICTs, and how 
this process is influenced by contextual factors. Possible avenues for future research 
would include extending this model to a fresh set of organizations to explore its 
usefulness, as well as consideration of the potential effect that cross-national spillover has 
on DICT adoption, as discussed earlier. Future researchers should consider the ways in 
which the structure of the media system may influence organizations’ adoption of DICTs, 
and how the particular legislative arrangements that obtain in different national contexts 
influence the decisions advocacy organizations make with respect to DICTs. Further, a 
study that includes organizations that do not engage in online activities would deepen and 
enrich our understanding of what drives organizations to use, or not to use, such tools.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
Below is a tabular copy of the codebook used in the web analysis. 
 
Variable name Description Values 
Organization Name of the organization Text 
ID Number Assigned id number  Number 
Nationality Which nation the organization is primarily 
active in 
1 = United States 
   2 = United Kingdom 
   3 = Ireland 
Conservative  Measure of ideological orientation based on 
analysis of the website and associated 
materials 
0 = not conservative 
   1 = conservative 
Website URL of the relevant website Text 
Facebook Measure of whether or not the organization 
has a Facebook page 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Fb page URL of the organization's Facebook page Text 
Likes Number of likes the organization's 
Facebook page had garnered as of March 
31, 2014 
Number 
Post in last week Measure of whether or not the organization 
had posted within a week of January 31, 
2013, February 28, 2014 and March 31, 
2014 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
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Post today Measure of whether or not the organization 
had posted on the day immediately before 
or of January 31, 2013, February 28, 2014 
and March 31, 2014 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Twitter Measure of whether or not the organization 
has a Twitter feed 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Twitter feed URL of the organization's Twitter feed Text 
Followers Number of followers the organization's 
Twitter feed had garnered as of March 31, 
2014 
Number 
Tweets Number of tweets the organization had 
tweeted as of March 31, 2014 
  
Tweet in last week Measure of whether or not the organization 
had tweeted within a week of January 31, 
2013, February 28, 2014 and March 31, 
2014 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Tweet today Measure of whether or not the organization 
had tweeted on the day immediately before 
or of January 31, 2013, February 28, 2014 
and March 31, 2014 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
YouTube Measure of whether or not the organization 
has a YouTube channel 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
YouTube channel URL of the organization's YouTube 
channel 
Text 
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Subscribers Number of subscribers the organization's 
YouTube channel had garnered as of 
March 31, 2014 
Number 
Views Total number of views the organizations 
YouTube videos had garnered as of March 
31, 2014 
Number 
Video in last two weeks Measure of whether or not the organization 
had posted a video within two weeks week 
of January 31, 2013, February 28, 2014 and 
March 31, 2014 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
E-mail newsletter Measure of whether or not the organization 
publishes a regular e-mail newsletter to 
which a site visitor can subscribe 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Take action Measure of whether or not the 
organization's site includes a section or 
button to help site visitors identify relevant 
actions that they can take, such as e-mail 
campaigns to participate in 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Contact details Measure of whether or not the site provides 
visitors with a way to contact the 
organization, either through e-mail or via 
the mail or a phone number 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Blogs Measure of whether or not the 
organization's website includes blogs 
produced by organization staff offering 
news or opinion 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
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Comments Measure of whether or not the site offers 
any comment facilities, either on 
organizational or user-generated blogs 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
UGC Measure of whether or not the organization 
publishes user-generated content on its site, 
in the form of blogs, vidoes, or petitions, 
and excluding comment facilities 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Forum Measure of whether or not the site offers a 
forum in which users can engage directly 
with one another and share any content or 
comments of interest 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Video Measure of whether or not the site includes 
embedded video content, whether original 
or produced by other organizations 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Donate Measure of whether or not the site offers a 
way for site visitors to donate money 
online 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Media section Measure of whether or not the site includes 
a dedicated section for the press, with press 
releases or other relevant content 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Media contacts Measure of whether or not the site includes 
contact details for a media liaison or 
communications department 
0 = no 
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   1 = yes 
Website sophistication A subjective measure of the website's 
relative sophistication (compared to the 
sites of the other organizations under study) 
1 -10 scale, with a higher 
number indicating greater 
sophistication 
Website interactivity A subjective measure of the website's 
relative interactivity  (compared to the sites 
of the other organizations under study) 
1 -10 scale, with a higher 
number indicating greater 
sophistication 
Cookies Number of cookies inserted into my 
browser by the site homepage 
Number 
Third-party cookies Measure of whether or not the site uses 
third-party cookies 
0 = no 
   1 = yes 
Notes Personal notes on the website Text 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Below is a copy of the organizational survey I fielded between January 2014 and March 
2014. It included a consent form, as shown.  
 
Consent Form 
 
University of Pennsylvania 
Informed Consent Form 
Project: Collective action and digital information communication technologies: The 
search for explanatory models of social movements’ use of DICTs to mobilize, 
organize, and achieve political goals through collective action 
  
Principal Investigator:               
Michael X. Delli Carpini, Dean 
Annenberg School for Communication 
3620 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA, 19104 
mxd@asc.upenn.edu 
  
Investigator:                           
Felicity Duncan, PhD Candidate 
Annenberg School for Communication 
3620 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA, 19104 
fduncan@asc.upenn.edu 
  
You are being asked to take part in a study about the role that digital information 
communication technologies play in your organization. We are interested in learning how 
you use such tools, and what factors lead you to use certain tools and not others. 
  
Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any 
question and to stop the survey at any time or for any reason. No personal information 
will be collected, and every effort will be made to keep your responses anonymous. All 
the data collected will be stored in a secure workspace until this project is completed in 
August 2014. All data will then be deleted. 
  
The risks of participating in this study are minimal. You will not be asked for any 
confidential or sensitive information. You may contact the Office of Regulatory Affairs 
with any question, concerns or complaints at the University of Pennsylvania by calling 
+1 215 898 2614. You can also contact the principal investigator with any questions.  
 
I hereby acknowledge that I have read the above consent form. 
 
Organizational Data 
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What is the name of your organization? 
 
Do have permanent offices? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 We did previously, but do not any longer 
 
Do you employ any full-time staff members? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 Sometimes, but not currently 
 
We'd like to ask you some questions about your staff. You may not be certain about the 
answers to some of these questions. However, the intention of these questions is simply 
to get a general sense of the kinds of people your organization employs. If you do not the 
exact answer, simply offer your best estimate. 
 
How many full-time staff members do you typically employ? 
 
 1-5  
 
 6-10 
 
 11-20 
 
 More than 21 
 
What age category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's typical 
staff member? (Maximum 3) 
 
 18-24 
 
 25-34 
 
 35-44 
 
 45-54 
 
 55-64 
 
 Over 65 
 
What education category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's 
typical staff member? (Maximum 3) 
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 Less than High School 
 
 High School / GED 
 
 Some College 
 
 2-year College Degree 
 
 4-year College Degree 
 
 Masters Degree 
 
 Doctoral Degree 
 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
 
In your estimation, what is the typical salary paid to your organization's typical staff 
member? (Maximum 3) 
 
 Less than $30,000 
 
 $30,000 – $39,999 
 
 $40,000 – $49,999 
 
 $50,000 – $59,999 
 
 $60,000 – $69,999 
 
 $70,000 – $79,999 
 
 $80,000 – $89,999 
 
 $90,000 – $99,999 
 
 $100,000 or more 
 
What are some words you would use to describe your organization's typical staff 
member? For example, you might describe them as traditional, or innovative, or 
cosmopolitan, or hard-working. 
 
Membership data 
 
You will now be asked some questions about your typical members. Again, it is not 
necessary to be certain that your answer is correct. Instead, the goal of these questions is 
to get a sense of how your organization visualizes its members. 
 
Some organizations consider individuals to be members if they pay dues, and some 
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organizations consider individuals to be members if they subscribe to organizational 
communications, while others have yet another definition of membership. Does your 
organization have members, however you define them? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I'm not certain 
 
How do you define "members" in your organization? 
 
How many members do you estimate you have? 
 
What age category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's typical 
member? (Maximum 3) 
 
 18-24 
 
 25-34 
 
 35-44 
 
 45-54 
 
 55-64 
 
 Over 65 
 
What education category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's 
typical member? (Maximum 3) 
 
 Less than High School 
 
 High School / GED 
 
 Some College 
 
 2-year College Degree 
 
 4-year College Degree 
 
 Masters Degree 
 
 Doctoral Degree 
 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
 
What household income categories/categories do you think best describe/s your 
organization's typical member? (Maximum 3) 
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 Less than $30,000 
 
 $30,000 – $39,999 
 
 $40,000 – $49,999 
 
 $50,000 – $59,999 
 
 $60,000 – $69,999 
 
 $70,000 – $79,999 
 
 $80,000 – $89,999 
 
 $90,000 – $99,999 
 
 $100,000 or more 
 
Which of the following communication methods do you use to stay in touch with your 
members? 
 
 Use frequently Use infrequently Never use 
E-mail/E-newsletter    
Organizational 
website 
   
YouTube    
Twitter    
Facebook    
Other social media    
Automated phone 
calls 
   
Postal mail    
Other    
 
What are some words you would use to describe your typical member? For example, you 
might describe them as urban, or suburban, or traditional, or modern. 
 
Many organizations collect some basic information about their members, such as their e-
mail addresses, age, and other information. Do you gather any data on your members? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I'm not sure 
 
 
184
 
What types of data do you typically gather? 
 
Target public 
 
In addition to members, many advocacy organizations have a target public, a broader 
group of people that they seek to influence or inspire. The next few questions are about 
your organization's target public. Once again, you should answer to the best of your 
knowledge, even if you are not entirely certain that your answer is correct. 
 
What age category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's target 
public? (Maximum 3) 
 
 18-24 
 
 25-34 
 
 35-44 
 
 45-54 
 
 55-64 
 
 Over 65 
 
What education category/categories do you think best describe/s your organization's 
target public? (Maximum 3) 
 
 Less than High School 
 
 High School / GED 
 
 Some College 
 
 2-year College Degree 
 
 4-year College Degree 
 
 Masters Degree 
 
 Doctoral Degree 
 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
 
In your estimation, what is the average household income/s of your organization's target 
public? (Maximum 3) 
 
 Less than $30,000 
 
 $30,000 – $39,999 
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 $40,000 – $49,999 
 
 $50,000 – $59,999 
 
 $60,000 – $69,999 
 
 $70,000 – $79,999 
 
 $80,000 – $89,999 
 
 $90,000 – $99,999 
 
 $100,000 or more 
 
Which of the following communication methods do you use to communicate with your 
target public? 
 
 
 Use frequently Use infrequently Never use 
E-mail/E-newsletter    
Organizational 
website 
   
YouTube    
Twitter    
Facebook    
Other social media    
Automated phone 
calls 
   
Postal mail    
Other    
 
What are some words you would use to describe your organization's target public? For 
example, you might describe them as traditional, or innovative, or cosmopolitan, or hard-
working. 
 
Many organizations use technological means to help them understand their target public 
better. For example, many organizations use cookies or other browser-based technologies 
to collect information about visitors to their sites. Does your organization use 
technologies like cookies to collect information about visitors to your site? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I'm not certain 
 
What technologies does your organization use to collect information about visitors to its 
site? 
 
Some organizations have started to use information that they (or another company) have 
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gathered from people's online activities to try and reach people with relevant messages 
about their goals. To your knowledge, does your organization do this? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I'm not certain 
 
To the best of your knowledge, how does your organization use information about 
people's online activities to reach those people? 
 
External relations 
 
The next set of questions deals with your organization's relations with other organizations 
and institutions that can help them achieve their goals. 
 
Do you frequently interact with other organizations that are also active on issues related 
to LGBTQ issues? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I'm not certain 
 
Please list some of the other organizations you interact with. 
 
Does your organization send representatives to any networking conferences or events that 
help to foster and develop relations with other organizations? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
Which of the following communication methods do you use to communicate with other 
organizations? 
 
 Use frequently Use infrequently Never use 
E-mail/E-newsletter    
Organizational 
website 
   
YouTube    
Twitter    
Facebook    
Other social media    
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Automated phone 
calls 
   
Postal mail    
Other    
 
Do you ever communicate with journalists? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I'm not certain 
 
Which of the following communication methods do you use to communicate with 
journalists? 
 
 Use frequently Use infrequently Never use 
E-mail/E-newsletter    
Organizational 
website 
   
YouTube    
Twitter    
Facebook    
Other social media    
Postal mail    
Phone calls    
Face-to-face 
meetings 
   
Other    
 
Online communities 
 
These final questions address the issue of online communities. Many organizations 
engaged in advocacy have online supporters who use the Internet to share information, 
discuss important issues, and build relationships. The following questions will ask about 
your organization's online presence and the online activities of people who support you. 
They will also ask you about organizations that oppose your goals and the people that 
support them, and their online activities. 
 
How strong do you think your organization's online presence is? 
 
 Very strong 
 
 Somewhat strong 
 
 About average 
 
 Somewhat weak 
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 Very weak 
 
How would you say that your organization's web presence has changed in the last two 
years? 
 
 Improved a lot 
 
 Improved a little 
 
 Stayed about the same 
 
 Become a little worse 
 
 Become a lot worse 
 
How strong do you think the online community of people who support you is? A strong 
community might, for example, have an active online presence, perhaps in the form of 
active forum discussion groups, or popular Facebook pages that are used for discussion 
and networking. 
 
 Very strong 
 
 Somewhat strong 
 
 About average 
 
 Somewhat weak 
 
 Very weak 
 
How would you say that your organization's supporters' online community has changed 
in the last two years? 
 
 Grown a lot 
 
 Grown a little 
 
 Stayed about the same 
 
 Shrunk a little 
 
 Shrunk a lot 
 
How strong do you think the online presence of organizations that oppose you and 
advocate against your goals, is? 
 
 Very strong 
 
 Somewhat strong 
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 About average 
 
 Somewhat weak 
 
 Very weak 
 
How would you say that web presence of organizations that oppose you has changed in 
the last two years? 
 
 Improved a lot 
 
 Improved a little 
 
 Stayed about the same 
 
 Become a little worse 
 
 Become a lot worse 
 
 
How strong do you think the online community of people who oppose you is? A strong 
online community might, for example, have an active online presence, perhaps in the 
form of active forum discussion groups, or popular Facebook pages that are used for 
discussion and networking. 
 
 Very strong 
 
 Somewhat strong 
 
 About average 
 
 Somewhat weak 
 
 Very weak 
 
How would you say that the online community of people who oppose has changed in the 
last two years? 
 
 Grown a lot 
 
 Grown a little 
 
 Stayed about the same 
 
 Shrunk a little worse 
 
 Shrunk a lot worse 
 
Have you or your supporters ever faced online harassment or trolling from people who 
disagree with your positions? 
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 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 I'm not certain 
 
This concludes the survey. Thank you very much for your participation. If there are any 
additional points you would like to make, or any other information you would like to 
share, please do so in the space below.  
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APPENDIX THREE 
 
University of Pennsylvania 
Informed Consent Form 
 
Project: Collective action and digital information communication technologies: The 
search for explanatory models of social movements’ use of DICTs to mobilize, 
organize, and achieve political goals through collective action 
 
Principal Investigator:               
Michael X. Delli Carpini, Dean 
Annenberg School for Communication 
3620 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA, 19104 
mxd@asc.upenn.edu 
  
Investigator:                           
Felicity Duncan, PhD Candidate 
Annenberg School for Communication 
3620 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA, 19104 
fduncan@asc.upenn.edu 
  
You are being asked to take part in a study about the role that digital information 
communication technologies play in your organization. I am interested in learning how 
you use such tools, and what factors lead you to use certain tools and not others.  
 
This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question and to stop the 
interview at any time or for any reason. Unless you grant me permission to use your 
name or title in any publications that may result from this research, the information you 
tell me will remain anonymous.  
 
I would like to record this interview on a digital voice recorder for my personal reference. 
I will not record the interview without your permission. If you do grant permission for 
this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to revoke recording permission 
and/or end the interview at any time. This project will be completed by October 2014. All 
interview recordings and transcriptions of those recordings will be stored in a secure 
workspace until October 2014. The recordings and transcripts will then be deleted. 
 
The risks of participating in this study are minimal. You will not be asked for any 
confidential or sensitive information. You may contact the Office of Regulatory Affairs 
with any question, concerns or complaints at the University of Pennsylvania by calling 
+1 215 898 2614. 
 
You can also contact the principal investigator with any questions. 
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Participant 
Name:___________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant 
Signature_________________________________________________________  
 
Date:___________________________________________________________________
___  
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